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GLOSSARY 
 
Economic Sanctions Are coercive economic measures taken against one or more 
States to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a 
State’s opinion about the other's policies. It is the restriction or 
stopping of international trade or economic activities taken by one 
Party (the “sender”) in order to influence the behaviour of another 
Party (the “target”). 
 
Target State   State or government against which sanctions are imposed. 
 
Sanctions  An economic limitation or restriction by means of policy or 
legislation. 
 
Embargoes   Where States refuse to sell goods and to a target State. 
 
Boycotts    Where States refuse to buy goods from the target State. 
 
Apartheid Government Refers to the government in power in South Africa before the 
democratic election of 1994 
 
Maternal Mortality Rate The number of maternal deaths related to childbearing divided by 
the number of live births (or by the number of live births plus fetal 
deaths) in that year.  
 
Infant Mortality Rate  The number of children dying under a year of age divided by the 
number of live births that year. The infant mortality rate is also 
called the infant death rate. 
 
Child Mortality Rate The under-five mortality rate or child mortality rate is the number of 
children who die by the age of five, per thousand live births. 
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MAIN ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS  
 
African Charter  African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights  
African Commission African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
American Protocol/ 
The Protocol of San 
Salvador  
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ANC African National Congress 
Anti-Apartheid 
Convention 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of 
the Crime of Apartheid  
CERD International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination  
CESCR UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
Committee on CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
CRC UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
ECHR, European Court on Human Rights 
ECOSOC  Economic and Social Council 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
HRC  Human Right Committee 
IAC  Inter-American Commission of Human Rights  
IACHR  Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
ICCPR  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICESCR  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
ICJ  International Court of Justice  
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross   
IHL International Humanitarian Law  
IHRL International Human Rights Law  
ILO International Labour Organisation 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
Iraq Republic of Iraq  
ITL International Trade Law 
OAS Organisation of American States 
OFAC US Office of Foreign Assets Control 
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OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
PAC Pan Africanist Congress 
SC  Security Council  
UN  United Nations 
UNDHR  United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNITA National Union for the Total Independence of Angola 
WHO  World Health Organization  
WW1 World War One 
WW2 World War Two 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Let me conclude by saying that the humanitarian situation in Iraq poses a 
serious moral dilemma for this Organization. The United Nations has 
always been on the side of the vulnerable and the weak, and has always 
sought to relieve suffering, yet here we are accused of causing suffering to 
an entire population. We are in danger of losing the argument, or the 
propaganda war - if we haven’t already lost it - about who is responsible 
for this situation in Iraq – President Saddam Hussein or the United 
Nations.”1 
Kofi Annan 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council may decide what measures, not 
involving the use of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and 
may call upon member States to apply such measures in order to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.2  One of the measures that can be decided on is 
sanctions.  Sanctions have, to a large extent, been imposed to defend human rights.  
Economic sanctions were commonly believed to be a mechanism that was a humane 
alternative to war.  During the last decade, the Security Council has applied economic 
sanctions in several cases that, in turn, have drawn the attention of different United 
Nations human rights bodies and mechanisms to their possible impact on the enjoyment 
of human rights.3  Fundamentally, any economic sanctions programme’s main objective 
is to induce dysfunction in the trade and financial systems of the target State.4  By doing 
                                                 
1 Kofi Annan, Press Release SG/SM/7338 IK/292 SC/6834 24 March 2000, available here,  
< http://www.fas.org/news/iraq/2000/03/20000324-sgsm7338.htm > (Accessed 19/10/2007). 
2 Charter of the United Nations June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S.NO. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, entered into force 
October 24, 1945. See articles 24, 39 and 41. 
3 See Annexure A attached at the end of this thesis, 19 cases of UN economic sanctions programmes have been 
imposed on different States. 
4 Garfield R (1999) 3. 
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this, it is believed, that the specific goal (if there is one) of furthering the specific human 
rights objective within that State should be achieved.   
 
Recent studies have indicated that the impact of these economic sanctions is not only 
undesirable and ineffective but also that the imposition thereof inevitably involves a 
long-term human cost within the target State.5  The human cost of economic sanctions, 
even if legitimate, is therefore a cause for genuine concern.   
 
The Charter of the United Nations embraces the legal aspects of economic sanctions, 
however, economic sanctions is to a large extent influenced by the political climate of 
the sender.  In many instances the political will play an important role in terms of the 
ferocity of economic sanctions.  This will be illustrated by the lethargic approach to 
application of economic sanctions in the case of Apartheid South Africa compared to 
strict and decisive approach to economic sanctions against Iraq.  Broad–based 
economic sanctions indiscriminately and disproportionately applied negate the legal 
protection in place to protect human beings more so in terms of the right to health 
because it is highly conducive to economic challenges.   
 
On the one hand, the broad-based economic sanctions implemented against the State 
of Iraq have clearly been the most devastating assault by the international community 
on a State for human rights abuses ever.  On the other hand, sanctions implemented 
against the Apartheid State of South Africa are constantly referred as an example of a 
successful economic sanctions programme achieving its goal of a new democratic 
South Africa.   
 
The purported success of economic sanctions as imposed on South Africa had never 
been placed in context.  Limited analysis was done to establish the impact of economic 
sanctions on the rights of South African citizens.  A comparison of data from Iraq and 
limited data from South Africa is meant to achieve such a context.  However to limit the 
                                                 
5 See Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys, UNICEF 1999, available at  
< http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm > and < http:// www.unicef.org/reseval/iraq.htm > released August 12, 
1999. 
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scope of such a contextual analysis, the focus is placed on an analysis of the impact of 
economic sanctions on the right to health of the population of the target State.  The 
lessons learned from the impact on the right to health and recommendations to reduce 
the impact could be helpful for similar economic sanctions programmes.  The hope is 
that unnecessary human cost of economic sanctions will be minimal to none. 
 
2. NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
In normal circumstances a State cannot be expected to provide people with protection 
against every possible cause of ill health and an unlimited right to receive medical care 
for any and every illness that may be contracted.  The right to health takes account of a 
holistic approach to health that regards both healthcare and social conditions as being 
important determinants of health status.  These include the provision of safe drinking 
water, adequate sanitation, and health-related education and information, as well as 
others such as equitable health-related resource distribution, gender differences, and 
social well-being.  The right to health is highly dependent on available resources and 
resources are highly problematic in developing States.  Economic sanctions pierce at 
the heart of that problem in that it restricts those resources even further. 
 
As a consequence of the devastating impact of economic sanctions there is a need to 
re-think the imposition of economic sanctions as a mechanism to combat gross human 
rights violations committed by renegade government leaders. The result of this renewed 
thinking should reduce the devastating humanitarian impact as a result of the institution 
of economic sanctions.   
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
The method employed to undertake this research is by way of literature review of the 
relevant literature.  Reliance will therefore be placed on relevant primary and secondary 
sources, internationally and domestically, that apply to the States concerned.  This will 
include statutes, case law, international rules and principles, books, articles, legal and 
non-legal and Internet based sources. 
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4. DELIMITATION OF STUDY AREA 
 
The study will only focus on economic sanctions from a legal perspective and not that of 
any other profession, for example economics.  An in-depth discussion on the 
complexities of economic sanctions and the different variables that affect the economics 
of a state will therefore be limited.  
 
The United States of America (US) and the United Nations (UN) are two of the main 
subscribers to the institution of economic sanctions.  The legislation and policies relating 
to economic sanctions that originate from these two bodies is of added importance to 
understand the economic sanctions policies that were applied to South Africa and Iraq.  
Although other unilateral economic sanctions were applied in both cases the scope of 
this thesis is limited to the US and UN. 
 
5. RESEARCH PROBLEM 
 
Why are economic sanctions imposed against South Africa referred to as a successful 
programme and the economic sanctions programme imposed against Iraq as 
unsuccessful?  Is the long term impact on human rights taken into account?   
 
6. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
 
This Chapter attempts to place the research in context and lays the background for the 
research.  Chapter Two is to ascertain the justiciability of international economic, social 
and cultural rights in general and specifically the scope and content of the right health.  
Chapter Two is followed by a discussion of sanctions in Chapter Three.  In addition to 
the discussion of sanctions, and specifically economic sanctions, certain possible 
improvements of economic sanctions and the monitoring thereof are recommended 
suggested.  Chapter Four is an analysis of the economic sanctions programmes in 
South Africa and Iraq with specific focus on the impact of economic sanctions on the 
right to health.  In addition, Chapter Four gives an indication whether the impact of 
economic sanctions is taken into account when establishing the successfulness of an 
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economic sanctions programme.  Chapter Five contains conclusions and 
recommendations regarding the impact of economic sanctions on the right to health and 
possible improvements to its implementation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The focus of this thesis is on International Human Rights Law (IHRL), in particular 
the right to health. International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Trade Law 
(ITL) form an indivisible and interrelated part of the analysis of the impact of 
economic sanctions on States in relation to the international rights of the civilian 
populations.   
 
The first part of the chapter entails a general analysis of the scope and content of 
IHRL and the developments in the sphere of economic, social and cultural rights. 
This analysis will be done in the context of the historical developments and 
challenges in the enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights.  The second 
part of the analysis regarding the enforceability of these rights relates to the right to 
health as an economic, social and cultural right and specific focus will be placed on 
the scope, content and progressive realisation of the right to health. 
 
The protection of the right to health of people does not stop in peace time: IHL also 
provides for protection of civilians in times of conflict. The most prominent of 
instruments regulating international and domestic conflict, the four Geneva 
Conventions as well as its two Protocols, also makes provision for the protection of 
the right to health in times of war.  The justifiability of the right to health in times of 
conflict is also relevant to this analysis as economic sanctions are a mechanism 
employed in times of peace and in times of war. 
 
2. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS IN BRIEF 
 
The origin of economic and social rights is unclear but apparently these rights drew 
strength from the injunctions expressed in different religious traditions to care for 
those in need and those who cannot care for themselves.6  After the Second World 
                                                 
6 Steiner, H.J. and Alston, P.(2000) 242. 
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War (WW2) and as a reaction to events prior and during the war, the allies7, and later 
the international community8, came to believe that the establishment of a new world 
order should be based upon the commitment to the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.9  Thereafter the United Nations (UN) adopted important 
international bills of rights consisting of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UNDHR),10 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR),11 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).12 
 
The UNDHR is not a binding treaty and was adopted by the UN General Assembly 
without legal force.  Its purpose, according to its Preamble, is to provide “…a 
common understanding of human rights and serve as a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and nations….”13  In context and by implication these 
standards did not exist at the time but must be achieved to avoid the atrocities of 
WW2 from repeating themselves.  The persuasive nature of this document, at the 
very least, as Buergenthal et al puts it, “is that the international community attributes 
a very special moral and normative status to the Universal Declaration that no other 
instrument of its kind has acquired.”14   
 
One of the first debates in the development of international human rights law was 
whether there should be a single covenant dealing with civil and political rights as 
well as social, economic and cultural rights.  This debate is illustrative of the first 
political power struggle within the international human rights community between the 
Soviet Union (former USSR now Federation of Russia) led East and the United 
                                                 
7 Major Allies (later: permanent members of the UN Security Council) included: - China; France (03 September 
1939) - then (after 1940) Free France; United Kingdom (03 September 1939); Soviet Union from 22 June 1941); 
United States (from 07 December 1941). Minor Allies included:- Australia; Belgium (invaded May 10, 1940); 
Brazil; Canada (10 September 1939) Greece (invaded October 28, 1940); Holland (invaded May 10, 1940); 
Luxembourg; New Zealand; Norway (invaded April 9, 1940); Poland (invaded 1 September 1939); South 
Africa; Yugoslavia. (Dates added is the date the particular States where deemed to have become part of the 
WWII) <http://www.battle-leet.com/pw/his/Allies%20WW1%20WW2.htm> (Accessed on 29/02/07). 
8 The international community includes the United Nations and Regional bodies like, the European Union and 
the African Union and, the States who impose sanctions like the USA and the rest of the developed world. 
9 Craven, M. (1995) 7. 
10 Adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
11 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 23 March 1976. The origins of economic and social rights are diffuse but apparently the rights drew 
strength from the injunctions expressed in different religious traditions to care for those in need and those who 
cannot care for themselves.  
12 Adopted by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 2200 A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 and entered into 
force on 03 January 1976. 
13 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble, at paras 7 and 8. 
14 Buergenthal T. et al (2002) 40. 
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States of America (US) led West.15  Although the US objected to the adoption of one, 
all inclusive, covenant they did not per se object to social and economic rights.16 
 
This was illustrated in 1941 when President Roosevelt had nominated “freedom from 
want” as one of the four freedoms that should characterise the future world order. He 
spelled out this vision in his 1944 State of the Union address as follows:17 
“We have come to a realization of the fact that individual freedoms cannot 
exist without economic security and independence.  ‘Necessitous men are not 
free men’.  People who are out of a job are the stuff of which dictatorships are 
made. In our day these economic truths have become accepted as self-
evident.  We have accepted, so to speak, a second bill of rights, under which 
a new basis of security and prosperity can be established for all, regardless of 
station, race or creed.” 
Among these rights are: 
“...The right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to achieve and 
enjoy good health....”18 
 
Although the Union address was an indication that the US supported the existence of 
economic based rights order it did not mean that these purported economic rights 
must have the same status as civil and political rights.  The States that were in 
favour of two separate covenants, in particular the US and other western States such 
as the United Kingdom (UK) opined that traditional principles derived from liberal 
theories, such as the primacy of the individual, would be infringed by placing 
economic and social rights on an equal footing with civil and political rights.19   
 
The debate culminated in the adoption of two separate covenants.  The assumption 
was that civil and political rights were legally enforceable and justiciable, in other 
words, they could be invoked before and applied by a court of law or a similar (quasi) 
judicial entity.20  In contrast, it was assumed that economic, social and cultural rights 
were not immediately enforceable and therefore required State intervention for their 
                                                 
15 Craven M (1995) 9. 
16 Steiner, H.J. and Alston, P. (2000) 243. 
17 President Roosevelt State of the Union Address (11 January 1944), available at, 
<http://www.infoplease.com/t/hist/state-of-the-union/155.html> (Accessed on 27/02/07). 
18 Italics my own. 
19 Arambulo K. (1999) 17. 
20 Arambulo K..(1999) 17. 
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realisation and ultimately would have to be achieved progressively.21 This 
interpretation had been the forefront of the lack of enforceability, also known as 
justiciability, of economic, social and cultural rights.  Human rights, according to 
Leary, are defined as justified claims to freedoms, immunities and benefits that the 
individual has upon his or her society and which society must respect and ensure.22   
 
According to Beetham, to qualify as a human right, the aspiration must satisfy a 
number of criteria.  These criteria include: that the right must be universal and 
fundamental; that the right must be justiciable; that it should be clear who holds the 
duty to uphold or implement the right, and the agency should possess the capability 
to fulfil its obligations in terms of the right.23  The argument is that the rights 
contained in the ICESCR do not satisfy all these requirements and thus, the rights in 
the ICESCR can, at most, be a statement of aspirations or goals rather than being 
enforceable rights.  
 
The criteria as set out by Beetham, forms the basis of this chapter’s analysis of the 
scope, content and implementation of economic, social and cultural rights.  The 
analysis will entail, firstly, a general discussion of the universality and fundamentality 
of economic, social and cultural rights.  Secondly, through an analysis of 
jurisprudence of international qausi-judicial and judicial bodies this part of the 
Chapter will illustrate that economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable or 
enforceable. Lastly, my findings will demonstrate that States Parties to the ICESCR 
hold the obligation to fulfil the rights therein and if a State Party is incapable the 
international community must take on this responsibility. 
 
3. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AS HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
 
3.1 The Right must be Fundamental and Universal  
 
Concepts such as the fundamentalism and universalism of human rights are not 
synonymous with economic, social and cultural uniformity.  The concept of 
universality entails the argument that human rights belong to all human beings and 
                                                 
21 Arambulo K. Ibid. 
22 Leary A. (1993) 482-483. 
23 Beetham D. (1995) 41. 
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are fundamental to every type of society.  In this way, everyone has the same basic 
human rights.   
 
The concept of universalism, on the other hand, advocates a pattern of application to 
all worldwide.  Some argue that the concept of universality is culturally constructed.  
This is the so-called “cultural relativist argument,”’24 the very rationale of which is to 
deny claims of universality.  Human rights are viewed as representing the particular 
belief systems of some cultures and societies rather than those of all cultures and 
societies.  Accordingly, human rights are considered a western construct of limited 
application to non-Western nations.   
 
Fall, the Secretary-General of the World Conference on Human Rights, indicated that 
he and others had to grapple with the question of universality of human rights and 
came up, after considerable negotiation, with this definition that was adopted in the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action paragraph 5:  
“All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and 
interrelated. The international community must treat human rights globally in a 
fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.  
While the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the 
duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to 
promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”25 
 
International human rights instruments and bills of rights of nations speak of the “all 
human beings” and “everyone” before they spell out the particular rights in those 
documents.  The most important comprehensive human rights instrument to be 
proclaimed by a global international organisation at the time, the UNDHR, declares 
that: “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” and “everyone 
is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration can be fully realised.”26   
 
                                                 
24 Cultural relativism is the principle that an individual human's beliefs and activities should be understood in 
terms of his or her own culture. 
25 Fall I. (1997) 79. 
26 Article 1 and article 28 respectively. 
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Thus, it can be argued that equal treatment of every human being is the most basic 
principle of the concept of human rights.27  If the right to health, for example, is 
considered a fundamental human right, significant difference in access to healthcare, 
or the health status of individuals must therefore be seen as violations of the 
principle of equality.28  Arguments such as the lack of resources as used by a State, 
do not justify human rights abuses in the form of discriminatory treatment because 
equal treatment is fundamental and universal.29   
 
International human rights experts had discussed the issue of universality and 
fundamentality, and confirmed that: 
 
“…human rights and fundamental freedoms are indivisible and 
interdependent, equal attention and urgent consideration should be given to 
the implementation, promotion and protection of civil and political and 
economic, social and cultural rights.”30 
 
“… all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, interrelated and of equal 
importance for human dignity.  Therefore, states are as responsible for 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights as they are for violations of 
civil and political rights.”31 
 
Universality of human rights is questioned because of the differences in economic 
conditions in each State.  Ayala-Lasso writes that the notion of universality is not 
static in fact it is a “dynamic process.”32  Full realisation of human rights may never 
be achieved if one takes into consideration factors of political, economic, social and 
cultural differences.  However, through the dynamic process of universally accepted 
goals the full protection of human rights is approachable.33   
 
                                                 
27 Mahoney K. and Mahoney P. (1993) 483. 
28 Mahoney K and Mahoney P. Ibid 483. 
29 Warren D. (1997) 90. 
30 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Jan. 8, 1987, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 43d Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17/Annex (1987),re-published in the Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987), pp. 122–135, 
para 3. 
31 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, reprinted in (1998) vol. 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 691, see also <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> 
(Accessed  21/03/08), para 4. 
32 Warren D. (1997) 92. Italics my own. 
33 Warren D. (1997) 91.  
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Human rights are inextricably linked to the preservation of human dignity.  This 
means that respect for individual dignity is due equally to one and all, regardless of 
circumstance.  In this way, human rights must apply universally.  Individuals may 
exercise different rights, or exercise the same rights differently, depending on which 
group they belong to within society.  Different groups include women, children, or 
those of a certain race, ethnicity or religion.  Even if the form or content of human 
rights changes over time, the concept of their universality and fundamentality 
remains the same.  Thus it is fair to state that economic, social and cultural rights are 
not only aspirations but human rights accessible to all. 
 
3.2 Justiciability of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
One of the main arguments against economic, social and cultural rights, as rights 
that are immediately enforceable, is whether these rights are justiciable.  If they are 
not justiciable they are not capable of being invoked in a court of law and applied by 
the judiciary.34  The argument on justiciability relates directly to the cornerstone of 
separation of powers in a democracy.  Chirwa summarises the argument skilfully, 
when he states:  
“the countries (western countries) argued that enforcement of these rights is 
programmatic and costly, and therefore dependant on the availability of state 
resources.  Furthermore, they argued that economic, social and cultural rights 
lack specificity and entail intricate policy decisions regarding their 
implementation…that the judiciary is not institutionally competent and not 
democratically legitimate enough to make such difficult choices, therefore 
rendering judicial enforcement inappropriate.”35  
 
Christiansen states in this regard that: 
 
“in theory, the social (economic and cultural) rights remedies imposed by a 
court could be overwhelming to a State, such as if a court were to require the 
government to provide universal employment, universal education through to 
the university level, free unlimited health care, etc.  But this is the enforcement 
                                                 
34 Eida A. (1995) 41. 
35 Chirwa D.M. “Toward Revitalizing Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Africa: Social and Economic 
Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria” Human Rights Brief vol10 Issue 
1 at <http://www.wcl.edu/hrbrief/10/1africa.cfm> (Accessed 03/09/2007). 
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issue, not the justiciability issue.  The nature of the rights themselves is not a 
legitimate basis for rejecting their justiciability.  A valid rejection of social 
(economic and cultural) rights justiciability must rely on their inability to be 
properly or effectively adjudicated.  Hence, the real area of concern is not the 
nature of the rights but what some commentators fear judges and courts will 
do with such rights.”36 
 
Economic, social rights and cultural rights are more frequently related to a volatile 
area of government policy for most nations.  The question of justiciability is multi-
faceted.  A court also has other challenges that lie within specific areas of 
adjudication such as addressing the actual plaintiff’s complaint or an appropriate 
remedy.  The analysis of international law focuses on the right to enforce the 
economic, social and cultural rights through adjudication by a competent court rather 
that the specific details of the adjudication process.   
 
With proper construction, all social, economic and cultural rights can be justiciable, 
provided there are common minimum obligations that are predetermined by 
international human rights law.37  The developments in the justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights within the international human rights case law sphere are 
explored. 
 
3.2.1 International Level 
 
3.2.1.1 International Court of Justice 
 
In the following matter, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory,38 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
demonstrated the justiciability of the rights contained in the ICESCR in general.  The 
UN General Assembly adopted a resolution asking the ICJ to urgently render an 
Advisory Opinion on what legal consequences arose from Israel’s construction of a 
                                                 
36 Christiansen E.C. (2007) 10. In this article the author uses the South African Constitutional Court cases for his 
analysis. 
37 An in dept discussion on the meaning of “minimum obligation” will take place under the heading ‘The Right 
Heath’. 
38 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory Advisory Opinion of 
the ICJ of 19 July 2004 General List No. 131. Accessible at  
< http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm > (Accessed 06/11/07). 
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wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, considering the rules and principles of 
international law.   
 
Israel is a State Party to both the ICCPR and ICESCR.  However, Israel denied that 
the ICCPR and ICESCR applied to the Occupied Palestinian Territory and argued 
that the relevant law that applies to the Palestinian area is international humanitarian 
law.39 
 
The Court held that the rules and principles of international law that were relevant in 
assessing the legality of the measures taken by Israel include the ICESCR as well as 
the ICCPR.  The ICJ held further, that the ICESCR is applicable both to territories 
over which a State has sovereignty and to those over which it exercises jurisdiction 
outside sovereign territory. 40 
 
The ICJ held that Israel is bound by the provisions of the ICESCR.  Furthermore, it is 
under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of such rights in those 
fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities.41  In effect 
the ICJ imposed a negative obligation on Israel to refrain from violating the 
provisions of the ICESCR.  The Court held that the construction of the wall and its 
associated regime, inter alia, impeded the exercise by the persons concerned of 
their rights to work, health, education and to an adequate standard of living as 
guaranteed by the ICESCR.42  The Court directed Israel to cease construction and 
dismantle the wall, provide compensation and other forms of reparation to the 
Palestinian population, and to return any land and other immovable property seized 
for the purposes of constructing the wall.43 
 
It is evident that the ICJ was of the opinion that the rights contained within the 
ICESCR were applicable in times of war as well as in times of peace.  Furthermore 
Israel as the occupying State is responsible for not violating the obligations under the 
ICESCR.  The court did not address the positive obligations placed on States Parties 
                                                 
39 Supra, para 102. 
40 Supra, paras 102-113. 
41 Supra, para 115. 
42 Supra, para 130. 
43 For a comprehensive analysis of the South African contribution to the ICJ in relation to this Advisory Opinion 
see:  Munga A. “Legal consequences of the construction by Israel of a wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory: South Africa’s contribution to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice” (2005) 20 
SA Public Law  86-101. 
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by the ICESCR.  The court had the opportunity to decide on the justiciability or 
enforceability of the rights in the ICESCR, however, this opportunity was not taken. 
  
3.2.1.2 Human Rights Committee 
 
The Human Rights Committee44 (HRC) is the UN body responsible for the 
adjudication of the rights in the ICCPR and for resolving claims of violation of the 
rights in the ICCPR. Furthermore, the HRC supervises the implementation of the 
ICCPR and has made it clear that the right to equality protected by article 26 applies 
across the spectrum of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.45  Most 
importantly, this means that the individual complaints mechanism available under the 
first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR46 can be used to make complaints about 
discrimination in the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights.47   
 
The integrated approach, as Sheinin calls it, is one of the methods that are used to 
protect economic, social and cultural rights.48  The HRC and other international and 
quasi-judicial and judicial bodies49 have indicated their willingness to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights through the non-discrimination provisions applied 
to civil and political rights and found in other international conventions.50  This 
willingness to protect economic, social and cultural rights has been illustrated 
through the decisions of various international treaty monitoring bodies. These 
decisions demonstrate the justiciability of economic, social and cultural human rights.  
 
The HRC had to consider whether the right to health was infringed through the 
discriminatory treatment of the State, in Ms. Yekaterina Pavlovna Lantsova v. The 
Russian Federation.51 
                                                 
44 The HRC was established by article 40 of the ICCPR. 
45 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 18, “non-discrimination” (Thirty-seventh session, 1989), 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 
U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 26 (1994), para 6. Article 26of the ICCPR provides:  
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of 
the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
46 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G. A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN 
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316, 999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into for March 23, 1976. 
47 Eide A. et al (1995) 44. 
48 Eide A et al (1995) 44ff. 
49 See discussion of this issue below.  
50 Other conventions are cited below. 
51 Comm. No. 763, CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997, (2002) Accessible at 
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Mr Lantsova was placed in a pre-trial detention centre in March 1995 and died one 
month later. The prison was overcrowded and conditions were inhuman due to 
inadequate ventilation, food and hygiene.52  The mother of the deceased then made 
a complaint to the HRC regarding the violation of articles 6, the right to life; article 7, 
the right not to be subjected to torture and cruel and degrading treatment; and article 
10 of the ICCPR, the detained person’s right to be treated with human dignity.53 
 
The HRC held that the detention of an individual obliges a State to protect the 
individual in terms of the right to life in terms of article 6 of the ICCPR.  The right to 
life was violated since the State had failed to take steps to ascertain Mr Lantsova’s 
health status and provide adequate medical assistance and adequate conditions of 
detention.54   
 
Concerning the death of Mr Lantsova, the HRC held that the State had failed to take 
reasonable and appropriate steps by providing Mr Lantsova with medical assistance. 
The HRC affirmed that it is incumbent on States to ensure the right of life of 
detainees, and not incumbent on the latter to request protection.55 Consequently, the 
HRC concluded that, in this case, there had been a violation of paragraph 1 of article 
6 of the Covenant.  
 
The conditions of detention also violated the right to respect for the inherent dignity 
of detained individuals as provided for in article 10.56  The HRC did not feel it 
necessary to deal with article 7, however, it held that the Russian Federation should 
provide appropriate compensation, order an inquiry into the death and ensure similar 
violations do not occur in future.57  
 
In effect the HRC had imposed a positive obligation on a State to protect the health 
of a prisoner through the rights to life and human dignity.58  In addition to this positive 
obligation the HRC established the justiciability of the right to health through 
                                                                                                                                                        
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/763-1997.html> (Accessed 10/10/07). 
52 Supra, paras 1.1-1.5. 
53 Supra, para 3. 
54 Supra, para 9.2.  
55 Supra, para 9.2. 
56 Supra, para 9.1. 
57 Supra, para 11. 
58 For a similar example of the prisoners right to food and housing see: Womah Mukong v. Cameroon Comm. 
No. 458/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 (1994). Accessible at 
 < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/458-1991.html>  (Accessed 10/10/07). 
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interpretation and application of the right to non-discrimination in the ICCPR. 
Although this case applies specifically to prisoners, where the State takes on a 
special relationship of protection, nothing prohibits the application of this case to the 
general population. 
 
The following two decisions of the HRC demonstrate its commitment to ensure 
justiciability of social rights through the non-discrimination provision, article 26 of the 
ICCPR. These cases dealt with the infringement upon the right to unemployment and 
retirement benefits that the complainants were entitled to, by State differentiation.  
 
In the first case, relating to social rights F. H. Zwaan de Vries v. The Netherlands59, 
the HRC adjudicated upon a complaint from Mrs. Zwaan de Vries. The complainant, 
who was born in 1943 and married to Mr. C. Zwaan, was employed from early 1977 
to 9 February 1979 as a computer operator.  Since then she had been unemployed. 
Under the Unemployment Act she was granted unemployment benefits until 10 
October 1979. She subsequently applied for continued support on the basis of the 
Unemployment Benefits Act.  The Municipality of Amsterdam rejected her application 
on the ground that she did not meet the requirements because she was a married 
woman; the refusal was based on section 13, subsection 1 (1), of the Unemployment 
Benefits Act, which did not apply to married men.60 
 
The legal question was whether the complainant was a victim of a violation by the 
State Party of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
which provides that all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law.  The complainant asserted that the 
only reasons she was denied unemployment benefits were her sex and marital 
status and contended that this constituted discrimination within the scope of article 
26 of the Covenant.61  The States’ argument was that unemployment benefits were 
fundamentally a social right protected in the ICESCR and that the matter is therefore 
inadmissible as HRC does not have jurisdiction. 
 
                                                 
59 Comm. No. 182/1984, CCPR/C/29/D/182/1984, (1987), available at  
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/newscans/182-1984.html> (Accessed 10/10/07). For a similar case 
concerning the non-discrimination clause and social security see: S. W. M. Brooks v. The Netherlands, Comm. 
No. 172/1984, CCPR/C/29/D/172/1984, 9 April 1987. 
60 Supra, para 2.1. 
61 Supra, para 2.2. 
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The HRC held that the State violated article 26 of the ICCPR, which provides that all 
persons are entitled to equal protection of the law without any discrimination.62  This 
non-discrimination protection applies to the socio-economic domain, and is not 
limited to the rights explicitly enshrined in the ICCPR.  Rather, all legislation should 
be non-discriminatory.  The ICCPR does not provide for positive obligations on a 
State to enact legislation; however, if a State exercises its State sovereignty by 
enacting legislation it must comply with article 26.63   
 
In this case, the legislation required married women to meet a condition that did not 
apply to married men.  This differential treatment was not based on objective or 
reasonable criteria.64  The legislation was therefore discriminatory, although it had 
been repealed before the decision by the State.  The HRC ordered an appropriate 
remedy for Mrs Zwaan de Vries.65  
 
In Ibrahima Gueye et al. v. France,66 the second case relating to social benefits, the 
HRC applied the same criteria of protection in relation to article 26 of the ICCPR.  
The complainants claimed that French legislation provided superior pensions for 
soldiers of French nationality than it did for retired soldiers of Senegalese nationality, 
who had served in the French Army prior to the independence of Senegal in 1960 
and therefore they were victims of discrimination in terms of article 26.67  The French 
State claimed that the different treatment was justified due to the complainants’ loss 
of French nationality upon independence, the difficulties in establishing the identity 
and family situation of retired soldiers, and the differences between the economic 
and social conditions prevailing in France and in its former colonies.68 
 
The main question before the HRC was whether the complainants were victims of 
discrimination within the meaning of article 26 of the ICCPR or whether the 
differences in pension treatment of former members of the French Army should be 
                                                 
62 Supra, para 12.5. 
63 Supra, para 12.4. 
64 Supra, para 13. 
65 Supra, para 14 and 16. 
66 Comm. No. 196/1985, CCPR/C/35/D/196/1985, (1989). Accessible at  
< http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/html/511-1992.html >, (Accessed 10/10/07). 
67 Supra, para 1.1-1.5 
68 Supra, para 1.5. 
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granted differently depending on whether the former members were French nationals 
or not. 69 
 
The HRC rejected the State’s arguments.  It said that the issue was not the question 
of nationality that determined the granting of pensions to the complainants but the 
services rendered by them in the past and that services were the same as those 
rendered by their French counterparts.70  Mere administrative inconvenience or the 
possibility of some abuse of pension rights cannot be invoked to justify unequal 
treatment.  Finally, differences in the economic, financial and social conditions 
between France and Senegal could not be invoked as a legitimate justification for the 
discrimination against all retired soldiers living in Senegal.  Whether of Senegalese 
nationality or French nationality they would face the same economic and social 
conditions, yet their treatment for the purpose of pension entitlements was different.  
The HRC held the differentiation amounted to prohibited discrimination because it 
was unreasonable and very subjective and ordered the French State to remedy it.71   
 
Where a State differentiates unreasonably one can rely on the general provision of 
non-discrimination in the ICCPR, whether it is an economic, social or cultural right or 
otherwise, the HRC does not permit a State violation of such a kind.  The standard 
set by the HRC is therefore that of reasonableness.72  The cases further 
demonstrate that economic, social and cultural rights are justiciable through the non-
discrimination provision of the ICCPR.  The HRC has interpreted the right to life in 
article 6 of the ICCPR as including aspects of the right to health.73  The HRC stated 
that: 
“the expression ‘inherent right to life' cannot properly be understood in a 
restrictive manner, and the protection of this right requires that States adopt 
positive measures.  In this connection, the Committee considers that it would 
be desirable for States Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant 
mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to 
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.”74 
                                                 
69 Supra, para 9.3. 
70 Supra, para 9.5 
71 Supra, para 11. 
72 For a proper understanding of the reasonableness test in the domestic law sphere, in the context of the South 
African Constitution see Currie I. and De Waal J. (2005) 577-582.  
73 HRC General Comment No 6, para 5. 
74 Ibid. 
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Although the applicants relied on the right to life and the non-discrimination 
provisions of the ICCPR, the rights that were violated were unequal treatment or 
access to pension benefits as well as the right to health.  This finding corresponds to 
the concept that human rights are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated.  This 
means that a violation of the right to equality or the right to human dignity may often 
impair the enjoyment of other human rights, such as the rights to health or the right 
an equitable pension, and vice versa.  HRC illustrated that an applicant can demand 
equal treatment of economic, social and cultural rights through the non-
discrimination provisions or the right to life proclaimed in the ICCPR.  The 
jurisprudence of the HRC does encourage enforceability of the economic, social and 
cultural rights, however the UN body had not decided explicitly on the enforceability 
of justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights as yet. 
 
3.2.1.3 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination  
 
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination75 (Committee on CERD) 
is responsible for the protection, enforcement and interpretation of the International 
Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination76 (CERD).  
 
The Committee on CERD, in fulfilling its responsibility in relation to CERD, had to 
decide on a matter dealing with the lack of adequate housing in L. R. et al. v. 
Slovakia.77  In particular, the Committee on CERD had to decide on the compatibility 
of a resolution adopted by the Dobšiná municipal council78 with the discrimination 
provisions of CERD.  The second resolution in question was passed in an attempt to 
cancel a previous resolution in which the council had approved a plan to construct 
low-cost social housing for Roma-inhabitants living in very poor conditions.  The 
second resolution was passed as the result of a petition that was submitted by the 
anti-Roma groups.  The second resolution stated that the municipality must not 
provide low cost housing as it would result in an influx of people of Gypsy origin.79  
 
                                                 
75 The Committee on CERD is established by article 9 of CERD. 
76 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. 
77 Comm. No.31/2003: Slovakia CERD/C/66/D/31/2003. Accessible at  
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/country/decisions/31-2003.html> (Accessed 10/10/2007). 
78 Resolution No. 251-20/III-2002-MsZ. 
79 Supra, para 1.1-1.2. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: The right to health 
 
21 
 
The complainants contended, inter alia, that the State Party had failed to safeguard 
their right to adequate housing as the only grounds for rescission of the previous 
resolution was related to race.  This action, they contended, violated Article 5(e)(iii) of 
the ICERD.80 
 
The Committee on CERD held that, taken together, the municipal council resolutions 
in question, which consisted of an important practical and policy step towards 
realisation of the right to adequate housing, followed by its revocation and 
replacement with a weaker measure, amounted to an impairment of the recognition, 
or exercise on an equal basis, of the human right to housing.  
 
This right is protected by Article 5(e)(iii) of CERD and Article 11 of the ICESCR.  The 
Committee also found that the State Party was in breach of its obligation to 
guarantee the right of everyone to equality before the law in the enjoyment of the 
right to housing, contrary to Article 5(e)(iii) of CERD.  The Committee ruled that 
Slovakia should, inter alia, take measures to ensure that the complainants be 
restored to the position that they were in upon adoption of the initial resolution by the 
municipal council.81   
 
The right to housing, an economic and social right, can be protected through the 
specific non-discrimination provision of the CERD.  Although the applicants relied on 
the non-discrimination provisions of the CERD, the right that was violated was the 
right to housing.  The Committee on CERD can enforce economic, social and cultural 
rights through the non-discrimination provisions in CERD.  A similar position to the 
HRC is therefore applicable to the Committee on CERD.   
 
3.2.1.4 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  
  
Probably the most important arguments in favour of the contention that social and 
economic rights are justiciable relates to the work done by the UN Committee on 
                                                 
80 Supra, para 3.2-3.4. Article 5(e)(iii) provides … States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial 
discrimination in all forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race,  colour, national 
or ethnic origin,…, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights:…(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, 
in particular: (iii) the right to housing. 
81 See a similar case dealt with by the  Committee on CERD A. Yilmaz-Dogan v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 
1/1984, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/36/D/1/1984 (1988). Accessible at 
 <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/country/decisions/1-1984.html>  (Accessed 10/10/2007). In this case the 
Committee on CERD had to deal with the right to work, entrenched in article 5 (e) (i) of the CERD. 
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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which was established by the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) under the ICESCR.82  The primary 
responsibility for the enforcement of the ICESCR lies with the CESCR.  One of the 
mandates of the CESCR is to assist States Parties to the ICESCR in the 
interpretation of the various provisions of this Covenant. 
 
The CESCR publishes general comments on the substantive articles of the ICESCR 
in an attempt to clarify the obligations of State Parties.  In particular the general 
comments deal the issues such as enforceability and implementation of various 
rights.83  One of the issues that the CESCR had to deal with is the concept of 
justiciability.  This concept was presumably addressed by article 2 of the ICESCR.  
Article 2(1) of the ICESCR states that: 
“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the 
adoption of legislative measures.”84  
 
This provision was problematic as it was interpreted by State Parties to negate their 
obligations on economic grounds rather than enforcing the rights in the ICESCR.  In 
fulfilling its mandate to interpret article 2, the CESCR published General Comment 
No. 385 on the nature of States Parties’ obligations.86 
 
                                                 
82 ICESCR, article 19. 
83 General Comment No 14 (2000) The right to the highest attainable standard of health E/C.12/2000/4 
Accessible at <http://www.publichealthlaw.net/reader/docs/GenCom14.pdf> (Accessed 11/09/2007) and General 
Comment No. 13 The right to education (Art 13):.08/12/99 E/C.12/1999/10. Accessible at  
< http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/dos.nsf/(symbol)/E.C12.999.10.En?OpenDocument > (Accessed 03/07/2007). 
84 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.  
85 Each of the six UN human rights treaty-monitoring bodies, including the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, periodically publishes documents known as General Comments or General Recommendations, 
which provide guidelines for States parties on the interpretation of specific aspects of the human rights treaty of 
concern to the particular committee. General Comments clarify the content of Covenant rights in more detail 
and may outline potential violations of those rights and offer advice to States parties on how best to comply with 
their obligations under the treaties. 
86 CESCR General Comment No. 3 (1990): The nature of States parties obligations, article 2(1) of the ICESCR, 
available here 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR’S+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument> (Accessed 
10/08/07). 
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The CESCR stated that article 2 is of particular importance to fully understand the 
ICESCR and must be seen as having a relationship with all of the other provisions of 
the ICESCR.  Furthermore, it describes the nature of the general legal obligations 
undertaken by States Parties to the ICESCR.  While the ICESCR provides for 
progressive realisation and acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of 
available resources it also imposes various obligations which are of immediate 
effect.87  This interpretation was applied in other General Comments of the ICESCR, 
for example General Comment 13,88 a general comment on the enforceability of the 
right to education.  
 
The CESCR General Comment No. 3 set out, in general terms, the State Parties’ 
obligations regarding substantive rights in the ICESCR.  State Parties cannot 
attribute their failure to meet at least their minimum core obligations due to a lack of 
available resources without demonstrating that every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those 
minimum obligations.  The assessment as to whether a State has discharged its 
minimum core obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying 
within the country concerned.89   
 
The two principles have been the cornerstone of misconception and had therefore 
warranted a more precise interpretation than that which is apparent from article 2 of 
the ICESCR.  Important to this debate is the concept of a violation of ESCR and this 
must be distinguished from the failure to realise economic, social and cultural rights.  
As discussed below, it is a failure to recognise this distinction that had resulted in the 
misconceptions surrounding the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights. 
 
3.2.1.4.1 Progressive Realisation and Core Minimum Obligations 
 
Monitoring the violation and enforceability of the rights in the ICESCR is a 
continuous struggle because of the concession imposed by article 2 that the right 
can be realised progressively.  The question on behalf of the State remains how they 
must comply with their obligations, in terms of the ICESCR, when there are stark 
differences between economic, social, cultural and political conditions between 
                                                 
87 General Comment No. 3, para 1. 
88 E/C.12/1999/10 of 08 December 1999, see paras 56 and 57 respectively. 
89 General Comment No. 3 para 10. 
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States.  For this reason, the CESCR had placed a reliance on a concept of “core 
minimum” of each of the economic, social and cultural rights.  The core minimum 
concept enables the CESCR to follow a violations approach as opposed to an 
aspiration approach. 
 
The CESCR provides that:  
“...the term progressive realisation is often used to describe the intent of the 
phrase - ‘to take steps’.  The concept of progressive realisation constitutes 
recognition of the fact that full realisation of all economic, social and cultural 
rights will generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time.”90 
 
The CESCR further provides that:  
“...even where the available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the 
obligation remains for a State Party to strive to ensure the widest possible 
enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances. …the 
obligations to monitor the extent of the realisation, or more especially of the 
non-realisation, of economic, social and cultural rights, and to devise 
strategies and programmes for their promotion, are not in any way eliminated 
as a result of resource constraints.”91 
 
The core minimum obligation or the core minimum theory of a State entails the 
immediate and necessary steps and action a State must take in the event of 
resource constraints.  The CESCR had commented that: 
 Article 2(1) obligates each State Party to take the necessary steps “to the 
maximum of its available resources;” 
 In order for a State Party to be able to attribute its failure to meet at least its 
minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it must demonstrate 
that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition 
in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations;92 
 The available resources include both the resources existing within a State and 
those available from the international community through international 
cooperation and assistance.93 
                                                 
90 General Comment No. 3, para 9. 
91 General Comment No. 3, para 11. 
92 General Comment No. 3, para 10 
93 General Comment No. 3, para 13. 
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The jurisprudence of the CESCR makes it clear that a State Party has the obligation 
“to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” towards that goal of full 
realisation of the rights in the ICESCR.94  CESCR also imposes obligations which 
are of “immediate effect:” 
 
 Firstly, article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides State Parties must “take steps” 
towards “the full realization of the rights;”  
 Secondly, article 2(2) of the ICESCR provides a “undertaking to guarantee” 
that the relevant rights “will be exercised without discrimination;” 95   
 Thirdly, by implication, “minimum core obligations to ensure the satisfaction of, 
at the very least, minimal essential levels of each of the rights” is applicable 
immediately irrespective of the availability of resources of the State Party 
concerned.96 
 
In essence, a State can either fail to realise the rights in the ICESCR or violate the 
rights in the ICESCR.  A State Party has the obligation to rebut the prima facie 
presumption to discharge its obligations by producing evidence to the monitoring 
body, in this case the CESCR, as to the steps it has taken. 
 
It can therefore be surmised, on the one hand, that if a State Party had not taken any 
steps at all to realise any economic, social and cultural rights, it would amount to a 
violation of the ICESCR.  In terms of the steps that should be taken, the CESCR 
stated they should be “deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible 
towards meeting the obligations recognised in the Covenant.”97  In other words, the 
steps that must be taken by a State cannot be purposeless or futile in that State’s 
particular circumstances.  On the other hand, if a State Party can demonstrate what 
steps they have taken that is to the maximum of its resources or to ensure the widest 
possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances, it would 
have discharged its obligation in the event that the rights are not fully and 
immediately realised.  
 
                                                 
94 Ibid. 
95 See General Comment No. 3, para 1. 
96 General Comment No. 3, para 10. 
97 General Comment No. 3, para 2. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: The right to health 
 
26 
 
Fidler, argues against the core minimum theory as he is of the opinion that it is 
contrary to article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention that provides:  
“…you must interpret a treaty in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of 
the object and purpose thereof.”98  
 
Fidler’s argument implies that the interpretation of the provisions of the ICESCR as 
envisaged by the CESCR is not possible because it is not in compliance with the 
ordinary meaning of the right as stated in the treaty.  This is, however, not the 
interpretation of the CESCR in its General Comment No. 3 and the international 
human rights experts as will be discussed below.99  The CESCR stated that the 
minimum core theory is essential to the purpose and object of the ICESCR, it stated: 
 
“… a State Party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived of 
essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and 
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to 
discharge its obligations under the Covenant;”100 
“If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a 
minimum core obligation, it would be largely deprived of its raison d'être 
(reason for being).”101 
 
3.2.1.4.2 Limburg Principles and Maastricht Guidelines  
 
The Limburg Principles102 and the Maastricht Guidelines 103 serve as important tools 
of interpretation in the realm of economic, social and cultural rights.  International 
                                                 
98 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980. 
Fidler D.P. (2000) 302. 
99 The Committee is the UN body responsible for monitoring the ICESCR. 
100 General Comment No. 3, para 10. 
101 General Comment No. 3, para 9, words in brackets my own. 
102 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Jan. 8, 1987, U.N. ESCOR, Commission on Human Rights, 43d Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17/Annex (1987), re published in the Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1987) 122–135. The 
Limburg Principles are also derived from the Siracusa Principles , UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/4, 28 September 1984 
and 7 Human Rights Quarterly 3, 5 (1985). A group of distinguished experts in international law, convened by 
the International Commission of Jurists, the Faculty of Law of the University of Limburg (Maastricht, the 
Netherlands) and the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, University of Cincinnati (Ohio, United States 
of America), met in Maastricht on 2-6 June 1986 to consider the nature and scope of the obligations of States 
parties to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the consideration of States 
parties Reports by the newly constituted ECOSOC Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
international co-operation under Part IV of the Covenant.  
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experts had met on various occasions to discuss and formulate their understanding 
of the international consensus on the obligations engendered by the rights in the 
ICESCR.  I discuss, in brief, these two guidelines here although it does not strictly 
fall under the heading of CESCR.  These guidelines had clarified the comments 
made in General Comment No. 3 and are relevant and directly linked to the 
enforcement of economic, social and cultural rights as was interpreted by the 
CESCR. 
 
The Maastricht Guidelines read together with the Limburg Principles were “designed 
to be of use by all who are concerned with understanding and determining violations 
of economic, social and cultural rights and in providing remedies thereto, in particular 
monitoring and adjudicating bodies at the national, regional and international 
levels.”104  They are not only an integral part of the discussion on enforceability but 
also provide possible remedies to problems of enforcement. 
 
General Comment No. 3 stipulates that a State has three general obligations.  They 
are namely, the obligation to respect, protect and fulfil.105  The three obligations form 
the core of the meaning of violations of economic, social and cultural rights as well 
as remedies.  Within these obligations are other obligations that assist as to whether 
the three obligations had been violated.  For example, the obligation to fulfil entails 
obligations to facilitate, provide and promote and a violation of these obligations 
could amount to a violation of the obligation to fulfil.106  These obligations are 
discussed in detail under the right to health. 
 
International bodies and tribunals have found economic, social and cultural rights 
justiciable on an international as well as on a regional level.  The following discussion 
explores the interpretation and application of regional instruments in the debate 
about the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights.  In particular the 
                                                                                                                                                        
103 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, reprinted in (1998) vol. 20 
Human Rights Quarterly 691, see also <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/Maastrichtguidelines_.html> 
(Accessed  21/03/08). A group of more than thirty experts met in Maastricht from 22-26 January 1997 at the 
invitation of the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan Institute on 
Human Rights (Cincinnati, Ohio, USA) and the Centre for Human Rights of the Faculty of Law of Maastricht 
University (the Netherlands). The objective of this meeting was to elaborate on the Limburg Principles as 
regards the nature and scope of violations of economic, social and cultural rights and appropriate responses and 
remedies. 
104 Maastricht Guidelines, Introduction. 
105 Maastricht Guidelines, para 6 
106 CESCR General Comment No. 14 (2000), para 33. 
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discussion will entail jurisprudence from Africa by the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights, in Europe from the European Court of Human Rights, and in 
America as continent, from the Inter-American Court on Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.  
 
3.2.2 Regional Level 
 
The justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights is developed further in the 
decisions and opinions of regional quasi-judicial and judicial bodies. These bodies 
are responsible for the monitoring and implementation of regional human rights 
instruments. 
 
3.2.2.1 African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights107 (African Charter) established 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Commission) to 
monitor the implementation of the African Charter.  The African Commission can hear 
State and individual petitions or communications in relation to a State’s obligations 
under the African Charter.108 
 
In the matter of Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and the 
Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria109 the communication alleged 
an infringement of various rights in the African Charter.  This case dealt with the 
violation of traditional civil and political as well as economic, social and cultural 
rights.  The communication to the African Commission, alleged that the military State 
of Nigeria had been directly involved in oil production through the State oil company; 
that the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) is the majority shareholder in 
a consortium with Shell Petroleum Development Corporation (SPDC); and that 
operations by the NNPC and SPDC have caused environmental degradation and 
health problems that resulted from the contamination of the environment amongst 
the Ogoni people.110 
 
                                                 
107 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 
I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 1986. 
108 African Charter, articles 47 and 55 respectively. 
109 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 155/96 (2001). Accessible at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/155-96.html> (Accessed 10/10/07). 
110 Supra, para 1. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: The right to health 
 
29 
 
The complainants alleged violations of amongst others, articles  4, the right to life 
and integrity of person, article 14, the right to property, article 16, the right to health, 
article 18(1) the right to family life, and article 24, the right to a satisfactory 
environment, of the African Charter.111  In relation to the allegation relevant to this 
thesis, the alleged violation of the right to health and a safe environment as an 
underlying precondition of health,112 the African Commission ruled that the Ogoni 
people had suffered these violations.  The African Commission held that the State 
had violated their right to health as provided by article 16 of the African Charter. In 
addition the African commission held that the State violated the Ogoni people’s the 
right to a clean environment as provided by article 24 of the African Charter due to 
the State’s failure to prevent pollution and ecological degradation.113  The African 
Commission stated that the: 
“...government compliance with the spirit of Articles 16 and 24 of the African 
Charter must… include ordering or at least permitting independent scientific 
monitoring of threatened environments, requiring and publicising 
environmental and social impact studies prior to any major industrial 
development, undertaking appropriate monitoring and providing information to 
those communities exposed to hazardous materials and activities and 
providing meaningful opportunities for individuals to be heard and to 
participate in the development decisions affecting their communities.”114  
 
In relation to the other alleged violations, the African Commission suggested that a 
failure to provide material benefits or reparation for the Ogoni people also constituted 
a violation of the African Charter.  Furthermore, it found that the implied right to 
housing (including protection from forced eviction), which is derived from the express 
rights to property, health and family read together, was violated by the destruction of 
housing and harassment of residents who returned to rebuild their homes.115  Finally, 
it found that the destruction and contamination of crops by State and non-state 
actors, violated the duty to respect and protect the implied right to food.  In this 
regard the African Commission stated: 
                                                 
111 Supra, para 10. 
112 Supra, para 50. 
113 Supra, paras 52-54. 
114 Supra, para 53. 
115 Supra, paras 59-62. 
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“...that the right to food is implicit in the African Charter, in such provisions as 
the right to life (Article 4), the right to health (Article 16) and the right to 
economic, social and cultural development (Article 22). By its violation of 
these rights, the Nigerian Government trampled upon not only the explicitly 
protected rights but also upon the right to food implicitly guaranteed.”116  
 
The African Commission ordered the Nigerian government to cease attacks on the 
Ogoni people, to investigate and prosecute those responsible for attacks, to provide 
compensation to victims, to prepare environmental and social impact assessment in 
the future and to provide information on health and environmental risks. 
 
The case demonstrates the willingness of the African Commission to recognise the 
direct justiciability of the economic, social and cultural rights.  Chirwa writes that the: 
“SERAC case marks the first decision that directly addresses the enforcement 
of economic, social and cultural rights since the (African) Commission 
became operational…, [and] the decision shows a renewed commitment by 
the African Commission to the implementation of ESCR’s ...more importantly it 
demonstrates that ESCR’s are justiciable.”117 
 
The African Commission also dealt with a specific aspect of the right to health in 
relation to the States ability to fulfil its obligations in Purohit and Moore v 
Gambia.118  The communication alleged, inter alia, that the legislative regime in 
Gambia, in particular the Lunatics Detention Act, was outdated and violated the right 
to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health (Article 16) and the 
right of the disabled to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical 
and moral needs (Article 18(4)), in overcrowded mental facilities and insufficient 
policy on mental health, guaranteed in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.119  
                                                 
116 Supra, para 63. 
117 Chirwa D.  “Towards revitalising economic, social and cultural rights in Africa: Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria” (2002) 10 No. 1 Human Rights Brief 
14 Accessible at <http://www.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/10/1africa.cfm> (Accessed 03/09/07). 
118 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Comm. No. 241/2001 (2003). Accessible at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/241-2001.html> (Accessed 10/10/07). 
119 Supra, para 3,4 and 9 respectively.  Article 16 of the African Charter provides -:  
1. Every individual shall have the right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health; 
2. State Parties to the present Charter shall take the necessary measures to protect the health of their 
people and to ensure that they receive medical attention when they are sick.  
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The African Commission held that Gambia fell short of satisfying the requirements of 
Articles 16 and 18(4) of the African Charter.  The African Commission stated that the 
enjoyment of the right to health is crucial to the realisation of other fundamental 
rights and freedoms and includes the right of all to health facilities, as well as access 
to goods and services, without discrimination of any kind.120  Furthermore those 
mental health patients should be accorded special treatment to enable them to attain 
and sustain their optimum level of independence and performance.  This would be 
consistent with Article 18(4) and the standards outlined in the UN Principles for the 
Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and Improvement of Mental Health Care.121 
 
The African Commission stated that it was aware that millions of people in Africa are 
not enjoying the right to health maximally because African countries are generally 
faced with the problem of poverty which renders them incapable to provide the 
necessary amenities, infrastructure and resources that facilitate the full enjoyment of 
this right.122  Therefore, having due regard to this depressing but real state of affairs, 
the African Commission read into article 16 the obligation on the part of States 
Parties to the African Charter to take concrete and targeted steps, while taking full 
advantage of its available resources, to ensure that the right to health is fully realised 
in all its aspects without discrimination of any kind.123  
 
The African Commission then ordered the State to repeal the LDA.  The case 
therefore illustrates the justiciability of the right to health in the African regional 
context.  The Purochit case makes reference to an important factor relating to the 
poverty in Africa but reconciles itself that the State should still take steps to fulfil its 
obligations and cannot just argue a lack of resources.124   
 
3.2.2.2 Inter-American Court of Human Rights  
 
In the Americas, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) together with 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IAC) acts as the judicial bodies 
                                                                                                                                                        
2. Article 18(4) of the African Charter which provides -: The aged and disabled shall also have the right 
to special measures of protection in keeping with their physical or moral needs. 
120 Supra, para 80. 
121 Supra, para 81. 
122 Supra, para 84. 
123 Ibid. 
124 See Purochit, para 84.  
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interpreting the American Convention on Human Rights (American Convention).125  
The Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights126 (American Protocol), also called the Protocol 
of San Salvador, provides a means of protection for economic, social and cultural 
rights.  
 
Article 19(6) of the American Protocol provides that any instance in which the rights 
established in the Protocol are violated by an action directly attributed to a State 
Party, individuals and non-governmental organisation can complain to the IACHR.127  
This Protocol of San Salvador extends direct access to individuals to complain to the 
IACHR.  The right to health128 and the underlying preconditions of the right to health 
for example a healthy environment129 is also provided for in the Protocol. 
 
One of the cases where such a procedure was applied is the “Five Pensioners 
Case.”130  Essentially the case dealt with the State of Peru’s arbitrary reductions and 
suspension of payment of pensions owed to five Peruvians as well as the failure of 
the government to implement the decisions of the local courts.131  
 
The IAC alleged that Peru violated Article 21, the right to property, article 25 (judicial 
protection) as well as Article 26 providing for the right to progressive development of 
economic, social and cultural rights of the American Convention by reducing by law, 
to the detriment of the alleged victims, the amount of the equalised132 pensions they 
had received since their retirement.   
                                                 
125 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov 22, 1969, O.A.S Treaty Series No. 36, at 1, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.23 
doc. Rev. 2, entered into force July 18, 1978. 
126 Adopted at the 18th Session of the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States held in San 
Salvador on 17th November 1988 and entered into force on the 16th of November 1999. Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92doc.6 rev1 at 67(1992), See  
< http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic5.htm> (Accessed 01/03/07). 
127 Article 19(6) provide: 
Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of Article 8 and in Article 13 are violated 
by action directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give rise, through participation of 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44 through 
51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights. This provision must be read with 
article 44 of the American Convention providing for individual petitions.  
128 Article 10 of the Protocol.  
129 Article 11. 
130 Judgment of February 28, 2003, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R, (Ser. C) No. 98 (2003) Accessed at  
< http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/98-ing.html > (Accessed 10/10/07). 
131 Supra, para 88(e). 
132 The word “equalized” is used here to mean equalized with salaries of employees employed in the same 
position as the claimants but at 1992.  
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When the alleged victims ceased to work for the Superintendency of Banks and 
Insurance (SBS) they opted for the retirement regime established in Decree Law No. 
20530, and this institution recognised their right to receive a retirement pension 
progressively equalized with the salary of the SBS employee who occupied the same 
position or a similar function to the ones they occupied at the date of their retirement.  
This acquired right could only be modified by the State, to the detriment of the five 
pensioners, as regards the parameters established in Article 21 of the Convention.   
 
The complainants as well as the IAC argued that the State of Peru violated Article 26 
of the American Convention, in that: 
“when it drafted Decree Law No. 25792, which constituted an unjustified 
setback with regard to the level of development of the right to social security 
that the victims had achieved in accordance with Decree Law No. 20530. As 
of the entry into force of Decree Law No. 25792, the five pensioners began to 
receive approximately one-fifth of the retirement pension they had been 
receiving;” 
further that: 
“the obligation established in Article 26 implies that the States may not adopt 
regressive measures in relation to the level of development achieved unless 
in exceptional circumstances and in accordance to application of Article 5 of 
the Protocol of San Salvador133 nor did it allege or prove any other 
circumstance to preserve the general welfare in a democratic society.”134 
 
The IACHR held that: 
”economic, social and cultural rights have both an individual and a collective 
dimension.  This Court considers that their progressive development, about 
which the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has already ruled, should be measured in function of the growing coverage of 
economic, social and cultural rights in general, and of the right to social 
security and to a pension in particular, of the entire population, bearing in 
mind the imperatives of social equity, and not in function of the circumstances 
                                                 
133 Supra, para 142. Article 5 of the San Salvador Protocol provides: For the scope of limitations and restriction 
which must be in relation to the general welfare of the democratic society. 
134 Supra, para 142. 
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of a very limited group of pensioners, who do not necessarily represent the 
prevailing situation.”135 
The Court said: 
“it is evident that this is what is occurring in the instant case; therefore, the 
Court considers that it is in order to reject the request to rule on the 
progressive development of economic, social and cultural rights in Peru, in the 
context of this case.”136 
 
The complainants were successful in that the IACHR found that the State did violate 
articles 21 and 25 of the American Convention.  The case illustrates the justiciability 
of economic, social and cultural rights provided that the rights of the general 
population, as a whole, are in dispute.  Surely this decision could also be applied in 
the situation of a particular group such as women, children and the elderly as well as 
other categories of disadvantaged groups. 
 
3.2.2.3 Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
 
In the matter of Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v El Salvador137 pertaining to the 
immediately enforceability of the right to health at the IAC, the complainants were 
people living with HIV/AIDS. They alleged that the State of El Salvador’s failure to 
provide them with triple therapy medication138 violated, inter alia, their rights to life, 
article 4; freedom from inhumane treatment, article 5; equal protection, article 24; 
judicial protection, article 25; and economic, social and cultural rights, article 26, 
provided in the American Convention on Human Rights139. They also alleged that this 
omission by the State constituted a violation of the right to health guaranteed by 
article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador. 
 
                                                 
135 Supra, para 147. 
136 Supra, para 148. 
137 Case 12.249, Report No. 29/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 20 rev. at 284 (2000). Accessible at  
< http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/29-01.html> (Accessed 10/10/2007). 
138 This treatment is triple dose of antiretroviral drugs. The drugs include: nucleoside reverse transcriptase 
inhibitors (NRTIs), protease inhibitors (PI) and non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NNRTIs). The 
advent of these antiretroviral drugs gave rise to triple therapy, which consisted of two NRTIs and one PI 6-8 or 
two NRTIs and one NNRTI For a comprehensive discussion on this matter see Romanelli R. et al (2006) 
“Effectiveness of dual and triple antiretroviral therapy in the treatment of HIV-infected children”, available at  
< http://www.scielo.br/pdf/jped/v82n4/en_v82n4a06.pdf > (Accessed 21/11/07). 
139 See note 86 above. 
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The IAC held that the case was admissible with respect to Article 26 of the 
Convention, which obliges States to take steps to progressively realise the rights 
implicit in the economic, social and cultural standards enshrined in the American 
Convention.140  The IAC stated: 
 “[I]t was not competent ratione materiae (relevant reasons) to determine 
independently, violations of Article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador through 
the system of individual petitions.  However, the Inter-American Commission 
can consider this Protocol in the interpretation of other applicable provisions, 
in light of the provisions of Articles 26141 and 29142 of the American 
Convention.”143 
 
Therefore the IAC, although not competent to hear matters directly, used the 
Protocol of San Salvador to further enforce the principle of justiciability of economic, 
social and cultural rights although as an interpretative mechanism to understand 
other rights protected in the American Convention.  
 
3.2.2.4 European Court on Human Rights 
 
In the decision known as the Belgian Linguistic Case (Nos. 1 & 2)144 the European 
Court on Human Rights (ECHR), the judicial body responsible for ensuring the 
observation of the obligations undertaken by State Parties to the European 
Convention,145 had to deem how the right to education is protected article 2 of the 
First Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights146 (1st Protocol to 
ECHR).147 
 
The applicants were French-speaking residents of certain Flemish-speaking areas of 
Belgium, who wanted their children to be educated in French. While Dutch speaking 
children in a particular French-speaking area were allowed to be educated in Dutch-
                                                 
140 Supra, para 36. 
141 Progressive development of measures taken by the State. 
142 Prohibit interpretation contrary to the American Convention. 
143 Supra, para 36. 
144 (No.1) (1967), Series A, No.5 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 241 and (No.2) (1968), Series A, No.6 (1979-80) 1 EHRR 
252.  
145 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S> 222, 
entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols No’s 3, 5, 8, and 11 which entered into force on 20 
Sept. 1970, 20 Dec. 1971, 01 Jan. 1990, and 1 Nov. 1998, respectively, article 19. 
146 E.T.S. 9,213 U.N.T.S. 262, entered into force May 18, 1954. 
147 The ECHR allow individual petitions to the Court in terms of article 34 of the European Convention, as 
amended by Protocol 11. 
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speaking schools in a bilingual district outside the neighbourhood, French speaking 
children in an equivalent Flemish area could not attend the French-speaking schools 
in the same bilingual district but were compelled to attend their local Dutch language 
schools. 
 
Article 2 of the First Protocol to the ECHR does not recognise a right to education to 
the extent that would require States to establish at their own expense, or to 
subsidise, education of any particular type or at any particular level.148  The provision 
guarantees a right of access to educational institutions existing at a given time and a 
right to an effective education.  For the right of education to be effective, there must 
be a right to official recognition of the studies a student has successfully completed.   
 
The Court, however, found that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the 
Convention relating to non-discrimination in conjunction with Article 2 as the 
legislation prevented children from having access to French-language schools in 
certain communes of Brussels, solely on the basis of the residence of their parents. 
This was not the case for Dutch-language schools and thus constituted differential 
treatment, which was unjustifiable under Article 14.149 
 
In the light of the above analysis, international and regional human rights 
jurisprudence indicate the willingness by court interfere with legislative and other 
measures taken by a State that amount to discrimination in relation to economic, 
social and cultural rights.  There have been limited international cases that directly 
deal with the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights although there have 
been opportunities lent to some courts to deal with the question of justiciability.  
 
Some regions such as the African Commission’s jurisprudence has been in the 
forefront of the justiciability debate, indicating clearly that economic, social and 
cultural rights are justiciable, as was decided in the SERAC case.  However the work 
of the other international and regional judicial bodies in the Lontsova, Zwaan de 
Vries, Gueye, L.R. Purochit and Belgium linguistics cases are indicators of the 
                                                 
148 Article 2 provides: No State shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it 
assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. 
149 Article 14 provides: The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.  
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willingness to adjudicate on economic, social and cultural rights.  It must be 
acknowledged there is still work to be done by courts to improve the perception that 
economic, social and cultural rights are not justiciable.   
 
4. ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL ASPIRATIONS AS HUMAN 
RIGHTS: A SPECIFIC FOCUS ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
On the one hand, our health and the health of those we care about are extremely 
important to us.  Regardless of our socio-economic or cultural setting, we consider 
our health to be our most basic and essential quality.  Ill health, on the other hand, 
can keep us from going to school or to work, from attending to our family 
responsibilities and from participating meaningfully in daily activities.  Human rights 
are interdependent, indivisible and interrelated. 150  The interrelated relationship 
means that violating the right to health may often impair the enjoyment of other 
human rights, such as the rights to education or work as well as the right to life. 
 
International human rights standards recognise that each individual has “the right to 
the highest attainable standard of health.”151  The right to health is not only a 
programmatic goal to be attained in the long term. The fact that the right to health 
should be a tangible programmatic goal does not mean that no immediate 
obligations on States arise from it.  The right to health does also not mean that 
everyone can demand a right to be healthy from their particular State.152 
 
The right to health entails the obligation that States must create conditions in which 
everyone can be as healthy as possible.  It embraces a right to healthcare services 
and a number of underlying preconditions of health.  This part of the paper seeks to 
examine the right to health with a few goals in mind.  Firstly, to illustrate the scope of 
the right to health, secondly, to examine what the common minimum obligations of 
the right are, and thirdly, to elaborate on the jurisprudential developments of the right 
                                                 
150 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, adopted by the World Conference on Human Rights, held in 
Vienna, 14–25 June 1993. (A/CONF.157/23). 
151 See discussion on Article 12 below. 
152 Fidler D.P. (2000) 302; General Comment No. 14, UN Doc. E/C.12/20000/4 <http:www.unhchr.ch> 
(Accessed 21/11/06),  para 8. 
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with regards to the violations approach as well as to the progressive realisation 
thereof. 
 
4.2 Scope of the Right to Health in International Human Rights Law 
 
International Human Rights standards grant each individual the right to the highest 
attainable standard of health.  If there is a right to health, it means that individuals 
can enforce their rights against governments, both their own and internationally, with 
regards to protection, achievement and promotion of this right.  
 
The World Health Organization (WHO) articulated the first specific international 
health and human rights provisions in the preamble to its Constitution written in 
1946.153  It declares that: “… the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of 
health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of 
race, religion, political belief, economic, or social condition.”154 
 
The phrase the “highest attainable standard of health” is commonly referred to by the 
short-hand term the “right to health.”  Soon after the WHO Constitution was 
formulated, the right to health was affirmed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR)155 which states that:  
“everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and 
well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, housing, medical 
care, necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of 
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood and old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”156   
 
Currently the right to health can be found in a large number of international human 
rights instruments: 
 
                                                 
153 The Constitution of World Health Organization, was adopted by the International Health Conference held in 
New York from 19 June to 22 July 1946 by the representatives of the 61 States and entered into force on 07 
April 1948, available at < http://www.searo.who.int/aboutsearo/pdf/const.pdf > (Accessed 24/08/2006). 
154 WHO Constitution Preamble, para 1. 
155 Adopted and proclaimed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. 
156 UNDHR article 25 (1)2. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: The right to health 
 
39 
 
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination157 (1965), article 5 (e)(iv) provides that: 
“States Parties undertake to ... eliminate racial discrimination ... and to 
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or 
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, ... the right to public health, 
medical care, social security and social services....” 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(1979),158 articles 11 (1)(f), 12 and 14 (2)(b) states: 
“States Parties shall ... ensure to (women) ... access to specific educational 
information to help to ensure the health and well-being of families, including 
information and advice on family planning....  States Parties shall ... eliminate 
discrimination against women in ... health care ... to ensure, on a basis of 
equality of men and women, access to health care services, including those 
related to family planning....; ensure ... appropriate services in connection with 
pregnancy....  States Parties shall ... ensure ... that (women in rural areas) ... 
have access to adequate health care facilities, including information 
counselling and services in family planning....”159 
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), article 24 states: 
“States Parties recognize the right of the child to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of health and to facilities for the treatment of illness and 
rehabilitation of health....”160 
 
Other similar provisions are found in the International Convention on the Protection 
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (1990),161 
articles. 28, 43 (e) and 45 (c) as well as the International Convention on the 
                                                 
157 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly Resolution 34/180 of 18 
December 1979 entry into force 3 September 1981, in accordance with article 27(1). 
158 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 
December 1965 entry into force 4 January 1969, in accordance with Article 19. 
159 Words in brackets my own. 
160 G.A. res.44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 49.) at 167, U.N. Doc. A 44/49 (1989), entered into force 
on Sept, 1990. 
161 G.A. res. 45/158, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 262, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), entered into 
force 1 July 2003, available at, < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/n8icprmw.htm > 
(Accessed 09/10/2007). 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: The right to health 
 
40 
 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities 
(2006), article 25. 162 
 
The right to health is also recognised in several regional instruments, such as the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948) article XI;163 the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981), article 16;164 the Additional Protocol 
to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, known as the Protocol of San Salvador (1988),165 article 10 and the 
European Social Charter (1961, revised in 1996),166 article 11.  The American 
Convention on Human Rights (1969)167 and the European Convention for the 
Promotion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) contain provisions 
related to health, such as the right to life, the prohibition on torture and other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment as well as the right to family and private life.168   
 
The ICESCR was the first human rights treaty to require states to “progressively” 
recognise and realise the right to health.  The ICESCR provides key provisions for 
the protection of the right to health in international law; article 12 provides: 
“(1) The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of 
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health. 
(2) The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to 
achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: 
(a) The provision for the reduction of the still birth rate and of infant mortality 
and for the healthy development of the child;  
                                                 
162 G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 (2006) , entered 
into force May 3, 2008, available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/disability-convention2006.html > 
(Accessed 09/10/2007). 
163 O.A.S. Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in 
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 
17 (1992), available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm > (Accessed 09/10/2007). 
164 Adopted June 27, 1981, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force Oct. 21, 
1986. 
165 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 69 (1988), entered into force November 16, 1999, reprinted in Basic Documents 
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 67 (1992), 
available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas10pe.htm > (Accessed 09/10/2007). 
166 ETS No. 35, Turin, 18.X.1961, available at, < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/euro/ets35.html > (Accessed 
09/10/2007). 
167 O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic 
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 
(1992), available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm > (Accessed 09/10/2007). 
168 213 U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force Sept. 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 which 
entered into force on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 
respectively, available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z17euroco.html > (Accessed 09/10/2007). 
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(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;  
(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational 
and other diseases;  
(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical services and 
medical attention in the event of sickness.”  
 
Even though the right is enumerated in the above mentioned instruments, the right to 
health has been problematic in terms of the way each State interprets their 
obligations under article 12.169  The lack of conceptual clarity has complicated both 
implementation and monitoring of the right to health.170  In an attempt to clarify the 
meaning of the right to health, the treaty bodies that monitor the ICESCR, the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the 
CRC have adopted General Comments or general recommendations on the right to 
health and health related issues.  These comments provide an authoritative and 
detailed interpretation of the provisions found in the relevant treaty.171   
 
The CESCR had stated the purpose of the General Comments is to: 
 
“to make the experience gained so far through the examination of these 
reports available for the benefit of all States Parties in order to assist and 
promote their further implementation of the Covenant; to draw the attention of 
the States Parties to insufficiencies disclosed by a large number of reports; to 
suggest improvements in the reporting procedures and to stimulate the 
activities of the States Parties, the international organizations and the 
specialized agencies concerned in achieving progressively and effectively the 
full realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant. Whenever necessary, 
the Committee may, in the light of the experience of States Parties and of the 
conclusions which it has drawn there from, revise and update its general 
comments."172 
 
                                                 
169 Fidler D.P. (2000) 302. 
170 Chapman A. and Russell S. (2002) 187. 
171 As will be discussed later in this section. 
172 CESCR, Introduction, The purpose of general comments, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22, annex III at 87 (1989), 
article 3. 
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Another source of interpretation also comes from conferences and declarations, 
such as the International Conference on Primary Health Care resulting in the 
Declaration of Alma-Ata,173 in which States pledged to progressively develop 
comprehensive healthcare systems to ensure effective and equitable distribution of 
resources for maintaining health.  The Declaration of Alma-Ata also reiterates that 
States have the responsibility to provide for the health of their populations, “which 
can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate health and social measures.”174  
Other such declarations include the UN Millennium Declaration and Millennium 
Development Goals,175 and the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS,176 also 
serve to clarify various aspects of public health relevant to the right to health and 
reaffirm commitments to the realisation of the right health.   
 
The most important source of interpretation in terms of article 12 of the ICESCR is 
General Comment No. 14 on the right to health.177  It was published by the CESCR 
to provide a detailed elaboration of the content of article 12, and emphasises how 
the substantial issues arising from article 12 should be implemented.  It states that: 
 
”the right to health extends not only to timely and appropriate health care but 
also to the underlying determinants of health, such as access to safe and 
potable water and adequate sanitation, an adequate supply of safe food, 
nutrition and housing, healthy occupational and environmental conditions, and 
access to health-related education and information, including on sexual and 
reproductive health.  A further important aspect is the participation of the 
population in all health-related decision-making at the community, national 
and international levels.” 178 
 
State parties are required to guarantee the availability, accessibility, acceptability and 
quality of such health services, including the underlying preconditions of health.179  
The obligations of the State are to some extent limited by the available resources, 
                                                 
173 WHO Declaration of Alma-Ata, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma-Ata, USSR, 
September 1978. 
174 Declaration of Alma Ata (1978) V. 
175 Available here, < http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/> (Accessed 20/11/2008). 
176 General Assembly Resolution S-26/2 of 27 July 2001. 
177 CESCR, General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of health (Twenty-second session, 
2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000). 
178 General Comment No. 14, para 11. 
179 General Comment No. 14, para 12. 
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however, as stated in the previous section, it is the view of the CESCR that a State 
has the obligation to work as “expeditiously and effectively as possible” to realise this 
right and that a State has a duty to take “deliberate, concrete and targeted steps” to 
ensure full realisation of the right. 
 
In terms of the guarantees or elements that a State must satisfy to fulfil its 
obligations in terms of the right to health, General Comment No. 14 provides: 
 The element of availability includes functioning public health and health care 
facilities, goods and services, as well as programmes in sufficient quantity;180  
 The element of accessibility includes health facilities, goods and services 
accessible to everyone, within the jurisdiction of the State Party. This element 
has four overlapping dimensions:  
→ non-discrimination,  
→ physical accessibility,  
→ economical accessibility (affordability),  
→ information accessibility;181  
 The element of acceptability includes all health facilities, goods and services 
that must be respectful of medical ethics and culturally appropriate as well as 
sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements,182  
 The final element of quality includes health facilities, goods and services that 
must be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality.183  
 
The right to health, like all economic, social and cultural rights, imposes on States 
Parties three types of obligations: 
 The obligation to respect means States should not to interfere with the 
enjoyment of the right to health;184 
 The obligation to protect means States should ensure that third parties (non-
state actors) do not infringe upon the enjoyment of the right to health.185  
 The obligation to fulfil means States should take positive steps to realise the 
right to health.186  
                                                 
180 General Comment No. 14, para 12 (a). 
181 General Comment No. 14, para 12 (b). 
182 General Comment No. 14, para 12 (c). 
183 General Comment No. 14, para 12 (d). 
184 General Comment No. 14, para 33. 
185 Ibid. 
186 Ibid. 
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As stated earlier, the obligation to fulfil contains obligations to facilitate, provide and 
promote.  The obligation to fulfil requires the State: 
 
 To facilitate through positive measures that enable and assist individuals and 
communities to enjoy the right to health;  
 To make provision for a specific right contained in the Covenant when 
individuals or a group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realise 
that right themselves by the means at their disposal; 
 To promote public awareness as to the right and procedures for asserting and 
protecting the right, for example through human rights education, creating and 
publicising opportunities for participation and capacity building to enable 
meaningful participation.187 
 
The CESCR guidelines in terms of the violations of the right to health are particularly 
important to an analysis of the justiciability of the right.  Hence the section III in 
General Comment No. 14 is discussed in more detail.  There is a distinction between 
inability and unwillingness by a State Party to comply with article 12.  A State that is 
unwilling to use the maximum of its resources to realise the right to health is in 
violation of article 12.188  Retrogressive measures or acts in the form of a repeal or 
suspension that negatively affect the realisation of the right to health also constitute a 
violation of this right.189  Thus, a failure to take steps to have a national policy or 
enact legislation towards realisation of the right to health is also a violation.190  
 
Violations of the obligation to respect include, for example, the denial of access to 
health services goods and facilities due to discrimination or the deliberate 
withholding or misrepresentation of information vital to health protection.191  
Violations of the obligation to protect include, for example, failing to discourage the 
production, marketing and consumption of tobacco, narcotics and other harmful 
substances or the failing to protect consumers and workers from practices 
detrimental to health.192  Violations of obligation to fulfil include, for example, failure 
to reduce infant and maternal mortality rates or insufficient expenditure or 
                                                 
187 General Comment No. 14, para 37. 
188 General Comment No. 14, para 47. 
189 General Comment No. 14, para 48. 
190 General Comment No. 14, para 49. 
191 General Comment No. 14, para 50. 
192 General Comment No. 14, para 51. 
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misallocation of public resources which results in a non-enjoyment of the right 
especially of the vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as children.193 
 
According to Fidler, as a result of the controversy of defining the terms of the right to 
health, the right has been seen largely as a right of access to health services.194  
Complete physical, mental, spiritual, and social well-being is apparently achievable 
through access to health services.  In the literature, Leary distinguishes between the 
right to health, the right to healthcare and the right to health protection.195  Each of 
these terms implies specific meanings and a distinctive interpretation is required for 
each term.  According to Leary, the right to healthcare refers to health services 
whereas health protection refers to the underlying preconditions for health for 
example safe water, clean environment and adequate sanitation.196  The right to 
health therefore entails freedoms in the form of protection from unauthorised medical 
experimentation and entitlements in the form of equality in the provision of 
healthcare services.  
 
The term right to health and its alleged ambiguity is no different from other similar 
terminology in international law, for example “the right to a fair trial” and “the right to 
association.”197  Leary says that the full meaning of these phrases is not clear from 
their short-hand expressions,198 yet these phrases have become entrenched and 
acquired a generally accepted meaning through frequent use and elaboration.199  
This process of clarification is likely to continue with the result that the scope of the 
right to health will become still clearer in the future, for example through the 
development of regional and national case law.200  It is the only way the achievement 
of a right to health “conducive to living a life in dignity.”201 
 
4.2.1 Core Minimum Obligations; Maximum Resources and Progressive 
Realisation in terms of the Right to Health 
 
                                                 
193 General Comment No. 14, para 52 
194 Fidler D.P. (2000) 302.  
195 Mahoney K. and Mahoney P. (1993) 484. 
196 Leary V. (1993) 12.  
197 Articles 14 and 22 of the ICCPR. 
198 This means that instead of saying the right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, 
the shorter term right to health is use instead. In other words, the use of the shorter term should not be 
interpreted as ambiguous because the longer term is more specific and less ambiguous.  
199 Mahoney K. and Mahoney P. (1993) 485 
200 See case discussion below. 
201 CESCR General Comment No. 14, para 1. 
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Tomaševski notes that it is widely acknowledged that the State has the responsibility 
of fulfilling the right to health of the population, but the contour of this responsibility is 
continuously debated depending on the different State practices.202  Therefore, the 
assessment of a human right criterion has to be based on a shared understanding of 
the precise obligation of the State. This explains the need for core minimum content 
of the right to health. 
 
The enforceability of the right to health took place in terms of the concept of “core 
minimum” obligations placed on States Parties that endure resource constraints and 
as a result of the use of the term “progressive realisation”.  Donders et al spells out 
the meaning of the term “core content” (also known as the core minimum or core 
obligations), they state that the term: 
“is to be regarded as a useful means or instrument in helping to analyse and 
clarify the normative content of economic, social and cultural rights, which are 
deemed to be open-ended, with a view to assessing the conduct of States in 
this field in general and identifying violations in particular.”203   
 
CESCR General Comment No. 14 provides for core obligations that are of 
“immediate effect” and “are non-derogable.”204  Violations by a State Party of the 
core minimum obligations of the right to health cannot under any circumstances be 
justified.205   
 
The General Comment reiterated what was said by the HRC in General Comment 
No. 3 that “to the maximum resources” includes international resources.206  Most of 
the well known international organisations have a role in the realisation of the right to 
health, including WHO, The International Labour Organization, the United Nations 
Development Programme, UNICEF, the United Nations Population Fund, the World 
Bank, regional development banks, the International Monetary Fund, the World 
Trade Organization and other relevant bodies within the United Nations system.207  
                                                 
202 Eide et al, (1995) 128. 
203 Donders Y and Volodin V (2007) 196. 
204 General Comment No. 14, para 30 and 47 repectively. 
205 Ibid. 
206 General Comment No. 14, para 38. 
207 General Comment No. 14, para 64. 
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Developed States should provide economic and technical assistance to developing 
States to enable them to fulfil their core obligations.208   
 
The core minimum obligations of State parties as set out by the Committee in the 
General Comment are:  
“(a) to provide equal access to health facilities, goods and services to 
vulnerable and marginalised groups, (b) to provide access to food which is 
nutritionally adequate and safe to ensure freedom from hunger. (c) to ensure 
basic shelter, housing and sanitation, and an adequate supply of safe and 
potable water (d) in providing essential drugs, (e) a comprehensive national 
health strategy and plan…,”209  
“(a) to ensuring reproductive maternal and child health-care, (b) in providing 
immunisation against the major infectious deceases, (c) of taking measures 
against epidemic and endemic deceases, (d) in providing education and 
access to information concerning the main problems in the community, and (e) 
in providing appropriate training for health personnel, including education and 
human rights.”210   
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights, in general, and the right to health specifically, 
are universal, fundamental and justiciable.  The State together with the assistance of 
the international community holds the duty to uphold and implement these rights.  
 
The right to health is an inclusive right.  It is normally associated with access to 
healthcare and the building of clinics and hospitals.  This is partly the case but the 
right to health extends further than just that.  The right to health has two basic 
components: a right to healthcare and a right to healthy conditions (or preconditions).  
It includes a wide range of factors that can help us lead a healthy life.  These factors 
include safe drinking water, adequate sanitation; safe food; adequate nutrition and 
housing.  The right to health should be understood as a right to the enjoyment of a 
                                                 
208 General Comment No. 14, para 45. 
209 General Comment No. 14, para 43. 
210 General Comment No. 14, para 44. 
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variety of facilities and conditions which the State is responsible for providing as 
being necessary for the attainment and maintenance of good health. 
 
The right to health particularly protects vulnerable groups through the provision of 
certain freedoms.  These freedoms include the right to be free from non-consensual 
medical treatment, such as medical experiments and research or forced sterilisation, 
and to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  In addition, the right to health provide for access to the health services, 
goods and facilities, all of which must be provided without any discrimination.  Non-
discrimination is a key principle in human rights and is crucial to the enjoyment of the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health.  This is clearly illustrated by the 
International Human Rights jurisprudence.  
 
In the event of the State really being incapable of fulfilling its obligations due to 
economic problems, the responsibility will normally be placed the international 
community to provide economic and technical assistance and cooperation.  Of cause 
the determining as to the ability of the State will lie with the CESCR and other similar 
bodies.  However, the imposition of economic sanctions on target States severely 
affects and can place a tremendous strain on the health of a population.211   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
211 See discussion in Chapter 3 on Sanctions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter will examine the international law relating to sanctions in general and 
economic sanctions in particular.  It examines the impact of economic sanctions on 
the enjoyment of the right to health and its preconditions.  This will be done by 
analysing factors such as the impact on economy as well as the healthcare system 
of the target State.  In addition, the analysis on the impact on the population will 
necessitate looking at factors such as nutrition, mortality rates and access to 
medicine.   
 
The previous Chapter established the scope and content of the right to health as an 
international human right and a similar analysis is required for economic sanctions.  
The challenges in this section are to keep the discussion about economic sanctions 
within the limits of this thesis as there is a hefty amount of literature on the subject.  
This thesis therefore also focuses on the classification of sanctions, the legal and 
political basis of economic sanctions and the impact in general on the enjoyment of 
the right health of the population of a target State.   
 
Furthermore, certain improvements to the design and monitoring of economic 
sanctions are necessary and some recommendations are made in this regard.  It will 
be argued that the modus operandi in respect of the imposition of economic 
sanctions resembles strategies of war.  Therefore as my argument goes economic 
sanctions call for the application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principles, 
especially the rules of necessity, proportionality or reasonableness and the 
prohibition on the use of indiscriminate attacks.  Additionally, within this section the 
concept of targeted sanctions are analysed as well.  Another element which is 
discussed is the possible improvement of the design and monitoring of economic 
sanctions.   
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2. OVERVIEW OF SANCTIONS 
 
The aim of economic sanctions is to prevent the exchange of goods, services or 
people across national borders, thereby isolating the target State from international 
commerce.  It is used as an effort to alter the political behaviour of the target State, 
through economic and political means.   
 
The imposition of sanctions dates back centuries.212  Sanctions were established by 
practice in the Napoleonic wars and came about through rules of Blockade and 
Contraband.  A blockade meant that all shipments that were imported by the enemy 
State from 3rd party States could be blocked or intercepted by the State imposing the 
blockade.  A State could declare “Contraband of war,” certain goods that it deemed 
to have an enemy destination and susceptible to military use also called “complete 
contraband.”213 Some goods were declared “conditional contraband,” susceptible to 
military and civilian use.214   
 
These practices were later encompassed in early legal instruments, for example the 
Declaration Restricting Maritime Law, Paris of 16 April 1856, and the un-ratified 
Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War, London, 26 February 1909.215  A 
complete Blockade was imposed on Germany on 11 March 1915 after Germany 
declared the water surrounding the UK a war zone.  Already these rules of 
contraband resembled the prohibition on import of dual purpose goods as was 
applied to Iraq until the second US invasion.  These embargoes were some of the 
earlier indications of sanctions as a persuasive mechanism to enforce foreign policy 
goals. 
 
One of the first examples of a successful threat of sanctions, in this early period, was 
the threat of economic sanctions that succeeded in resolving the border dispute 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) and Albania, in 1921.216  
The League of Nations (later to become the United Nations) issued the threat of 
                                                 
212 Wolcott L. (1997) 353 
213 Hufbauer G.C et al. 3. 
214 Hufbauer G.C. et al 3-4. 
215 Hufbauer G.C et al. 3. Available here , < http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebART/255-330020?OpenDocument > 
(Accessed 02/04/2008). 
216 Other examples included arms embargo on Paraguay and Bolivia over the dispute relating to a place called 
Chaco. Both the US, not a member of the league at the time, and the league itself, placed an arms embargo on 
the two States. 
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economic sanctions to Yugoslavia if it continued to encroach on the border of 
Albania.217  Yugoslavia withdrew from the border and cited the reason for the 
withdrawal as being “to avoid the dangerous consequences of non-acceptance.”218 
However, it was not until the end of the First World War (WW1) that States began to 
explore the notion of employing economic sanctions as a substitute to a purely 
military response for human rights abuses.219   
 
Sanctions do take on various forms and although the focus of this chapter is on 
economic sanctions, a brief description of most of the classes of sanctions is 
discussed here.   
 
3. CLASSIFICATION OF SANCTIONS 
 
There is no single clear definition of sanctions although the international community 
has called for the development of such a definition.220  An accurate definition of 
sanctions is difficult to articulate because sanctions are complex in form and in 
function.221  For example, sanctions can take the form of limits on exports or imports, 
denials of fishing rights, restrictions on international finance and lending, denials of 
visas or aircraft landing rights, freezing or seizing another State's assets, or cutting 
off or reducing foreign aid, to name but a few.222   
 
Sanctions are applied in the alternative or as complementary to other measures, and 
can be directed at States, organisations and individuals. In the light of the various 
forms and functions of sanctions, the search for a narrow definition of sanctions is an 
academic exercise which falls outside the scope of this thesis.  To fulfil the aims of 
                                                 
217 Vale P. (1979) 6. See also Hufbauer G. C et al (1990)17.  
218 Hufbauer G. C et al (1990)17. 
219 League of Nations Covenant under  article 16 of the Covenant provides: If any Member should resort to war 
in disregard of its Covenants... it shall be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of 
the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, 
the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and 
the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-
breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not. For the full version 
of the Covenant of the League of Nations and amendment of 1924 see, 
< http://www.historicaldocuments.com/CovenantoftheLeagueofNations.htm > (Accessed 20/08/2008). 
220 Security Council Press Release SC/6845, 28th Meeting of 17 April 2000: Clearer Definition, Tighter 
Targeting of UN Sanctions, Accessible at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/sanc6845.htm> 
(Accessed 10/11/07). 
221 Gibson S. (1999) 166. 
222 Ibid. 
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this Chapter concerned with critiquing the impact of broad-based economic 
sanctions on the right to health, a broad definition of sanctions will suffice. 
 
Sanctions can be defined as any foreign policy or legislation “that is implemented 
against a target State to coerce the target State through the imposition of sanctions 
to change its international or national policies.”223  Such offending policies run the 
spectrum from unlawful aggression or nuclear proliferation to the gross violation of 
human rights.224  
 
Military sanctions may include arms embargoes or the termination of military 
assistance or training.  These sanctions are also inherently targeted, as only the 
army and/or the police of the target State feel the impact.  Diplomatic sanctions 
directly target the ruling elite of a target State: diplomats, political leaders and their 
close family may have their visas revoked and may be forbidden to participate in 
international bodies and organisations.  The UN has implemented this kind of 
sanctions in States such as Libya and Sudan.225  Other steps towards diplomatic 
isolation include the withdrawal of diplomatic personnel and international 
organisations from the target State.  
 
Travel sanctions can include both sanctions against the travel of certain individuals 
or groups and sanctions against certain kinds of air transport.  The first kind is by 
nature targeted, as lists of people or groups of people are compiled who are not 
allowed to leave their State or at least not allowed to enter the states imposing the 
sanction.  This type of ban has been imposed on whole governments, such as was 
imposed against members of the military junta in Sierra Leone in 1998, and also 
against non-governmental groups, such as the leaders of the National Union for the 
Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 1997.  Bans on certain types of air travel 
include the current ban on taking off or landing of any aircraft owned, leased or 
                                                 
223 Italics my own. 
224 As was applied against South Africa for Apartheid, SC Resolution 418 of 1977 imposed an arms embargo, 
although there were already two embargoes applied in Resolutions 181 and 182 of 1963 these were not 
compulsory as they was not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See A Brief Overview of Security 
Council Applied Sanctions: An informal background paper prepared by the United Nations Sanctions 
Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, available at 
<http://www.un.org/doc/sc/committees/sanctions/overview.pdf> (Accessed 15/11/07).  
225 See Annexure A UN Sanctions Table. 
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operated by or on behalf of the Taliban, established by the SC Resolution 1267 
(1999).226 
 
Cultural and Sport sanctions have less of a negative impact than other forms of 
sanctions; however they can still have undesired results.  The athletes of the target 
nation may be banned from international sports competitions, folk dancers, 
musicians and other artists may also be banned and restrictions may be placed on 
educational and tourist travel.  This was also applied to the Apartheid State of South 
Africa.   
 
Purely economic sanctions, including trade sanctions and financial sanctions, are 
also categories of sanctions and will form the focus of the later parts of this chapter.  
The categories referred to above, as well as other types of sanctions, can be 
imposed to serve one or more of the following functions: 
 
 To destabilise the management and administration of the target State, for 
example, the long-standing US unilateral sanctions against Cuba.227 
 
 To obstruct or block a military action, for example, sanctions against Italy for 
its unlawful occupation of Ethiopia228 or to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait 
in 1990;229 
 
 To operate as a tool for conveying a message of disapproval of some State 
action.230  The message can relate to State interference with elections or 
electoral transitions or State sponsorship of terrorism, as was imposed on 
Afghanistan for its failure to respond to the demand for the hand-over Osama 
bin Laden.231   
 
                                                 
226 See Annexure A UN Sanctions Table. 
227 A unilateral trade embargo was imposed on Cuba by the US in 1960 and was subsequently amended by the 
Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996.  Frost M. (1979) Collective Sanctions in 
International Relations: A Historical Overview of the Theory of Practice at 15-16. 
228 For a comprehensive discussion of the sanctions placed on Italy, see Frost M. (1979) 8.  
229 SC Resolution 661 of 1990. 
230 Gibson S. (1999) 167.  
231 Contained in para 13 of  SC Resolution 1267 of 1999, by which it requested that the Taliban turn over Osama 
bin Laden, who is accused of terrorism, to the appropriate authorities, without further delay. 
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 To act as a part of a trade war such as that between China and US232 or the 
weakening of the military potential of the targeted State, as was imposed on 
the Taliban government of Afghanistan by placing an arms embargo against 
the Taliban.233  
 
 To be deployed in a commodity-specific form, by the creation of defensive 
export controls to support national security considerations.  These forms of 
sanctions are commonly used to restrict the flow of nuclear weapons 
technology and also in statutory arms export controls; an example of this is 
the sanctions imposed on Iraq.  As mentioned above, in Iraq, the SC 
established an export/import monitoring mechanism for dual-use items, such 
as chlorine.234   
 
 To be imposed on a 3rd Party with no governmental capacity, an example of 
this being The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in 
Angola.235   
 
 To be imposed to protect an animal species as was imposed on Japan by the 
US for whaling of protected whale species.236   
 
4. ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
 
Although all sanctions do have some economic component, for example an arms 
embargo includes the sale and purchase of arms, strictly speaking, an arms 
embargo is not an economic sanction.  The word economic is defined as “anything 
relating of or relating to the production, development, and management of material 
wealth, of a country, household, or business enterprise.”237  Economic sanctions 
therefore restrict or limit the production, development and management processes.   
                                                 
232 Pape R. (1997) 90. 
233 SC Resolution 1333 of 2000. 
234 SC Resolution 1051 of 1996. The concern behind the restriction of these products, like chlorine, are that they 
can be used as an ingredient in the production of biological weapons, although they are most commonly used in 
providing safe drinking water, hence the dual-use principle.  
235 Comprehensive sanctions had been placed on UNITA in the years 1993-2000. Sanctions started with the 
organisation’s dispute with the national elections of 1991 that was supervised by the UN and later evolved into 
other human rights abuses. 
236 American Society of International Law (2001) U.S. Sanctions against Japan for Whaling  The American 
Journal of International Law Vol 95 No 1, 149-152. 
237  Collins English Dictionary (2004). 
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There are two basic kinds of economic sanctions: trade sanctions and financial 
sanctions.  On the one hand, trade sanctions restrict imports and exports to and from 
the target State.  These restrictions can be comprehensive or broad-based in that 
they restrict the imports and exports of the majority of the goods and services of the 
State or they can be selective, only restricting export and import of certain goods.  
The later economic sanction is often connected with a trade dispute.   
 
Financial sanctions, on the other hand, address monetary issues.  These can 
include, blocking the assets of the target State held abroad, limiting access to 
financial markets and restricting loans and credit, restricting international transfer 
payments as well as restricting the sale and trade of property abroad.238  The 
freezing of development aid forms another component of this type of financial 
sanctions and is applied the most often in current sanctions regimes.239   
 
Financial sanctions were applied during the Iran hostage crisis when the US froze all 
Iranian assets within the US and was able to use the release of assets as a 
bargaining chip during the hostage negotiations.  A similar freeze of assets of the 
Iraqi elite took place, as part of the broad-based sanctions against Iraq.  It was 
believed that this kind of sanctions, denying the regime of Saddam Hussein access 
to world financial markets, would partially retard the regime’s ability to rebuild the 
military.240   
 
The first attempt to freeze personal assets of the ruling elites occurred in May 1994 
against members of the government that applied martial law in Haiti, after a coup 
d’état241 took place in 1991.242  Gibson states that the economic sanctions policy 
imposed on Haiti was not as successful as it only “strongly urged” States to freeze 
                                                 
238 Bossuyt M. (2000) The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights 
available at < http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/unreports/bossuyt.htm> para 12 and 13, (Accessed 
14/11/2007). See also Economic and Social Council at E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/33. 
239 Gibson ibid 233. According to Tomaševski cutting of government-to-government aid, where South Africa is 
the first and best known example is applied the most; see Tomaševski K (2000) 378. 
240 Gibson S (1999) 232. 
241 A coup d'etat involves the seizure of an existing government by unconstitutional or undemocratic means . It 
is also known as an overthrow of the government. It is sometimes accompanied by limited violence, as when the 
head of State is killed in the coup. A coup d'état involves relatively few members of the population, and these 
few frequently are military officers. Participants generally control strategic elements of the armed forces and 
police, and have the cooperation of at least some civilian and political leaders.  
242 The SC by its Resolution 917 of 1994, adopted on 6 May 1994, the SC imposed additional sanctions 
measures, including freezing the funds and financial resources of all officers of the Haitian military and their 
immediate families and those employed by or acting on behalf of them. 
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the personal assets of the Haitian elites, rather than making the action mandatory 
upon States.243   
 
There is a substantial overlap between financial and trade sanctions, especially 
when applied comprehensively, since with their foreign assets frozen and access to 
new funds blocked, sanctioned States would be unable to pay for imports, and trade 
would suffer.  Economic sanctions are problematic in this regard, firstly, because 
while used as a measure to maintain international peace and security they also 
impact directly on the realisation of international human rights.  Secondly, they 
strengthen the argument, commonly offered by States to explain a State’s non-
compliance with its human rights obligations, that it lacks the resources to fulfil their 
obligations.244  Thirdly, economic sanctions cause macroeconomic shock and 
economic and social disruption on a scale that cannot be mitigated by humanitarian 
aid, and this affects the well-being of a population and can thus affect their 
enjoyment of the right to health. 
 
4.1. Legal and Political Basis for Economic Sanctions 
 
World politics is an important component of economic sanctions and in particular the 
political ideology of the sender State or international organisation such as the UN.  
Economic globalisation has resulted in a situation where economic sanctions are 
almost exclusively employed by developed market economies against weaker 
developing economies.  There are various reasons for this revelation but the most 
important one is an active and indiscriminate economic sanctions foreign policy 
applied by the US.  Economic sanctions are after all a political tool expressing the 
foreign policy of a sender State or international organisation.   
 
4.1.1 United Nations and Security Council Sanctions 
 
In general, the UN Charter makes provision for a system of collective security of 
States.  The UN Charter, unlike the League of Nations Covenant which championed 
similar principles but confined it to acts of war, became the first international treaty to 
                                                 
243 Gibson S (1999) 232. Emphasis my own. 
244 UN Charter, articles 39 and 40. See discussion of this problem in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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create and authorise the imposition of sanctions.  Furthermore, the UN Charter 
establishes limitations on the threat or use of force by one State or group of States 
against the territorial integrity of another State advancing the use of sanctions rather 
than military force.245  For a comprehensive table of UN sanctions see Annexure A 
attached at the end of this thesis.   
 
The limitations, referred to above, brought an end to the indiscriminate use of force 
that characterised wars pre WW1 and WW2.  An initial step, before war can be 
contemplated, is a sanctions system regulated by international law.246  Measures 
short of war that served this purpose include the suspension of trade benefits, what 
we would today regard as trade or economic sanctions.247  
 
Article 41 of the UN Charter provides that: 
“The Security Council (SC) may decide what measures not involving the use 
of armed force, are to be employed to give effect to its decisions , and it may 
call upon the Members of the UN to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations.”  
The wording of article 41 gives the impression that the SC has an unlimited 
discretion as to the measures that it decides to impose.248  However this is not the 
case. 
 
Article 24 of the UN Charter states that the SC is required to act in accordance with 
the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.  No act of the SC is exempt from 
scrutiny as to whether or not that act is in conformity with the Purposes and 
Principles of the United Nations.  It is to some extent a limitation on the 
indiscriminate application of economic sanctions.  Additionally, article 1.1 of the UN 
Charter places a further limitation on its application, as it requires that sanctions or 
other measures undertaken to maintain international peace and security must be 
                                                 
245 UN Charter, article 2 (4), Article 51 of the UN Charter provides an exception to this limitation in the event 
that the State wanting to use force should use it for self-defence.  A discussion of the principle of necessity and 
proportionality is discussed below. 
246 UN Charter, article 4. 
247 Vázquez C. (2003) 798. 
248 Through the use of the word may in the provision imply an express permission or unfettered discretion. See 
Collins English Dictionary: Express (2004) 246. 
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“effective” and be “in conformity with the principles of justice and international 
law.”249   
 
Furthermore, the Article 1.1-limitation also applies to economic action taken by 
regional bodies.  Their action must also be inconformity and effective.  Economic 
sanctions can be done on their own or in consultation with the UN.  There are, 
however, intrinsic limitations on the scope of sanctions that may be imposed by 
regional bodies or groups of States, for example Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC), 250 and by a single State that acts unilaterally251.  The 
limitation is demanded by article 52 of the UN Charter and mandates that regional 
arrangements as well as individual States must ensure that their sanctions are 
“consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.”252  This means 
that all principles that apply to the UN must also apply to regional bodies that impose 
sanctions internationally. 
 
Economic measures are referred to as sanctions instead of countermeasures as this 
term has a military connotation.253  The SC may also call on members of the UN to 
apply sanctions.254  The prohibition or limitation on the threat or use of force left 
sanctions as among the most coercive of the available means for enforcing peace 
and security of all citizens across the world.   
 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter foresees the possibility of imposing collective 
sanctions on individual States in the case of threats to peace, breaches of peace and 
acts of aggression.255  Sanctions, adopted through Chapter VII, are also called 
collective sanctions, as it requires all UN member States to respect and adhere to 
them.256  In general, the principle of State sovereignty is respected by the UN 
Charter regarding matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a 
State.257  The imposition of collective sanctions is, however, a limitation of this State 
                                                 
249 Human Rights Sub-Commission Holds Annual Session NGLS Roundup, no. 61, September 2000, available 
at, http://www.un-ngls.org/documents/text/roundup/61hrsc.txt (Accessed 20/10/2008). 
250 OPEC is a group of oil rich States that imposed an oil embargo upon States that supported Israel’s occupation 
of Palestine.  
251 UN Charter limitations will be discussed below. 
252 UN Charter, article 52. 
253 Tomaševski K. (2000) 377. 
254 UN Charter, article 41. 
255 UN Charter Chapter VII, articles 39-51. 
256 UN Charter article 41. 
257 UN Charter, article 2.4. 
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sovereignty when the UN enforces any measures taken under Chapter VII of the 
Charter, as it seeks to undermine that State sovereignty.   
 
The SC, which was established by article 23 of the UN Charter, is vested with the 
discharging of the duties laid down in Chapter VII.258  The use of mandatory 
sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a target State to comply with the 
objectives set by the Security Council without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions 
thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions.  
 
Between 1945 and 1999 there were 17 conclusive cases of economic sanctions 
imposed by either unilateral or collective sanctioning States and/or organisations for 
the purpose of combating human rights violations by the States.259  These cases are 
deemed conclusive as they resulted in the fulfilment of the goal of the sanctions, 
which is normally a change in regime or government of pre-sanctions.260  The 
proliferation of economic sanctions between the years 1990 to 2000 also called the 
“sanctions decade”261 has hit the African continent the hardest, with no-less than 35 
African States sanctioned for various reasons based on human rights abuses.262  
One might draw the conclusion that UN economic sanctions impact Africa the most. 
 
4.1.2 Unilateral Sanctions imposed by the US  
 
The US’s policy of imposing economic sanctions on States that violate human rights 
first started to get momentum when the US Congress enacted section 32 of Foreign 
Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961 which states that:  
                                                 
258 See permanent members of the SC include US, UK, Russia, France and China, available at  
<http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp> UN Charter article 24.provides: 1) In order to ensure prompt and effective 
action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility 
the Security Council acts on their behalf.  2) In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in 
accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security 
Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII.  3) The Security 
Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration. 
259 Tomaševski K. (2000) 378-379. 
260 Tomaševski K. (2000) 378. 
261 Kofi Anan, Secretary-General , Reviews Lessons Learned During  the Sanctions Decade in remarks to 
International Peace Academy Seminar Press Release SG/SM/7360, Accessible at  
<http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/sanctions/sgstatement.htm > (Accessed 15/11/07). 
262 Tomaševski K. (2000) 378. 
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“it is the sense of the Congress that the President should deny any …military 
assistance to the government of any foreign country which practices the 
internment or imprisonment of that country’s citizens for political purposes.”263   
 
In December 1974 following more than a year of hearings critical of the 
administration, US Congress, at the instigation of Congressman Donald Fraser, 
passed section 502B of the FAA which states that: 
“it is the sense of the Congress that, except in extraordinary circumstances, 
the President shall substantially reduce or terminate security assistance to 
any government which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of 
internationally recognised human rights.” 
 
The FAA, in terms of section 502B, defined gross violations as including torture or 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged detention without 
charges; or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, and the security of the 
person. 
 
In 1978 Congress amended section 502B by deleting the words “the policy of the 
United States,” in effect made the section binding on the President.  In compliance 
with sections 116(d) and 502B(b) of the FAA country reports on human rights 
practices are submitted annually by the US Department of State to the US Congress.  
The reports cover internationally recognised individual, civil, political, and worker 
rights, as set forth in the UNDHR.  The reports also include the impact of the State or 
governments policies on the right to health. 
 
A different component of the US law on sanctions is not based on US Aid but on 
what the President of the US deems to be threats or acts of aggression against the 
US.  In 1976 the US enacted the National Emergencies Act (NEA)264 into their 
federal law to stop open-ended states of emergency and formalise congressional 
checks and balances on presidential emergency powers.  The problem, at the time, 
was that many US constitutional protections are suspended during a state of 
                                                 
263 Underline emphasis my own. 
264 50 U.S.C. 1601-1651. 
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emergency including the right to habeas corpus,265 the right to a jury for members of 
the National Guard266 as well as the suspension of numerous statutory laws.267 
 
The International Emergency Economic Power Act (IEEPA)268 falls under the 
provisions of the NEA.  It authorises the President to declare the existence of an 
“unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part 
outside of the US to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the US.”269  
 
The IEEPA gives US president powers to order the investigation, regulation, or 
prohibition on all commerce with the sanctioned individual or State subject to the 
jurisdiction of the United States.270  The sanctions apply to all US persons and 
entities including companies, non-profit groups, government agencies etc., 
regardless of where they are located.   
 
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury 
administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy 
and national security goals against targeted foreign States, terrorists, international 
narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction.  OFAC acts under Presidential wartime and national 
emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose 
controls on transactions and freeze foreign assets under US jurisdiction.  Many of 
the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are 
multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments.271  For a 
comprehensive table on US sanctions see Annexure B attached at the end of this 
thesis. 
 
Following its military debacle in Somalia, the US has often opted for sanctions rather 
than military intervention when aiming to pursued target States to end its human 
rights abuses.272  Garfield writes that between 1993 and 1996, 35 new sanctions 
                                                 
265 Article 1 (9). 
266 5th Amendment of the Bill of Rights.  
267 Harold C. R (2005) Martial Law and National Emergency, CRS Report for Congress, see also < http://www. 
Fas.org/sgp/crs/RS21024.pdf > (Accessed 03/10/2008). 
268 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1707. 
269 IEEPA section 1701. 
270 Title 50 Section 1702 a (1) A-B. 
271 See <http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/> (Accessed 01/10/2008). 
272 Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman (January 2004),One Decade Later -- Debacle in Somalia,  
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regimes were initiated by the US.  For a list of past US sanctions see Annexure C as 
well as a list of categories of US sanctions see Annexure D attached at the end of 
this thesis.  By 1997, US sanctions of some sort were in force against more than 50 
countries containing 68 per cent of the world’s population.  Most of these limit 
commercial relations or military cooperation.273  These statistics as well as the US’s 
position as global economic leader meant that it played and continues to play a vital 
role in the politics of economic sanctions.  A change to the US foreign policy towards 
making economic sanctions more effective might therefore have a ripple effect 
through the wider international community. 
 
In this regard, Wolcott states that the  
 
“U.S. Government, more adept than other countries in utilizing economic 
sanctions, is still not organized to deal adequately with sanctions or non-
military policies. Several weaknesses were identified, including: 1) lack of a 
mechanism for contingency planning, so that sanctions might be readily 
applied should a country on the brink of security violations step across the 
threshold; 2) a bureaucratic structure that greatly hampers decision making 
and implementation; and 3) a glut of sanctions expertise, especially in the 
communications and transportation arenas. “274 
 
A rethinking of the US sanctions policy is highly necessary to combat the long term 
impact of economic sanctions on the human rights.  Furthermore, regulation of the 
impact of economic sanctions will need to come from other international 
organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) as case in point, as a 
body already fulfilling a similar function in international trade law. The WTO would be 
suitable in this role because regulation cannot come from the UN or individual States 
because of their involvement in the institution of sanctions.   
  
                                                                                                                                                        
< http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_Somalia_0104,00.html> (Accessed 12/09/2008). 
273 Garfield R (1999) 4.  
274 Wolcott L.K. (1997) 7. 
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4.1.3 Political Basis for Economic Sanctions 
 
Economic sanctions are foreign policy measures.  A foreign policy maker needs to 
establish which foreign policy is necessary to each foreign event.  An analysis of the 
success and failure of foreign policy is very important to persuade a foreign policy 
maker to use alternative policies.  The key to an answer as to whether economic 
sanctions programme is a success or failure is not simple.  The question entails 
various interrelated questions that need to be addressed before one can come to a 
conclusion.   
 
In 2000 Baldwin wrote a very good analysis of this question.275  He states each 
policy maker has policy problems as there are not enough resources to cope with all 
problems.276 Thus, a policy maker needs ways to compare alternative courses of 
action of using scarce resources.  The question of success or failure may give 
foreign policy makers the necessary relevant knowledge to make good foreign policy 
decisions.   
 
The first element of success is the effectiveness of the foreign policy.  Most foreign 
policies are goal-oriented.  Therefore evaluating effectiveness in accomplishing goals 
is a necessary, but not sufficient, ingredient in estimating success.277  Baldwin uses 
the US Persian Gulf War as an example of the inefficiency of using this evaluation 
alone, he states that: 
“that during the Persian Gulf crisis, the goal of US foreign policy makers was 
not solely to force Saddam Hussein to with draw from Kuwait.  Additional 
goals included restoring the government of Kuwait, minimizing damage to 
Kuwait, discouraging Israeli intervention, encouraging United Nations support, 
reassuring potential allies that the United States was determined but not 
trigger-happy, discouraging other potential aggressors from trying to emulate 
Iraq’s behaviour, and so on. These various goals and targets were not equally 
important, but neither were they trivial enough to justify ignoring them. 
‘Winning the war’ is an oversimplification of the goals of any war, and 
                                                 
275 Baldwin D.A. “Success and Failure in Foreign Policy” (2000) vol 3 Annual Review of Political Science, 167-
182. 
276 Baldwin D.A (2000) 170. 
277 Baldwin D.A (2000) 173. 
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‘achieving the primary goal’ is an equally misleading way to define the 
success of economic sanctions.”278   
 
Further elements that must be taken in account in assessing the success or failure of 
economic sanctions include: the cost incurred by the sender State as well as the cost 
incurred by the target State;279 the stakes for the sender, for example 
 
“deterring the Soviet Union from launching nuclear missiles at the United 
States was probably a relatively easy task, although the stakes were very high 
for the United States. By comparison, getting South Africa or Rhodesia to 
change the way their societies were governed was relatively difficult, even 
though the stakes were lower for the United States. Other things being equal, 
the more difficult the undertaking, the more valuable is the achievement.” 280 
 
The second important element that should determine success or failure of foreign 
policy is the comparable or alternative measure.281  It is unlikely that the US 
economic policies will change in the near future because they are seen as the global 
leader and economic sanctions sends a clear message of disapproval of the 
destructive actions or policies of the target State.  The main alternative to economic 
sanctions is military force.  Annual defence spending by the US approaches $300 
billion while spending on non-military measures including economic sanctions, the 
State Department, United Nations etc, is less than $10 billion.282  The cost of military 
intervention far outweighs the cost of economic sanctions despite the fact that it does 
have an effect on the domestic businesses of the sender State; the cost of military 
action dwarfs that of economic sanctions.  The US also has a general sanctions 
policy for various matters such as terrorism and trafficking.  For a table of these 
sanctions see Annexure E attached at the end of this thesis.   
 
In order to establish whether economic sanctions, as imposed against South Africa 
and Iraq, were a success or a failure, the balancing of the above elements are 
necessary.  Various questions must be asked, including establishing the 
                                                 
278 Ibid. 
279 Baldwin D.A. (2000) 173-174. 
280 Ibid. 
281 Italics my own. 
282 Baldwin D.A. (2000) 179. 
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effectiveness of the policy, the goals and targets of the policy, the cost of the policy, 
and the alternative policies. 
 
5.  THE SHORT TERM IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THE 
RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
Comprehensive economic sanctions undoubtedly adversely impact on the 
enforcement of international human rights.283  A factor that must be mentioned is that 
it is in most cases difficult to distinguish between the impacts of economic sanctions 
on the one hand, from other factors such as war, poverty and unjust government 
action on the other.  The globalisation of economies has meant that broad-based 
economic sanctions do have serious repercussions for the economic development of 
a State and this also impacts on the welfare of the population.   
 
The CESCR has stated, in this regard, that: 
”economic sanctions cause a significant disruption in the distribution of food, 
pharmaceutical and sanitation supplies, it jeopardises the quality of food and 
the availability of clean drinking water, it severely interferes with the 
functioning of basic health and education systems, and undermines the right 
to work.”284 
 
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was the 
main subsidiary body of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.  With the 
dissolution of the Commission on Human Rights and its replacement by the Human 
Rights Council in 2006, responsibility for the Sub-Commission passed from the 
former to the latter.  Its primary mandate is described as: 
 
“To undertake studies, particularly in the light of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, and to make recommendations to the Commission concerning 
the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and the protection of racial, national, religious and 
linguistic minorities.”285 
                                                 
283 See generally Bossuyt M. (2000) The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the enjoyment of 
Human Rights: Working paper for the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/unreports/bossuyt.htm> (Accessed 12 04/07). 
284 CESCR General Comment No. 8 (1997) para 3.  
285 See Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights available at,  
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It is composed of 26 human rights experts, each with an alternate and each elected 
for a term of four years, with half of the posts up for election every two years.286  
 
The Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights has also 
recognised the adverse consequences of economic sanctions on human rights.287  In 
addition physicians, who have travelled to nations affected by broad-based economic 
sanctions, reported that suffering is cause by the lack of medical supplies and/or 
other basic health-related resources.288   
 
As stated previously, the right health is multi-faceted and thus many factors have an 
impact on the enjoyment of the right.  This can be a complex analysis and therefore 
to abide by the constraints of this thesis an in-depth discussion is not the aim.  The 
aim is to give the reader an understanding of the impacts that can occur when 
economic sanctions are imposed.  To analyse the impact of economic sanctions on 
the right to health references are made to the analysis of case studies.289  These 
case studies give the ability to establish the impact on the economy as well as the 
health system of the target States involved.   
 
5.1 Impact on the Economy and Health System of the Target State  
 
A military coup ousted Haitian President Aristide in September 1991 and economic 
sanctions were applied by the Organisation of America States (OAS) and the US.  
This embargo was supported by the UN General Assembly Resolution 46/7 of 11 
October 1991, supporting the OAS’ call for sanctions, and stipulating that there were 
to be no relations with the de facto government.290  The embargo included all Haitian 
exports.  This had a direct impact on the informal sector affecting garment, 
electronic, sports, and toy assembly industries and accounting for 29 780 job 
losses.291  In addition, it had impacted on the formal industries as well accounting for 
                                                                                                                                                        
< http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm > (18/11/2008). 
286 See Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights available at,  
< http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/2/sc.htm > (18/11/2008). 
287 Sub-Commission on Human Rights: The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the enjoyment of 
Human Rights, available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/unreports/bossuyt.htm > (Accessed 
08/09/07). 
288 Morin K. and Miles S.H (2000) 158. 
289 As done by R Garfield in 1995 in terms of a number of target State as well as Haiti in 1999.  
290 Available here, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/46/a46r007.htm> (Accessed 25/10/2008). 
291 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1499. 
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a loss of an estimate 200 000 jobs.292  A quarter of a million of Haitians lost their 
principal source of income.   
 
The embargo also resulted in a major rise in the price of imports.  This resulted in 
shortages of fuel which meant that agricultural products could not reach the capital, 
where 30% of the Haitian population reside.  Even though food imports were 
exempted their delivery was often delayed owing to the lack of vessels entering the 
Haitian ports.293  By August 1994 the embargo had prevented the export of $15 
million of coffee and cocoa, $12 million of mangoes and $14 million of essential oils.  
This resulted in a 30% decline in income per capita, while inflation rose to 138%. 
 
The impact on the enjoyment of the right to health was severe.  Limited access to 
clinical services and shortages of medicine and equipment frequently characterise 
less developed States.  The shortage of transport meant the increase of all imports, 
including essential drugs, medical and humanitarian supplies.294  In 1993 basic 
medicine such as penicillin295 and intravenous fluids296 cost 3 times and 
acetaminophen297 and antihistamines298 5 times what they in 1991.299  A shortage of 
kerosene and propane led to the collapse of the national cold chain for vaccine 
refrigeration; this combined with the closure of the main state hospitals resulted in a 
reduction of immunisation of children to 12% in 1993.  This resulted in a measles 
epidemic from June 1991 to November 1993, 10% to 14% of these cases were 
fatal.300  The child mortality rate increased due to the lack of access to medicine and 
medical services.   
 
Economic sanctions impose heavy economic shocks to trade as well as financial 
markets of the target State.  In many target States, sanctions-related lack of capital 
has had more of an impact than direct restrictions on importing medicine or food.  In 
                                                 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
295 Used to fight bacterial infections. 
296 Used for feeding persons intravenously such as the Total Parenteral Nutrition (TPN) system or Dextran (a 
form of glucose). 
297  Also known as Paracetamol. 
298 Antihistamines are used as treatment for allergies. 
299 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
300 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
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some sanctioned States, including Cuba and Yugoslavia, direct prohibition on the 
purchase of medicines has existed.301   
 
Although affected countries routinely blame shortages of essential drugs, medical 
supplies, and surgical equipment almost entirely on economic sanctions.  It has 
seldom been possible to demonstrate that prohibitions against purchase rather than 
a shortage of funds were responsible for the lack of these goods.  To alleviate the 
impact of the lack of funds special attention should be given to Gross National 
Product per capita, the average household income as well as households below the 
poverty level.  In addition, the focus should also be on the purchasing power of the 
average salary or minimum salary.   
5.2 Impact on the Preconditions to health 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, the right to health also includes the obligation on States to 
ensure conditions appropriate to good health.  Health and healthcare services are 
dependent on functioning water, sanitation, available electricity as well as on 
functioning equipment, X-ray facilities and refrigerators to store vaccines.  As the 
target State does not have budget for simple maintenance and procurement of 
equipment and spare parts the precondition to health cannot be maintained. 
 
Economic sanctions are directly responsible a reduction of potable water and 
adequate sanitation.  The reason for this is that economic sanctions cut off capital 
spending on spare parts for pump repairs and created scarcities in water purification 
products.  Furthermore economic sanctions also retard the imports of these parts 
from foreign companies because the companies fear prosecution or that they will 
contravene the sanctions.   
 
This was illustrated in Haiti where the percentage of potable water output declined 
from 30% to 50% during the first 18 months of the economic crisis and access to 
potable water declined from 53% in 1990 to 35% in 1994.302  This meant that the 
                                                 
301 Morin K. and Miles S.H (2000) 158. 
302 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
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population became reliant on fecal contaminated springs303 feeding the water supply 
system in Haiti.304   
 
A weakened physical and medical infrastructure strained the capacity of a health 
system to respond to emergencies.  Even when maternal mortality is low, reports of 
women delivering far from hospitals because of lack of ambulances due to a lack in 
engine parts is common.  This is a direct consequence of the inability to import the 
needed parts.  More women give birth without medical assistance or within a medical 
system lacking electricity, transportation facilities, or equipment and supplies for 
emergency interventions.  In addition, shortages of medicines, inability to diagnose 
or treat common illnesses, and the functional loss of equipment due to lack of access 
to spare parts is also common.  
 
5.3 Impact on Humanitarian Exemptions 
 
The US embargo on Nicaragua exempted medical and relief supplies to be used for 
immediate relief of humanitarian needs. 305  However, because of the ambiguity of 
the embargo law and fear of possible prosecution, many US firms refused to sell 
medicines or medical equipment intended for the Nicaragua population.306  Even if 
humanitarian exemptions of medicines were effective and this is normally not the 
case, the humanitarian efforts are not sufficient to maintain healthcare services and 
the health of the population.307   
 
                                                 
303 Failing home septic systems can allow fecal coliforms (bacteria) in the effluent to flow into the water table, 
aquifers, drainage ditches and nearby waters. Sewage connections that are connected to stormwater drainage 
pipes can also allow human sewage into surface waters. Large quantities of fecal coliform bacteria in water may 
indicate a higher risk of pathogens being present in the water. Some waterborne pathogenic diseases include ear 
infections, dysentery, typhoid fever, viral and bacterial gastroenteritis, and hepatitis A. The presence of fecal 
coliform tends to affect humans more than it does aquatic creatures. 
304 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
305 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 1984 ICJ REP. 392 June 27, 1986, was a case heard in 1986 by the International Court of Justice 
which ruled in favour of Nicaragua. As part of its judgment, the International Court of Justice awarded 
reparations to Nicaragua. The International Court of Justice found that the U.S. had violated international law by 
supporting Contra guerrillas in their war against the Nicaraguan government and by mining Nicaragua's 
harbours. The Court found in its legal verdict that the US was “in breach of its obligations under customary 
international law not to use force against another State,” “not to intervene in its affairs,” “not to violate its 
sovereignty,” “not to interrupt peaceful maritime commerce,” and “in breach of its obligations under Article 
XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 
January 1956.” 
306 Garfield R et al (1995) 458. 
307 Ibid. 
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UN sanctions in one country excluded food and medical supplies, however, the 
availability of basic medications decreased by 50% because the raw materials 
needed to produce them could not be imported.  Consequently, rates of typhus, 
measles, and tuberculosis were reported to have increased as well as a 30% 
increase in hospital mortality rate for other conditions and a 10% increase in overall 
mortality rate was also seen.308 
 
Almost all economic sanctions legislation in recent decades has had a provision for 
exemptions for medicines and/or food.  Nonetheless, economic sanctions commonly 
lead to limitations on the importation of medicines and foodstuffs due to disruption of 
commercial arrangements, complications in transportation, or lack of capital in the 
target State with which to purchase the exempted goods.309  Despite exemptions for 
medical goods, many companies producing equipment and medicines fail to fill 
orders from embargoed States for lack of ironclad assurances that the item indeed 
was exempted from the embargo.   
 
5.4 Impact on the population of the Target State 
 
Target States against which economic sanctions are applied report that malnutrition 
caused by high cost and shortage of food is often a leading cause of morbidity310 and 
death among children.311  Furthermore, in four hospitals in one target State, infant 
malnutrition was reported to affect between 32% and 57% of hospitalised children.312  
Infant malnutrition was compounded by the unavailability of infant formula and the 
malnutrition of the breastfeeding mothers.  The chronically ill and the elderly are 
often overlooked as vulnerable groups however they are also in need of specialised 
medicines and treatments.313  This group is particularly impacted by the increase of 
prices for medicine and reduction in access to medication. 
 
                                                 
308 Morin (2000) 158. 
309 Garfield op cit. 
310 In medicine, epidemiology and actuarial science, the term morbidity can refer to: the state of poor health 
(from Latin morbidus: sick, unhealthy); the degree or severity of a health condition, the prevalence of a health 
condition: the total number of cases in a particular population at a particular point in time; the incidence of a 
disease: the number of new cases in a particular population during a particular period; disability, irrespective of 
cause (for instance, disability caused by accidents). 
311 Morin (2000) 158. 
312 Morin op cit. 
313 See discussion about impact on vulnerable groups in South Africa and Iraq in Chapter 4. 
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To compound things further, contaminated water and defective sewage resulted in 
waterborne diseases and this caused an increase in deaths due to cholera, typhoid, 
and gastroenteritis.  These factors, taken together, led to a threefold increase in the 
child mortality rate of that target State.314   
 
5.5 Decrease in Infant Mortality rates 
 
The infant mortality rate is an important measure of the well-being of infants, 
children, and pregnant women because it is associated with a variety of factors, such 
as maternal health, quality and access to medical care, socioeconomic conditions, 
and public health practices.  There is an argument that infant mortality is not the best 
indicator for measuring the impact of economic sanctions on the right to health.  The 
reason for the argument being that it is comparatively easy to concentrate scarce 
resources and healthcare on pregnant and lactating women and infants than on 
other groups of children.  A State could easily have a policy to effectively apply the 
scarce resources to this group.  Although there was a refocus of policy by Cuba and 
Haiti, this was not the case in Iraq where health policy and the medical profession 
was geared towards high-tech, hospital-based curative medicine.   
 
Indeed, in Cuba, infant mortality actually declined under conditions of sanctions as a 
result of these measures.315  Some of the factors associated with these good 
outcomes are a strong family doctor programme, food rationing, routine monitoring of 
weight and weight gain among pregnant women and a highly improved medical 
education system.316  In Haiti a similar statistic was reported.  The reported drop in 
infant mortality rate amounted to 38% during the sanctions.317  Thus reports as to the 
reduction in infant mortality should not be the yardstick for assessing the impact of 
economic sanctions. 
 
The short term impact of economic sanctions is inevitable and mostly cannot be 
avoided by the target State. However, the abovementioned short term effects should 
not be allowed to continue for long periods that lead to endemic devastation. The 
impact on health and the pre-conditions for health is tremendous if the long term 
                                                 
314 Morin op cit. 
315 Garfield R. (1999) 13. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Gibbons E and Garfield R (1999) 1501. 
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impact is not addressed by the target State, NGO’s and other international 
humanitarian organisations.318  It is submitted that all parties involved in the design 
and monitoring of economic sanctions should respect basic principles of International 
Human Rights law as discussed in Chapter 2 as well as International Humanitarian 
Law (IHL) to achieve this minimisation.   
 
The following section looks at some considerations that could assist in minimising 
the long term impact of economic sanctions on the enjoyment of the right health.  In 
particular the section will give some suggestions on how to minimise the impact on 
the health system, general population as well as to prevent meaningless exemptions.   
 
6. PRINCIPLES THAT COULD MINIMISE THE LONG TERM IMPACT OF 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS ON THE ENJOYMENT OF THE RIGHT TO 
HEALH 
 
Some principles already established in international law could assist in the design 
and implementation of a sanctions programme.  The idea being that they would 
lessen the impact on the population of the target State.  Another means to minimise 
the impact on the health population is targeted sanctions which focus on the 
government elite perpetrating the human rights abuses rather than the general 
population.  Furthermore, better monitoring of sanctions could also minimise the 
impact of sanction on the health of the population.  The following section examines 
the viability of these possible solutions. 
 
6.1 International Humanitarian Law 
 
The general purpose of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is to protect civilians 
and combatants during conflicts.  One must remember that IHL is silent about the 
legitimacy of war itself.319  It does not concern itself with the reasons for war but 
rather focuses on what should happen during war.  This dimension of IHL, on the one 
hand, is also called the law of war (jus ad bello or justice in war) or the law of armed 
conflict.320  On the other hand, IHL is also concerned with the legitimacy of the resort 
                                                 
318 The impact on the enjoyment of the right to health of South Africans and Iraqis is dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 4. 
319 Although this is the case, the UN Charter provides in article 2(4) unjustified use of force is illegal and State 
must refrain from such measures. Article 51 of the UN Charter makes an exception to the rule against the use of 
force on the ground of self-defence. 
320 Bouchet-Saulnier F. (2002) 187. See also International Humanitarian Law in Brief, available at  
 <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/section_ihl_in_brief> (Accessed 12/11/2007). 
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to armed force, known as jus ad bellum (justice to war).  Hence jus in bello concerns 
acceptable conduct in war and jus ad bellum concerns acceptable justifications to 
use armed force  
 
The origin of IHL is found in ancient times.321  Robert writes that the “Greeks and 
Romans customarily observed certain humanitarian principles which have become 
fundamental rules of the contemporary laws of war.”322  IHL was established 
progressively through the practice of States during conflict and codified through 
treaties they adopted, normally after the resolution of the conflict.323  The works of 
Grotius has become known as the first systematic management of international law 
and in particular, IHL.324 
 
IHL principles have an important role to fulfil with regards to the conduct of States in 
times of war and/or internal conflict.  IHL principles can be implemented as a check 
and balance or limitation of economic sanctions.  IHL principles, such as the 
prohibition on indiscriminate military action and proportionality regulate the impact of 
war on the parties involved.  The principle of distinction directs those waging war to 
focus on military rather than civilian targets.   
 
As stated earlier in this thesis the Inter-Agency Standing Committee325 had stressed 
that any sanctions regime “must take fully into account international human rights 
instruments and humanitarian standards established by the Geneva Conventions.”326  
IHL principles can have an important role to fulfil with regards to the monitoring of 
                                                 
321 Klob R (1998) 409-419, para 2, also available at  
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JPg2> (Accessed 12/11/2007). 
322 Robert A, and Guelff R. (1989) 2. 
323 Bouchet-Sualier F. (2002) 187. In most instances these treaties are developed a particular experience after the 
time of the conflict. The First World War (WW1), which took place between 1914 and 1918, witnessed the use 
of new methods of warfare that were deployed on an unprecedented scale. These included poison gas, the first 
aerial bombardments and the capture of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war. The treaties of 1925 and 
1929 were a response to those developments. The Second World War (WW2), which took place between 1939 
and 1945, saw civilians and military personnel killed in equal numbers, as against a ratio of 1:10 in the First 
World War. In 1949 the international community responded to those tragic figures, and more particularly to the 
terrible effects that the war had on civilians, by revising the Conventions then in force and adopting a new 
instrument: the Fourth Geneva Convention for the protection of civilians. 
324 See also Hugo de Groot, De Jure Belle ac Pacis, libr tres, Paris 1625. Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch jurist 
and diplomat who strongly influenced the theory of law and the State, in general, and of international law, in 
particular. 
325 The IAS Committee, established pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, 
includes representatives of United Nations organisations and intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations active in humanitarian assistance operations. 
326 The IAS Committee Inter Agency Standing Committee Statement (S/1998/147), dated 29 December 1997, 
accessible at < http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/040/86/PDF/N9804086.pdf?OpenElement > 
(Accessed 27/03/2007). 
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sanctions.  Accordingly, this section puts forward the argument that the imposition of 
economic sanctions resembles strategies of war.327  Consequently, economic 
sanctions call for the application of IHL principles, including the principles of 
necessity, proportionality and the prohibition on indiscriminate military action. 328   
 
6.1.1 Sources of International Humanitarian Law 
 
The core sources of contemporary IHL are divided into two parts, named after its 
place of origin, also called Geneva law and Hague law.  Geneva law is found in the 
four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and two Additional Protocols of 1977.329  The 1949 
Conventions and Protocol I apply to international armed conflict, whereas, Common 
Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions, and Protocol II, apply to non-international armed 
conflict, known as internal or civil war.  Additional Protocols I & II attempt to update 
and expand on the provisions relating to international conflict and civil conflict.  The 
Hague law includes various treaties limiting production and use of certain 
weapons.330  The purpose of Geneva law is hence to protect those not, or no longer, 
taking part in hostilities, whereas, Hague law is to limit the methods and means of 
warfare adopted. 
 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states in relation to the 
differences of IHL and IHRL that: 
IHL aims to protect people who do not or are no longer are taking part in 
hostilities.  The rules embodied in IHL impose duties on all parties to a 
conflict.  Human rights, being tailored primarily for peacetime, apply to 
everyone.  Their principal goal is to protect individuals from arbitrary 
                                                 
327 Kozal P. (2000) 394. 
328 CESCR General Comment No. 8 (1997) para 6. 
329 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 
Geneva, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea. Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 
85, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Geneva, 12 
August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950. Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950; 
See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protections of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Dec. 7, 
1978; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force 
Dec. 7, 1978. For a General compilation of IHL instruments see Robert A, and Guelff R. (1989) Documents of 
the Laws of War 2ed: Clarendon Press. For a more recent list of IHL documents together with number of States 
parties are available at <http://www.icrc.org/eng> (Accessed 15/11/07). 
330 See for example Declaration (IV,1), to Prohibit, for the Term of Five Years, the Launching of Projectiles and 
Explosives from Balloons, and Other Methods of Similar Nature. The Hague, 29 July 1899, and Declaration 
(IV,2) concerning Asphyxiating Gases. The Hague, 29 July 1899. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
75 
 
behaviour by their own governments.  Human rights law does not deal with 
the conduct of hostilities.331 
 
The ICRC fulfils the function of promoter of IHL332 and is determined to preserve its 
independence from the UN because of the UN’s political nature.333  This resulted in 
an institutional separation between the UN as promoter of IHRL and the ICRC as 
promoter of IHL, in effect, further separating the development of two spheres of 
International Law. 
 
With the addition of Protocol I and II the independence of IHL and IHRL became 
marginally blurred.  Certain provisions of the Geneva Conventions of Protocols, for 
example article 75334 of Protocol I and Article 6335 of Protocol II, are derived directly 
from the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.336  This clearly 
illustrates that IHRL principles are applied to further the protection of individuals in 
times of war.  In an analogous fashion, the same must be possible for arguing that 
IHL principles may be applied with regards to the interpretation of IHRL.  In fact, 
nothing in international law prohibits such an application. 
 
6.1.2 IHL Principles: Necessity and Proportionality and the Prohibition on 
Indiscriminate Action 
 
In terms of IHL there are three traditional ways in which the legality of the use of 
armed force can be contested:  
 
 Firstly, the use of force must be necessary in that the target must be linked to 
a specific military objective.  Necessity is a component of self-defence and 
proscribes that any forceful action must be by means of last resort in all 
                                                 
331 ICRC (2002) International Humanitarian Law: Answers to your Questions, accessible at  
< http://www.icrc.org > (Accessed 03/11/07). 
332 Statute of the ICRC article 5, available at  
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList74/E1B071F72AF9BAB4C1256B66005C48D6> (Accessed 
17/11/07). Article 5(1) provides that: The ICRC shall maintain close contact with the National Societies. In 
agreement with them, it shall cooperate in matters of common concern, such as their preparation for action in 
times of armed conflict, respect for and development and ratification of the Geneva Conventions, and the 
dissemination of the Fundamental Principles and international humanitarian law. 
333 Klob R. (1998) para 3. 
334 Relates to the fundamental guarantees including the right to life, health, dignity and fair trial right of civilians 
in international armed conflicts.  
335 Article 6 relates to the fair trial rights of civilians in non-international armed conflicts. 
336 Roberts A and Guelff R. (1989) 388. 
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situations where States assert the right to use force unilaterally or 
collectively.337 
 Secondly, the attack must not be disproportionate to the original attack or 
threat.  Application of the principle of proportionality makes the monitoring of 
the use of force effective in that it ensures that the negative impact of the use 
of force on the State and its civilian population does not outweigh the goal; 
and 
 Lastly, the attack must distinguish between military objectives and civilian 
impact and must not be aimed at spreading terror in civilian populations 
(indiscriminate action).338 Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited by the Protocol 
I of the Geneva Conventions.339 
 
The principle of proportionality as well as the principle of necessity is well 
established in international law.  In the Case Concerning the Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua V. United States of 
America)340 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held in relation to the principles 
of necessity and proportionality that the US activity in supporting rebels against the 
government of Nicaragua did not meet the criteria of necessity and proportionality. 
The Court said “it could not find that the activities in question were undertaken in the 
light of necessity, and finds that some of them cannot be regarded as satisfying the 
criterion of proportionality….” 
 
The ICJ furthermore stated that: 
“the general rule prohibiting force established in customary law allows for 
certain exceptions. The exception of the right of individual or collective self-
defence is also, in the view of States, established in customary law, as is 
apparent for example from the terms of Article 51 of the United Nations 
Charter, which refers to an inherent right, and from the declaration in 
Resolution 2625 (XXV). The Parties, who consider the existence of this right 
to be established as a matter of customary international law, agree in holding 
                                                 
337 Gardam J. (2004) 6. 
338 Bouchet-Sualier F. (2002) 241, words in brackets my own. 
339 Protocol I articles 48 and 51. 
340(Merits) Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14 of 27 June 1986, available at  
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&code=nus&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&k=66&p3=5> 
(Accessed 20/11/07). 
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that whether the response to an attack is lawful depends on the observance of 
the criteria of necessity and the proportionality of the measures taken in self-
defence.”341 
 
Focus of the analysis will be placed on the principle of proportionality because of 
value it can give to diminishing the impact of economic sanctions on the enjoyment 
of the right to health.  However, the importance of the principle of necessity should 
not be neglected, I have assumed that sanctions as deterrence to gross human 
rights abuses can be a necessary action to convince a target State to change its 
conduct.   
 
6.1.3 Proportional Economic Sanctions  
 
The development of the principle of proportionality is linked to the growth over the 
centuries of the idea that civilians should be protected from the effects of warfare.342  
The underlying basis for this principle is different between jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello.   
 
On the one hand, in relation to jus ad bellum, the principle of proportionality relates 
to self-defence, in that it seeks to minimise the disruption of international peace and 
security.  This aspect of proportionality is centred on the level of destruction of the 
territory and infrastructure of the State; the overall collateral civilian damage and 
combatant casualties: and the impact of the use of force on third States.343  On the 
other hand, in jus in bello the principle of proportionality relates to the conduct of 
hostilities.344  The focus of this aspect of IHL is on the individual rather than the 
enemy State.345   
 
In attempting to give context as to how the proportionality test should be applied, 
O’Connell mentions two central principles of the law of countermeasures (sanctions 
fall in this category): firstly, that “they must be used only in appropriate 
circumstances” (therefore they must be necessary) and must respond to a wrong, 
                                                 
341 Nicaragua v United States of America, paras 187-201. 
342 Garham J. (2004) 14. 
343 Gardam J. (2004) 17. 
344 Roberts A. and Geulff R. (1989) 1. 
345 Gardam J. (2004) 19. 
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and secondly, that “they must be proportional to the injury suffered.”346  Cannizzaro 
goes further, stating that “proportionality requires not only employing the means 
appropriate to the aim chosen, but implies, above all, an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the aim itself.”347   
 
With this in mind the principle of proportionality is not without its problems. O’Connell 
says that: 
“the proportionality principle in humanitarian law also embraces a kind of 
exception.  Proportionality requires weighing the amount of force needed 
between the military target and the cost to civilians.  The proportionality 
principle permits escalating the amount of force used if the legitimate military 
objective cannot be obtained with less.  Few would support the legality of 
escalating sanctions which are already considered inhumane.”348 
 
The principle of proportionality is not unique to IHL as it is also found, to a limited 
degree, in the field of IHRL.  For example, in instances relating to states of 
emergency, the HRC has provided that the “need for derogation from human rights 
norms must be demonstrably proportionate.”349  In General Comment No. 27 the 
HRC applied the principle of proportionality to the interpretation of the right to 
freedom of movement in article 12 of the ICCPR.  The HRC stated that a restrictive 
measure taken on the freedom of movement must be proportional to the interest that 
is protected.350   
 
The HRC stated that the principle of proportionality will not be met “If an individual 
were prevented from leaving a country merely on the ground that he or she is the 
holder of ‘State secrets’, or if an individual were prevented from travelling internally 
without a specific permit.  On the other hand, the conditions could be met by 
restrictions on access to military zones on national security grounds, or limitations on 
the freedom to settle in areas inhabited by indigenous or minorities’ communities.”351  
                                                 
346 O’Connell M. (2002) 76. 
347 Cannizzaro E. (2001) 903. 
348 O’Connell M. (2002) 75. 
349 HRC General Comment No. 29  States of Emergency  CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. of 2001. Accessible at  
< http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrc29.html> (Accessed 20/11/07). See article 4. 
350HRC General Comment No. 27, Freedom of Movement (Article 12 of ICCPR),U.N. Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999). Accessible at, <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom27.htm> 
(Accessed 20/11/07), para 11-16. 
351 HRC General Comment No. 27 para 16, available at  
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This is a clear indication of an acceptance of the use of the principle of 
proportionality in IHRL.  
 
The proportionality test is also not unfamiliar in the domain of economic sanctions.  
The International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts stipulates that “countermeasures must be 
commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity of the 
internationally wrongful act and the rights in question.”352  The principle of 
proportionality was also alluded to by the CESCR when it stated:  
”in considering sanctions, it is essential to distinguish between the basic 
objective of applying political and economic pressure upon the governing elite 
of the country to persuade them to conform to international law, and the 
collateral infliction of suffering upon the most vulnerable groups within the 
targeted country.”353 
 
The principle of proportionality lends assistance to the evaluation of economic 
sanctions.  The principle would serve to balance the impact on the enjoyment of the 
right to health and the other goals of the economic sanctions.  The human rights 
approach would be to suspend economic sanctions if the impact on the minimum 
obligations of target State with regard to the right health is demonstrably 
disproportionate to the goal of the economic sanctions.   
 
The application of the principle of proportionality is a step in the right direction to a 
proper conceptualised test which can be used to monitor the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions.  One of the tests as to whether economic sanctions are 
successful is the effectiveness of the economic sanctions.  The effectiveness will 
depend on the proportionality of the effect of the economic sanctions.  If the 
proportionality or reasonableness test is applied correctly it can be a means to 
minimise the impact of economic sanctions.  Apart from the IHL developments one of 
the other developments in the world of economic sanctions is targeted sanctions.   
  
                                                                                                                                                        
< http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts//gencomm/hrcom27.htm > (Accessed 25/11/08). 
352 Article 51 of the U.N. GAOR International Law Commission, 56th Session. Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001). 
353 CESCR General Comment No. 8, para 6. 
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6.2 Targeted Sanctions 
 
Targeted sanctions are also called smart sanctions or designer sanctions.354  There 
are various forms of targeted economic sanctions.  The first of these forms of 
targeted sanctions fall under the umbrella of financial sanctions.   
 
Targeted economic sanctions focus on the political elite and incorporate principles of 
IHL and IHRL to assist the mechanism to become effective.  They form another 
attempt to strike solely to the disadvantage of political elites, and are applied to 
freeze their foreign assets, but are often more difficult to enforce than economic 
sanctions covering all trade and financial issues.  Financial sanctions require 
profound cooperation by the international community.355  Wolcott states that: 
“the greatest difficulty arises in the reluctance of countries to apply sanctions 
in the absence of a UN resolution.  Aside from the United States, which 
enacted the International Emergency Economics Powers Act (IEEPA), no 
country has passed legislation permitting the freezing of foreign assets held 
within national borders.”356   
 
Another form of targeted sanctions is the idea of combining both economic sanctions 
and economic incentives to induce compliance with international norms.  Also called 
the “carrots and sticks” approach, this kind of sanctions operates by giving incentives 
like financial aid that appeal to the specific target State.  The aid is used as tool to 
incite change to the unwanted policies of the target State.  Wolcott notes that 
incentives might “assist when the norms of democracy and human rights are 
violated, but not with threats to international peace and security, which require 
diplomatic and military backing.”357  For example, when the threat of the use of 
nuclear weapons arise the use of incentives will not be sufficient.   
 
Gibson warns that this mechanism “can only appropriately be used to encourage 
positive changes; using carrots for nations that have clearly violated international 
                                                 
354 Cortright D. and Lopez G. (2000) 240. 
355 Wolcott L. (1997) 363. 
356 Ibid. 
357 Wolcott L. (1997) 361. 
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norms risks is sending the wrong message. … incentives in this latter situation risk 
giving the appearance of rewarding wrongdoing.”358   
 
The goal or function of targeted sanctions has changed the general application of 
economic sanctions from the target State as a whole to the government elite with a 
focus on the individual or group of individuals.  This targeting is done through a form 
of individual lists.  In this way targeted sanctions conform to the principle of IHL 
prohibiting indiscriminate attacks and apply the sanction to the specific individuals.  
Information as to the particular individual is obtained through most States, connected 
to the targeted State or expert panels.359  Cameron writes about the source of 
information of individuals that: 
“it is reasonable to assume that those States with economic and historical 
(former colonial) interests in particular target States have taken the lead in 
blacklisting. I have heard from various people that the main source of the 
names in UNITA travel and financial sanctions was the Angolan 
government.”360 
 
This category of targeted sanctions adopted, what I call, US unilateralism (“you are 
either with us or against us!”) in relation to the blacklisting procedure adopted after 
September 11th.361  Cameron suggests that if blacklisting is to be maintained then 
there needs to be a national mechanism for appeal against wrongful blacklisting.362 
 
An example of the difficulty to get delisted from so-called terrorist lists was illustrated 
by the delay in delisting of prominent ANC members.  It was only in 2008 according 
to media reports that the United States government removed former President of 
South Africa, Nelson Mandela and other prominent ANC members such as Tokyo 
Sexwale and Sidney Mufamadi from its list of global terrorists.363  These individuals 
could until recently not enter the US without pre-authorisation as their application for 
visas would be rejected if they travelled to the US in their personal capacity.   
 
                                                 
358 Gibson S. (1999) 235. 
359 Cameron I, Targeted Sanctions and Legal Safeguards, available at,  
< http://resources .jur.uu.se/repository/5/PDF/staff/sanctions.pdf > (Accessed 21/09/07), at pg 5. 
360 Cameron I op cit 6. 
361 Cameron I op cit 14. 
362 Cameron I.op cit 35. 
363 Smith C. (10/08/2003) Mandela's name comes off US terror list, available at 
 <http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=3&art_id=ct20030810102700522T600578> (07/10/2008). 
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To resolve the problems unfolding in the de-listing of individuals Bothe states that: 
“there must be a general normative standard for any measure affecting 
individual rights, the review measures must be based on reliable 
evidence…and the individual must have an effective remedy against such 
measures.”364  
Furthermore that: 
“the individual must be notified in an understandable way and must have an 
opportunity to appeal. The review body must be independent and impartial; 
must be able to review the measure and must play a really decisive role and 
must not merely be advisory in nature.”365 
 
Bothe goes further and suggests that this blacklisting procedure should be 
complemented by a review procedure based on the review panels of the World Bank 
and the dispute procedure of the WTO.366  How this can be complemented by a 
national mechanism, as suggested by Cameron, is difficult to conceptualise.   
 
Targeted sanctions, in theory, to a large extent minimise the impact of economic 
sanctions.  A different aspect of targeted sanctions that is procedural in nature, 
applies to the short-comings in relation to humanitarian exemption clauses 
implemented by the UN Sanctions Committees. 
 
6.3 Appropriate Monitoring of Economic Sanctions 
 
The SC establishes Sanctions Committees to monitor the implementation and effects 
of sanctions it has decided to impose on States.  Sanctions Committees are named 
after the resolution imposing the sanction, for example Committee 661 monitors the 
sanctions on Iraq relating to SC Resolution 661 of 1990.  The Committees are made 
up of a non-permanent member of the SC; the chairperson has a secretariat of 
seven staff members and forms part of the UN Department of Political Affairs.  It 
                                                 
364 Bothe M. (2007) 5. 
365 Bothe M. (2007) op cit. 
366 Bothe M (2007) op cit, 6. Bothe summarises the essentials of this review procedure as including aspects like: 
a review of the listing decisions providing essential guarantees of fairness, namely: independence of the 
reviewing body; appropriate screening of review requests; effective and fair taking of evidence; speedy 
procedure; and publicity of the results of the procedure. 
 
 
 
 
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
83 
 
adopts its own rules of procedure and takes decisions by way of consensus of all the 
members.367 
 
Sanctions Committees decide whether a product that is sanctioned can be exempt 
taking into consideration the commercial or humanitarian nature of the transaction or 
of the goods in question.  The humanitarian goods excluded from sanctions, for 
example food and medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes, are 
subject to a “notification procedure.”368  The notification procedure requires only a 
letter to be sent to the Sanctions Committee and an acknowledgement will be sent, 
by the President of the Sanctions Committee, to the party authorising the goods to 
be imported.369   
 
Goods considered indispensable for the survival of the civilian population to operate, 
such as schools and hospitals, also known as goods that are “humanitarian by 
destination,” may also be exempt from the sanctions.  These goods are subject to a 
“non-objection procedure.”370  Here the Sanctions Committee examines requests on 
a case-to-case basis.  Only States, intergovernmental organisations, for example UN 
agencies, and the ICRC can make such requests.  Non-governmental organisations 
(NGO’s) may only submit requests to the State where their headquarters are located.  
This means that the NGO has to submit a request to its appropriate ministry, which 
then submits the request to the ambassador to the UN, who finally submits the 
request to the relevant Sanctions Committee.  The request is then open to objection 
from the members within a given period.  If the period had expired and there were no 
objections the request may be authorised.  Furthermore, if there are any objections 
the request will be refused without reasons. 
 
Bouchet-Sualnier critiques this procedure of the Sanctions Committee, arguing that it 
leads to long delays and refusals that are not transparent because the meetings of 
the Sanctions Committees are held behind closed doors without minute taking and 
no justification is given for a refusal.371  The CESCR also criticised the Sanctions 
Committees in calling for more transparent set of agreed principles and procedures 
                                                 
367 Bouchet-Sualnier F. (2002) 364. 
368 Ibid. 
369 Bouchet-Sualnier F. (2002) 365. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Ibid. 
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based on human rights, wider range of exempt goods and services, authorisation of 
agreed agencies to determine necessary exemptions, better resources for Sanctions 
Committees, more precise targeting of the sanctioned regime, and a more overall 
flexibility.372  
 
A possible answer to these criticisms can be found in interpreting the concept of 
humanitarian relief with regards to the role and structure of the Sanctions 
Committees in relation to sanctions.  In general, the civilian population of States 
have the right to receive humanitarian assistance, subject to certain conditions.  
Firstly, the State allowing passage must be satisfied that there are no serious 
reasons for fearing that consignments may be diverted from their destination, that 
there is effective control over the operation, that no definite advantage may accrue to 
the military efforts or economy of the enemy and that distribution will be carried out 
under the supervision of the protecting power or the ICRC.373  Secondly and more 
particularly, the following relief must be allowed for:  
medical and hospital consignments and objects necessary for religious 
worship intended only for the civilian population and essential foodstuffs, 
clothing and tonics intended for children under 15, expectant mothers and 
maternity cases.374 
 
The CESCR states in relation to the normative content of Article 11 of the Covenant 
that:  
“States Parties should refrain at all times from food embargoes or similar 
measures which endanger conditions for food production and access to food 
in other countries.  Food should never be used as an instrument of political or 
economic pressure.”375 
 
From the above provisions one can see that goods that are subject to the notification 
procedure as well as goods that are considered indispensable for the survival of the 
civilian population by the Sanctions Committee may be regulated in terms of 
humanitarian law.  These international norms may reduce the negative 
consequences of the Sanctions Committees procedures, namely, time delays in 
                                                 
372 CESCR General Comment No 8 para 12. 
373 Fourth Geneva Convention (IV), article 23 and Protocol I, article 70.  
374 Geneva Convention (IV) article 23. 
375 CESCR General Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food, E/C. 12/1999/5, 5 May 1999, para. 37. 
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granting notifications for humanitarian goods, as well as refusing to allow goods 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population without any reasons being 
provided.   
 
Geiss suggests a number of proposals to improve the Sanctions Committees 
procedure and efficiency with regards to the monitoring of targeted sanctions.376  He 
proposes the inclusion of automatic suspension clauses be included in the 
Resolution, and argues that:  
“under article 27(3) of the UN Charter, the suspension or termination of a 
sanctions regime requires the consent of all five permanent Security Council 
members. In light of political realities, it is unrealistic to assume that the 
Security Council will always achieve the necessary consensus to adapt a 
sanctions regime with sufficient speed to respond effectively to a humanitarian 
crisis.”377   
 
The clause will not only come into play automatically in the event of large scale 
humanitarian emergencies, but it will also give Sanctions Committees the opportunity 
to monitor the impact of the economic sanctions on the humanitarian situation and 
will give the Sanctions Committee the discretion to modify it appropriately.378   
 
7. CONCLUSION 
 
Economic sanctions can be a devious and destructive tool if used in the wrong way.  
When it is properly conceptualised the tool can be an alternative to war without the 
impact and loss of lives associated with war.  A proper design of economic sanctions 
implemented against a target State must consider principles of IHL and IHRL.   
 
These principles include the proportionality and necessity.  The principles can be 
used as a mechanism to evaluate the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  An 
example of a human rights approach is when the damage suffered as a result of 
sanctions can be kept to a minimum with the enforcement of the core minimum 
obligations as required for the enjoyment of the right to health.  This would comply 
with the notion of respect for human rights required by the CESCR in relation to 
                                                 
376 Geiss R. (2005) 189. 
377 Geiss R. (2005) 190. 
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economic, social and cultural rights.379  If the sanctioned State is not capable of 
fulfilling this obligation the international community must take this responsibility.380  
 
It goes without saying that a reaction to gross violations of human rights may not 
justify economic sanctions to such an extent as to deprive the people of the 
necessary means of survival.  The response to the violation of human rights, far from 
producing compliance, would in its turn worsen the situation of the people entitled to 
legal protection.381  
 
The concept of targeted sanctions considerably improves the situation but the same 
principles that are suggested to guide broad-based economic sanctions must be 
applied in the creation and implementation of targeted sanctions.  This means that 
principles of necessity and proportionality derived from IHL and general principles of 
human rights must be extended to the design and implementation of targeted 
sanctions.  
 
In conclusion some political considerations would need to be taken into account 
before the blanket implementation of economic sanctions:  
 
 Any Resolution imposing economic sanctions should be drafted in clear 
language and specify in precise terms the behaviour expected of the target 
State so that it is clear what change in behaviour will result in lifting of the 
economic sanctions.  This is important because prolonged economic 
sanctions have a significant potential for causing serious long-term damage to 
an economy and society of the target State.  In addition the Resolution must 
be clear as to what products are exempted from the Resolution.   
 
To facilitate the removal of ambiguity, the Resolution must state in clear terms 
categories of products excluded from the economic sanctions.  Furthermore, 
the foreign companies must be given the assurance that they will not be 
prosecuted for non-compliance with the economic sanctions provided the 
                                                 
379 CESCR General Comment No. 8 paras 1 referring to articles 1, 55 and 56 of the UN Charter and 12 any 
sanctioning State or third party must take responsibility for a more transparent set of agreed principles and 
procedures based on respect for human rights. 
380 CESCR General Comment No. 8 para 11. 
381 A closer examination of the Iraq situation will follow in Chapter 4. 
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traded products fall within these lists.  Preferably these exempted lists should 
be communicated to all enforcing the economic sanctions.  In particular, the 
list should be provided to military forces inspecting air, maritime and border 
cargoes.   
 
 Before the implementation of economic sanctions consideration must be given 
to the nature of the international wrong or human rights abuses that economic 
sanctions are intended to remedy, in other words, what are the stakes for the 
targeted State as well as the sender of the sanctions.  In this regard, it is 
important to note that the expression “threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression” in article 39 of the UN Charter is broad enough to 
include serious violations of human rights where these constitute a threat to 
the peace.  It may be that a stricter economic sanctions programme may be 
justifiable if the sanctions are imposed to contain or avoid an actual or 
threatened conflict instead of as a response to human rights violations. 
 
 Another consideration is the likely effectiveness of the economic sanctions.  
The most obvious way of judging the effectiveness of economic sanctions is in 
terms of their capacity to alter the conduct of the target State.  This is not the 
only measure of effectiveness; however, with consideration should also be 
given to the goal, targets as well as the alternatives of the sanctions regime.  
Consideration of other indicators of unsuccessful economic sanctions such as 
the cost or impact determined by mortality and morbidity rates should also be 
considered. 
 
 Regard must also be had for the potentially destabilising and devastating long 
term effects of the economic sanctions.  The stated objective or goal of 
economic sanctions is normally to alter the conduct of the target State.  It is 
important to remember that a further tacit objective, or unintended 
consequence, of sanctions may be the change of the political infrastructure of 
the target State.  In considering the severity of the economic sanctions, it is 
also necessary to take account of the fact that the sanctions may generate 
political instability, local tensions or violence and local hardships.  Instead an 
alternative objective before the lifting of economic sanctions should be 
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considered.  One such an alternative could be to bring the parties to the 
negotiation table. 
 
In conclusion, certain international humanitarian law considerations must be given to 
the economic sanctions programme during its implementation of economic 
sanctions: 
 
 The degree of suffering caused must be analysed on an ongoing basis.  
Indiscriminate economic sanctions must not be implemented by any State or 
international organisation.  A well-designed economic sanctions programme 
would seek to affect those in power (and therefore in a position to effect 
change) in the target State, rather than the population at large.   
 
 Humanitarian organisations should be mostly concerned with broad-based 
economic sanctions, as these have the greatest potential for inflicting suffering 
on the civilian population of the target State. It is self-evident that any 
comprehensive economic sanctions will affect the situation of the civilian 
population.  In assessing economic sanctions, it is necessary to consider the 
degree of long term suffering they cause to vulnerable groups, particularly the 
young and the elderly.  Automatic suspension clauses should come into effect 
if the impact on these groups is disproportionate to the objective. 
 
 The objective or the aim of economic sanctions must not be disproportionate 
to the cost or impact incurred.  The test for proportional economic sanctions 
should lie in the fulfilment of the core minimum obligations of the State.  If it is 
found that the State had reasonably attempted to fulfil its core minimum 
obligations, however the economic impact still demonstrably limit the 
enjoyment of the basic human rights, economic sanctions should be halted or 
automatically suspended.  The suspension should be made public in the same 
manner as the initial Resolution that imposed economic sanctions.  This must 
be done even if it means that the desired result such as a change of the 
government is delayed.   
 
 Economic sanctions should provide for humanitarian exceptions to limit the 
suffering caused among the civilian population.  The system of humanitarian 
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exceptions provided for in the sanctions resolution must be effective.  While 
proper implementation of economic sanctions will require the monitoring of 
goods shipped to the target State, it is essential to ensure that this does not 
undermine the humanitarian exemptions.   
 
 An effective humanitarian exemption must not be overburdened by complex or 
time-consuming administrative requirements which would increase the cost of 
delivery of humanitarian assistance and delay its arrival.  In this regard 
consideration of the pre-sanction GDP of the target State as well as budget for 
necessary departments such as health and education must be noted as an 
extreme shock to these budgets has ripple effects on the enforcement and 
enjoyment of these international human rights.   
 
 Economic sanctions should recognise the capacity of States and humanitarian 
agencies to provide humanitarian assistance in times of armed conflict where 
permitted by IHL.  If economic sanctions are likely to result in considerable 
hardship for the civilian population, a sanctions Resolution should require the 
provision of humanitarian assistance sufficient to ensure that the lives and 
health of the population are not endangered by the sanctions. 
 
 The situation of the civilian population in the target State should be taken into 
account in the design of economic sanctions.  The effects, long- as well as 
short-term, of the sanctions should be monitored during the implementation of 
economic sanctions. 
 
 The reason for the imposition of sanctions and the likely effectiveness of a 
sanctions regime are two factors which must be considered in order to arrive 
at an intelligent and sustainable position in regard to sanctions.  In particular, it 
is essential to bear in mind that under the UN Charter the options open to the 
SC when faced with a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression are limited by the UN Charter and IHL and IHRL.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON SOUTH AFRICA AND 
IRAQ 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Before analysing the effect that economic sanctions may have had on the population 
of South Africa382 and Iraq, the difficulties of such an analysis must be 
acknowledged.  In general, there exists no exact method for measuring precisely 
what damage was caused by sanctions as opposed to other factors.  For example, 
the US led armed intervention in Northern Iraq of April 1991 (First Gulf War) had 
devastating economic effects on that region.  There are clear difficulties with 
measuring exactly how much of the impact on the enjoyment of the right to health is 
attributable to economic sanctions alone.  Nevertheless, the studies and reports 
cited in the previous Chapters strongly suggest that economic sanctions have had a 
direct impact on the enjoyment of the right to health of the population of these target 
States.   
 
On the one hand the right to health includes basic elements normally associated with 
a healthcare system, such as the provision for: medical services in the event of 
sickness; the reduction of the still birth rate; the healthy development of the child as 
well as the prevention, reduction and control of epidemic and endemic diseases.383  
On the other hand the right to health requires some preconditions conducive to good 
health that are not normally directly associated with the healthcare system, such as a 
clean environment and clean potable water.  Economic sanctions can have a 
devastating impact on both these elements of the enjoyment of the right to health.   
 
I will attempt to create an understanding of the economic issues relevant to each 
target State.  In order to understand the ramifications of economic sanctions, the 
reader must understand the unique circumstances peculiar to each target State.  A 
brief background of the: history, economy and political dynamics are necessary.  This 
                                                 
382 The government of Apartheid South Africa had created, through legislation and policy, artificial 
classifications of people into black, coloured, indian and white.  It is necessary in this Chapter to refer to these 
classifications. However, I do not necessarily endorse the use of these terms. 
383 According to article 12 (2)(a) and (c). 
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methodology is aimed at giving the reader a better understanding of the impact on 
the enjoyment of the right to health on the population of the particular target State.   
Furthermore, this Chapter entails an analysis of the sanctions programmes imposed 
on South Africa and Iraq and begins with a focus on the political conditions 
necessitating sanctions.  In addition, it scrutinises the impact of the SC Resolutions 
that imposed sanctions, in general, as well as economic sanctions, in particular.  It 
not only analyses collective action taken by the UN, but also unilateral action taken 
by individual States specifically the US.  The Chapter concludes with a comparison 
of some of the salient similarities and differences between the two sanctions 
programmes.   
 
2. THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
 
The reason for including South Africa in this study is due to the lack of 
acknowledgement of the impact on the enjoyment of the rights of certain groups of 
South Africans.  In addition, instead of the impact on South African the focus of the 
economic sanction programme on South Africa had been the success of economic 
sanctions based on the fact that a regime change took place.   
 
For this reason the sanctions programme imposed on South Africa is commonly 
used as an example of the success of economic sanctions because it is credited with 
putting pressure on South Africa that supposedly led to the liberalisation of black 
South Africans.384  However, the devastating effect on South Africans due to 
economic sanctions was never acknowledged and never studied.  This lack of 
acknowledgment and research stems from a lack of statistical analysis of the impact 
on the vulnerable groups of South Africa that ultimately bore the brunt of the 
economic sanctions.   
 
Human rights abuses were perpetrated through the Apartheid policies and legislation 
of the government of South Africa.  Apartheid marginalised all groups, even some 
white groups.385  There were, of course, a minority of white people who was against 
the Apartheid policies and thus economic sanctions must have also had an impact 
on all South Africans including whites.  The impact that was suffered by the majority 
                                                 
384 See, for example, Garfield R (1999) 4.  
385 The reference to the word “white” is explained later in this section. 
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of other groups falling in other races was much more devastating and hence the 
focus of this analysis.   
 
The basic principle of Apartheid was that people be legally classified in racial groups 
based largely on appearance.  The marginalisation entered all spheres of community 
life regardless of mode: social, cultural, economic, political and civil. 
 
Politics, education, medical care and other public services were segregated 
according to race.  The public services available to Black people were of the most 
inferior standard of all the race groups.  Initially, the aim of the Apartheid was to 
maintain white domination while extending racial separation.  The apartheid policy 
became so popular that in the 1960's, a plan of Grand Apartheid was executed, 
emphasising territorial separation and police repression.386  
 
2.1 Political Conditions Necessitating Imposition of Sanctions 
 
Apartheid legislation was extensive and thus not all the legislation will be discussed. 
References are made to some of the legislation passed by the then South African 
parliament.  Apartheid legislation did not emerge in a vacuum.  Precursors to 
Apartheid legislation included the Mines and Works Act, and permitted the granting 
of certificates of competency for a number of skilled mining occupations to whites 
and coloureds only. 387   
 
After winning the 1948 election the National Party (NP), under the leadership of 
Daniel Francois Malan, immediately implemented its Apartheid policy.388  The NP 
ensured the enactment of the first miscegenation legislation called the Prohibition of 
Mixed Marriages Act in 1949.389  This Act prohibited marriages between white people 
and members of other races.  Race laws touched every aspect of social life, 
including education, land ownership, movement, employment, as well as health care. 
                                                 
386 The History of Apartheid in South Africa, available at  
< http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html > (Accessed 07/04/07). Apartheid or 
Political Apartheid is known as Grand Apartheid whereas segregation is known as Petty Apartheid. 
387 Act No. 12 of 1911. Other such legislation included:-The Natives Land Act, No 27 of 1913 and the Natives 
(Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923. 
388 Segregation law that served as precursors to Apartheid legislation passed by the NP included: The Natives 
Land Act, No 27 of 1913 and the Natives (Urban Areas) Act 21 of 1923 and made it illegal for blacks to 
purchase land from white people in areas other than black reserves and the later laid the foundation for 
residential segregation in urban areas. 
389 Act No 55 of 1949. 
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The Internal Security Act390 (ISA) conferred wide powers of detention without trial, 
banning of persons, organisations, gatherings as well as publications on the 
police.391   
The Public Safety Act392 (PSA) enabled the declaration of a State of Emergency 
(SOE) granting even wider and more unbridled powers to the executive in South 
Africa.  The Apartheid government declared partial SOE’s in 1960 and 1985 and 
National SOE’s in 1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989.393  The Public Safety Amendment 
Act394 (PSAA) enabled the declaration of unrest areas.  The idea was the extension 
of SOE-type powers within specified areas without actually declaring a SOE.  This 
was done to avoid the international repercussions in the form of economic sanctions 
for South Africa.395   
 
As stated in the introduction of this Chapter all South Africans were racially classified 
into categories: white396 (of European decent), black (of African descent), coloured 
(of mixed descent) and indian (originating from India).  In 1950 this classification was 
legislated by the South African parliament and named the Population Registration 
Act.397  The coloured category sometimes included major subgroups of Indians and 
Asians.  Classification into these categories was based on appearance, social 
acceptance, and descent. For example, a white person was defined as in 
                                                 
390 Act No. 74 of 1982. 
391 The aftermath of the Rabie Commission of Inquiry, recommended the Act, providing for the following: 
banning of organisations, if the Minister had reason to believe than an organisation was using, encouraging, or 
threatening violence or disturbance in order to overthrow or challenge state authority or bring about change 
(sections 4 and 6); banning of publications; (sections 5 and 15) banning of people, including confinement to a 
particular district, prohibition from attending any kind of meeting and prevention from being quoted as well as 
providing for house arrest (sections 19(1) and 20); indefinite preventative detention and detention for 
interrogation (sections 28 and 29); in addition the detention could not be invalidated by a court of law (section 
29(2)); detention of potential witnesses for not longer than six months or for the duration of a trial (section 31); 
empowerment of the Attorney-General to order that prisoners arrested be refused bail (section 30); prohibition 
of meetings (sections 46-53); redefinition of ‘communism' to include campaigns of civil disobedience and 
creation of racial hostility between European and non-European races of the Republic (section 54); proscription 
of such activities as the promotion of ‘general dislocation' or the causing of ‘prejudice or interruption' to an 
industry or undertaking ‘with the purpose of effecting social, political, constitutional, industrial or economic 
change' (section 54(2)); prohibition of actions causing, encouraging or fomenting feelings of hostility between 
different population groups (section 62). 
392 Act No. 3 of 1953. 
393 The PSA was finally repealed by the State of Emergency Act No 86 of 1995. 
394 Act No. 67 of 1986. 
395 See discussion on UN Resolution 569 below. 
396 Also included in this group was “honorary whites”, which included individuals not from European decent but 
that received the honour from the South African government to be classified as white. The “honour” was 
bestowed on individuals dependent on the governments relationship with the individual’s country of origin, an 
example of such individuals is Iranians. 
397 Act No 30 of 1950. 
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appearance obviously a white person or generally accepted as a white person.398  A 
person could not be considered white if one of his or her parents were non-white.  
The determination that a person was white would take into account his or her habits, 
education, speech, deportment and demeanour.  A black person would be of, or 
accepted as, a member of an African tribe or race, and a coloured person was one 
that was neither black nor white.399 
The Group Areas Act400 forced physical segregation between races by creating 
different residential areas for different races.  This led to removals of people living in 
the “wrong” areas.401  The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act402 (later called the 
National States Citizenship Act) required that all South African blacks become 
citizens of one of the self-governing territories.403  The Bantu Homelands Citizenship 
Act was a denaturalisation law passed by the Apartheid government.  It changed the 
status of the inhabitants of the make-shift States so that they were no longer citizens 
of South Africa.  The introduction of the Act also ensured that the white population of 
South Africa would have its contact with the 'non-white' population reduced to a bare 
minimum.  In 1970, Connie Mulder, the then South African Information and Interior 
Minister stated  
"no black person will eventually qualify (for South African nationality and the 
right to work or live in South Africa) because they will all be aliens, and as 
such, will only be able to occupy the houses bequeathed to them by their 
fathers, in the urban areas, by special permission of the Minister."404 
  
                                                 
398 Ibid. 
399 Other legislation included the Group Areas Act of 1950 which mandated clear separation of people according 
to their race and also amounted to forced removals in order to obtain separation and the Bantu Education Act No 
47 of 1953. 
400 Act No 30 of 1950. 
401 For example, the coloured community of District Six in Cape Town had to move to various places 
constructed by the Apartheid government for this reason. 
402  Act No 26 of 1970. 
403 Some of the so-called Bantustans received independence. In South Africa these included Transkei, Venda, 
Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei (the so-called TBVC states) which were declared independent, while others (like 
KwaZulu, Lebowa, and QwaQwa), received partial autonomy, but were never granted independence. Transkei 
(Xhosa) declared independent on 26 October 1976, Bophuthatswana (Tswana) declared independent on 6 
December 1977, Venda (Venda) declared independent on 13 September 1979, Ciskei (also Xhosa) declared 
independent on 4 December 1981, Gazankulu (Tsonga [Shangaan]), KaNgwane (Swazi), KwaNdebele 
(Ndebele), KwaZulu Zulu), Lebowa (Northern Sotho or Pedi) and QwaQwa (Southern Sotho). The Bantu 
Homelands Citizen Act was repealed by the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act No 200 of 1993. 
404 See < http://africanhistory.about.com/od/apartheidlaws/g/No26of70.htm > and < http://www.soweto-
funtours.co.za/images/time10.pdf > (Accessed 12/11/2008). 
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2.2 INTERNATIONAL REACTION 
 
Through implementation of the Apartheid policy, South Africa had violated 
international law and the UN Charter.  Apartheid had been denounced as unlawful 
and a criminal offence by the International Convention on the Suppression and 
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Anti-Apartheid Convention) 405 and unlawful 
according to the International Covenant on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD). 406  Apartheid had also been declared an “international crime” 
by the International Law Commission, the UN General Assembly and the Anti-
Apartheid Convention.407   
 
The Anti-Apartheid Convention also proclaims Apartheid to be a crime against 
humanity408 and expressly disposes of the principle of territoriality as an impediment 
to jurisdiction of the domestic courts.409  Furthermore the Anti-Apartheid Convention 
renders individuals criminally liable for the crime of Apartheid.  Hence, members of 
organisations and institutions (not the organisation or institution itself), and 
representatives of the State (not the State itself) are culpable.410 
 
2.2.1 Security Council Resolutions and other Sanctions 
 
The international community’s opposition to Apartheid was slow to develop, 
specifically because of South Africa’s strategic position in relation to trade routes 
around the Cape of Good Hope and because the country was a source of valuable 
essential minerals.411  The first international response came from the British 
Commonwealth.  Ewins writes in this regard that:  
                                                 
405 Adopted and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly Resolution 3068 (XXVIII) of 30 
November 1973 entry into force 18 July 1976, in accordance with article XV. Available at  
< http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/11.htm > (Accessed on 12/11/08). 
406 See full citation in Chapter 2.  
407 See Dugard J Sanctions against South Africa: An international law perspective 111, published in Orkin M 
(1989) Sanctions against Apartheid, Community Agency for Social Enquiry.  
408 Article 1. 
409 Article 5. 
410 Article 3. 
411 Ewins R. (1995) International Moves Against Apartheid, available at  
< http://www.speedysnail.com/textuary/apartheid.html > (Accessed 12/11/07). See also The Gleneagles 
Agreement on Sporting Contacts with South Africa, the Commonwealth agreement that excludes South Africans 
from competing in international sport (1977)  
< http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/commonwealth/gleneagles.html > (Accessed 12/11/08). 
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“this expulsion from the Commonwealth was not entirely to the dislike of the 
Afrikaner-dominated National Party government, which spoke of freedom from 
the old colonial masters and outside domination.”412 
 
The first UN General Assembly Resolution that dealt with South African policy was 
taken in 1946 after an application by the government of India.413  The UN was of the 
opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union was not in compliance with 
international agreements concluded by the Indian and South African governments. 
The Conference of Independent African States, predecessor to the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU), asked all African States to break off all diplomatic relations with 
South Africa and to institute a comprehensive trade, transport and communications 
boycott.414   
 
The request of the OAU spurred other organisations to follow suite and evolved in an 
international isolation and sanctions strategy against South Africa.  The isolation was 
accomplished through the withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961, withdrawal 
from the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the Universal Postal Union 
(UPU) in 1963. In addition, South Africa was forced to withdraw from the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the WHO in 1964 and even the General 
Assembly of the UN in 1974.415 
 
The UN created a series of bodies specialising in dealing with the Apartheid policies 
of South Africa.  The General Assembly established its Special Committee against 
Apartheid in 1962 and the UN Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Southern Africa 
was established by the HRC.  The General Assembly also adopted the Anti-
Apartheid Convention of 1973, as referred to above.  
 
The Anti-Apartheid Convention illustrates the divide in the application of measures 
against South Africa in that no western industrialised State ever ratified it.416  In the 
                                                 
412 Ewins R ibid. 
413 GA Resolution 44 (I) available here, 
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/95/IMG/NR003295.pdf?OpenElement > 
(Accessed 12/12/2008). 
414 Tomaševski K. (2000) 49. 
415 Ibid. 
416 See Status of Ratifications, Reservations and Declarations, at 
 < http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty8_asp.htm > (Assessed 12/11/08).  Notable absentees are the 
United Kingdom and the US.  
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same year as the adoption of the Anti-Apartheid Convention, the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities appointed a Special 
Rapporteur on the Adverse Consequences for the Enjoyment of Human Rights of 
Political, Military, Economic and other Forms of Assistance Given to the Racist and 
Colonialist regime of South Africa.  
 
The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) a breakaway party of the African National 
Congress (ANC) organised a series of demonstrations against the pass laws.417  On 
21 March 1960, a large group of black people in Sharpeville demonstrated by not 
carrying their passes.  A group of 300 police opened fire on the protesters.  The 
shooting left 69 people dead and 187 people wounded.  As a result of the unrest the 
government of South Africa declared a SOE.  The emergency lasted for 156 days.  
Wielding the PSA and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, the White regime had no 
intention of changing the unjust laws of Apartheid.418  
 
The Sharpeville Massacre, as it became known, did elicit a response from the SC.  
In April 1960 the SC passed a Resolution calling for the end of Apartheid, however, 
the UK and France decided to abstain from this Resolution resulting in no substantial 
economic action from the SC.419   
 
Another important international issue was the occupation of South-West Africa 
(Namibia) by South Africa.  The occupation was responsible for added international 
negative attention and the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa.  
South Africa officially took possession of Namibia from Germany during WW1.  After 
the war the Treaty of Versailles declared the territory to be a League of Nations 
                                                 
417 The Natives Abolition of Passes and Co-ordination of Documents Act No 67 of 1952, forced black people to 
carry identification at all times. A pass included a photograph, details of place of origin, employment record, tax 
payments, and police encounters. It made it a criminal offence to be unable to produce a pass when required to 
do so by the police. A black person could not enter an urban area without a pass. 
418 The History of Apartheid in South Africa, available at  
< http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~cale/cs201/apartheid.hist.html > (Accessed 07/04/07). 
419 SC Resolution 134 (1960) available here,  
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/032/95/IMG/NR003295.pdf?OpenElement > SC 
Resolution S/4300. On October 8, 1963 (the day the Rivonia trial began), Oliver Tambo addressed the UN 
General Assembly with these words: “I cannot believe that the United Nations can stand by calmly watching 
what I submit is genocide masquerading under the guise of a civilised dispensation of justice”. Three days later, 
the General Assembly passed a Resolution, by a vote of 106 to 1 (South Africa), condemning the South African 
Government’s apartheid policy and calling for the end of all political trials and the unconditional release of 
political prisoners. Britain, the US, France and Australia, however, abstained on the operative paragraph 
requesting the abandonment of the “arbitrary trial now in progress.” 
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Protectorate.  Subsequently, the territory was placed under the South African 
administration by the League.   
 
After WW2, South Africa refused to release the territory to begin its transition to 
independence.  At the time the territory was treated as a province of the Union of 
South Africa.  On 21 October 1966 the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 
2145 to terminate the mandate of South Africa and place Namibia under UN 
administration. This Resolution was upheld in the ICJ case, Legal Consequences 
for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970).420 
 
The ultimate goal of sanctions against South Africa was an unconditional end to 
Apartheid policies as stated in the Resolutions imposed on South Africa.  In 1962, 
the UN called for economic sanctions against South Africa.  In particular, the General 
Assembly passed Resolution 1761 (XVII) and called on member States “separately 
and collectively, in conformity with the UN Charter” to break diplomatic relations with 
South Africa, to close ports to South African vessels, to forbid their own vessels to 
enter South African port, to boycott all South African goods and refrain from 
exporting to South Africa, and to suspend landing rights for South African aircrafts.421  
Again this Resolution was not mandatory and implementation was voluntary.  As a 
result not all UN member States applied the Resolution.422   
 
In 1963, as a direct result of the Sharpeville Massacre and the initial imprisonment of 
Nelson Mandela, the SC adopted two SC Resolutions: 181 of 1963 and 182 of 
1963.423  These sanctions were, however, not adopted under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter and therefore implementation by member States was also voluntary.  
Essentially Resolution 181 called on all States to voluntarily cease all shipments of 
arms to South Africa and Resolution 182 called on all States to proscribe shipments 
of equipment and material for arms manufacture. 
 
                                                 
420 Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p. 16. at 57. 
421 Article 4(a)-(e). 
422 Dugard J. Sanctions against South Africa an international law perspective, published in Orkin (1989) 118. 
423 Resolution 181 S/5471 available at 
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/200/55/IMG/NR020055.pdf?OpenElement > 
Resolution taken on 04 December 1963 as well as SC 182 S/5386 available at,  
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/200/54/IMG/NR020054.pdf?OpenElement >, the 
Resolution was taken on 07 August 1963. 
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The attention of the SC was again placed on South Africa due to the killings during 
the Soweto uprising of 1976-7 as well as the death of Steve Biko in police custody in 
1977 and the consequent repressive police action in October 1977.  In SC 
Resolution 417 the SC condemned the brutal action under South African security 
laws as well as other racial repression taking place in South Africa at the time.424  
However, it was not until 4 November 1977, that the SC determined that the policies 
and actions of the South African government, together with the acquisition by South 
Africa of arms and related material, constituted a “threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security.”425   
 
Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the SC adopted Resolution 418 of 
1977.426  This Resolution imposed mandatory measures restricting arms and other 
military supplies to South Africa in terms of section 39 of the UN Charter.  
Furthermore, Resolution 418 called on all States to review all existing contractual 
arrangements with and licenses granted to South Africa relating to the manufacture 
and maintenance of arms, ammunition of all types and military equipment and 
vehicles, with a view to their termination.427  In addition the SC decided that all 
States should refrain from any cooperation with South Africa in the manufacture and 
development of nuclear weapons.428  With Resolution 473 of 1980 the SC called on 
the Sanctions Committee to redouble its efforts to secure full implementation of the 
arms embargo against South Africa by recommending measures to close all 
loopholes in the arms embargo.   
 
The SC adopted a further Resolution against South Africa in 1984.  Resolution 558 
requested States to refrain from importing arms, ammunition of all types and military 
vehicles produced in South Africa.  A further Resolution, SC Resolution 591 of 28 
November 1986, adopted comprehensive measures recommended by the Sanctions 
Committee to close loopholes in the arms embargo, reinforcing it and making it more 
comprehensive.  
 
                                                 
424 SC Resolution 417 of 31 October 1977, available at,   
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/297/00/IMG/NR029700.pdf?OpenElement >. 
425 SC Resolution 418 of 1977. 
426 Available at,  
< http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/297/00/IMG/NR029700.pdf?OpenElement >. 
427 SC Resolution 418 of 1977, para 3. 
428 SC Resolution 418 of 1977, para 4. 
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In 1985 in Resolution 569 the SC called for a lifting of the SOE and urged member 
States to adopt measures such as suspension of all new investments; prohibition of 
the sale of Kruger Rands; restriction of sports and cultural relations; suspension of 
guaranteed export loans; prohibition of all new contracts in the nuclear field; a 
prohibition of all sales of computer equipment that could be used by the South 
African army and police.429  However, as Dugard notes: 
“this Resolution was not preceded by a finding under article 39 (of the UN 
Charter) and was not binding on States.  Subsequent attempts by some 
members of the SC to persuade the SC to impose mandatory economic 
sanctions were vetoed by Britain and the United States.”430 
 
In the same era other forms of collective sanctions were imposed on South Africa, 
most notably the oil embargo of 1973 imposed by the OPEC. 431  The embargo came 
after much negotiation between African States affiliated with OPEC and Arab 
States.432  Iran a non-Arab State, however, refused to be part of the negotiations, 
and was seen by South Africa as a loophole to the embargo.433  This was followed by 
an oil embargo in 1985 by the European Economic Community (EEC).  However this 
embargo was perceived as a constraint on the importation of oil rather than a barrier.  
European member States were still involved with the shipping of oil to South Africa 
claiming a loss of jobs would ensue if they refused to do so.434   
 
A prominent feature of the Apartheid government of South Africa was its racial 
segregation of sporting activity within South Africa.  In 1977, Commonwealth heads 
of government agreed, as part of their support for the international campaign against 
Apartheid, to discourage contact and competition between their sportsmen and 
women and sporting organisations, teams or individuals from South Africa.  
 
The (Gleneagles) agreement was reached unanimously at Gleneagles in Scotland 
during the course of the biennial meeting of Commonwealth heads of government.435  
Therefore sports and cultural boycotts by international sports organisations became 
                                                 
429 SC Resolution 418, para 6 (a)-(f). 
430 Dugard J Op cit 117. 
431 The OPEC group States included, Nigeria, Gabon, Algeria, Libya, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Gambia. 
432 Kinghoffer A. (1989) 7. The Arab States included Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Kinghoffer A. (1989) 8.  
435 The Gleneagles Agreement on Sporting Contacts with South Africa (Commonwealth agreement on Apartheid 
in sport) 1977 < http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/commonwealth/gleneagles.html > (Accessed 12/11/08). 
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another form of defiance of the Apartheid policies.  The sport boycotts began with the 
expulsion of South Africa from international table tennis in 1956.  In addition, South 
Africa was excluded in 1964 and 1968 from Olympics by the Olympic Committee. 
and then expelled from the Olympic movement in 1972.436  South Africa was 
effectively banned from 90% of the international sport by the end of the 1980’s.   
 
Similar boycotts are recorded in the entertainment and artistic spheres.  The UN kept 
lists of artists that performed in South Africa in defiance of the boycotts and 
published this list at regular intervals.437  These cultural boycotts although also 
demoralising, had a less devastating effect on the Apartheid government of South 
Africa.   
The SC, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, terminated 
the sanctions against South Africa on 25 May 1994, by its Resolution 919 of 1994, 
after the first democratically elected government was formed in South Africa.  
Although the General Assembly on numerous occasions recommended the 
imposition of economic sanctions on Apartheid South Africa, mandatory economic 
sanctions were never imposed on South Africa.   
 
2.2.3 US Unilateral Sanctions  
 
The US played an important role in the impact that sanctions had on South Africa.  
This section refers to some of the policy decisions taken by the US to derail other 
bodies like the UN from taking decisive economic action against South Africa.  The 
initial US policy regarding Apartheid South Africa is summed up in the statement of 
the US representative to the UN, Francis T.P. Plimpton, who criticised the efficacy of 
economic sanctions against South Africa and stated that the US “will continue to 
oppose” specific sanctions.438  It signalled that western States were adopting an 
ambivalent approach to the abolition of Apartheid.   
 
In 1964 the US decided to restrict Eximbank loans available to South Africa and used 
its influence in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to convince the IMF to block 
                                                 
436 Ibid. 
437 UN Centre against Apartheid: Notes and documents August 1988 Register of Entertainers, Actors and Other 
who have performed in Apartheid South Africa. 
438 Case studies in Sanctions and Terrorism, available at 
< http://www.iie.com/research/topics/sanctions/southafrica.cfm > (Accessed 13/11/08) 
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the purchase of South African gold.  This was a first step towards the imposition of 
economic sanctions against Apartheid South Africa by the US, although it was 
implemented through the IMF.  At the instigation of the US the IMF refused to 
purchase gold at prices in excess of $35 per ounce.439  
 
Another step towards economic sanctions was taken on 22 February 1978 when the 
US administration under President Jimmy Carter issued regulations denying export 
and re-export of any item to South Africa or Namibia if the exporter “knows or has 
reason to know” the item will be “sold to or used by or for” the military or police in 
South Africa. 440  In 1979 the US decided to reduce military personnel in Pretoria and 
South African personnel in Washington.  These were positive steps but again, the 
action had almost no impact on the Apartheid policy exercised by the South African 
government.  The Reagan administration continued to apply a so-called “constructive 
engagement” policy with no decisive economic action.441 
 
In the 1980’s the western States started placing economic pressure on South Africa.  
This action was not taken by the executive component of these States but through 
the legislative component over-ruling its executives.442  The US Congress imposed 
comprehensive sanctions on South Africa on the 2nd of October 1986 and although 
President Reagan vetoed the Act his veto was overridden by Congress.443  The 
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (Anti Apartheid Act) of 1986444 was passed for 
the: 
“purpose of a comprehensive and complete framework to guide the efforts of 
the United States in helping to bring an end to the Apartheid in South African 
and lead to an establishment of a non-racial, democratic form of government.”  
 
McDougall’s summary of the Act states that it: 
“bans imports into the US of textiles, agricultural products, iron and steel, coal, 
and uranium…as well as any article grown, produced, manufactured, 
marketed or otherwise exported by a parastatal organisation of South Africa 
                                                 
439 Hufbauer G.C (1990) 229. 
440 Hufbauer G.C (1990) 228 
441 Bloom J (1986) 7. 
442 For example the Reagan administration believed in a constructive engagement with South Africa to induce 
gradual change, however, this achieved little. 
443 Levy P. Sanctions on South Africa: What did they do?, available at  
< http://www.econ.yale.edu/growth_pdf/cdp796.pdf > (Accessed 08/05/07). 
444 The Anti-Apartheid Act 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (Supp. IV 1986). 
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and Namibia.  In addition it prohibits new investment in South Africa and new 
loans to the government or organisations controlled by the government and 
revokes US and South African landing rights and aircraft providing services to 
the government.”445 
 
The Anti-Apartheid Act had a devastating effect on the South African economy 
because it shut down any prospect of economic growth.  One of the main reasons for 
the decline in growth was disinvestment by US multinational companies doing 
business in South Africa.446  The US national and international foreign policy towards 
the Apartheid government of South Africa differed somewhat during this time.  Even 
though the US enacted the Anti Apartheid Act, on 20 February 1987 the US, UK and 
West Germany still vetoed the SC Resolution calling for a package of mandatory 
sanctions.447  
 
As stated above, one of the consequences of the Anti-Apartheid Act was the process 
of disinvestment.  Disinvestment is a kind of economic sanction that require the 
withdrawal of foreign investment by international corporations.448  Various 
international corporations disinvested in their own corporations including Coca Cola, 
Exxon, Ford, IBM, etc.  UNESCO estimated that of 1453 foreign companies in South 
Africa at the time, 520 disinvested and this meant that about R18 Billion worth of 
private capital was moved out of South Africa.449   
 
The Sullivan Principles, introduced in 1977, consisted of seven requirements a 
corporation was to demand for its employees as a condition for doing business in 
South Africa.450  In general, the principles demanded the equal treatment of 
employees regardless of their race, both within and outside of the workplace. These 
demands directly conflicted with the Apartheid South African policies of racial 
segregation and unequal rights. 
                                                 
445 McDougall G. (1988) 20. 
446 Ewins R op cit 7. 
447 Hufbauer G.C. (1990) 229. 
448 See Budlender D (1989) Assessing US Corporate Disinvestment: The Case Report for the Equal Opportunity 
Foundation, Community Agency for Social Enquiry. 
449 Innes D Multinational Companies and Disinvestment 228; Published in Orkin M (1989) Sanctions against 
Apartheid Community Agency for Social Enquiry. 
450 In 1977, Rev. Leon Sullivan, an African-American preacher, was a member of the board of General Motors. 
At the time, General Motors was one of the largest corporations in the United States. General Motors also 
happened to be the largest employer of blacks in South Africa, a country which was pursuing a harsh program of 
state-sanctioned racial segregation and discrimination targeted primarily at the country's indigenous black 
population. One principle was added in 1984. 
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The principles were: 
1) non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities; 
2) equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 
3) equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same 
period of time; 
4) initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in 
substantial numbers, blacks and other non-whites for supervisory, 
administrative, clerical, and technical jobs; 
5) increasing the number of blacks and other non-whites in management and 
supervisory positions; 
6) improving the quality of life for blacks and other non-whites outside the work 
environment in such areas as housing, transportation, school, recreation, and 
health facilities; and 
7) working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and 
political justice. 451 
 
The Sullivan Principles were celebrated when introduced and gained wide use in the 
United States, particularly during the disinvestment campaign of the 1980s.  Before 
the end of South Africa's Apartheid era, the principles were formally adopted by more 
than 125 US corporations that had operations in South Africa.  Of those companies 
that formally adopted the principles, at least 100 completely withdrew their existing 
operations from South Africa. 
 
Although international corporations withdrew from South Africa, in an attempt to 
comply with the Anti-Apartheid Act, they still maintained links and continued to 
benefit from the corporations that they sold their businesses to.  An example of this 
was the agreement between IBM and ISM that entailed payment to the IBM 
Corporation to provide IBM products and services to the South African market.  The 
agreement would be renewable after 3 years.  A similar scenario took place with the 
disinvestment by General Motors (GM).  Delta Motor Corporation was a South 
African car manufacturer, which was created through a management buy-out after 
General Motors (GM) divested from South Africa in 1986.  The agreement entailed a 
continuation of the production of motor vehicles in South Africa under existing 
                                                 
451 Added in 1984. 
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trademarks.  The new Delta Corporation would then pay a licence fee to GM for use 
of their trade names such as Opel, Isuzu and Suzuki in South Africa.  In 1997, GM 
acquired a 45 per cent stake in Delta, and in 2003 the company became a fully-
owned subsidiary of General Motors South Africa again.452 
 
2.3 IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
The following section dealing with the impact on the right to health is divided into 
three sections, the first dealing with the economy and vulnerable groups, the second 
relates to the elements of the right to health and lastly the impact on the 
preconditions for health.  All three sections related to the impact on the international 
right to health and the enjoyment thereof.  For the purposes of this section the 
reference to “blacks” includes all groups not of European decent. 
 
2.3.1 Impact of economic sanctions on vulnerable groups and the 
economy 
 
The concept of human rights and vulnerable groups is not new.453  Any group that is 
open to injury or attack is vulnerable.  The Apartheid government created extra 
vulnerable groups, which consisted of almost everyone other then the white group.  
Apartheid had an impact on all vulnerable groups regardless of race, such as 
women, children, the elderly, the disabled, people with HIV/AIDS, all these 
vulnerable groups deserve special attention in normal circumstances.   
 
International human rights instruments to a large extent recognise the rights of these 
vulnerable groups.454  In addition, consideration before implementation of economic 
                                                 
452 See the article published by the South African Department of Trade and Industry, available at  
< http://www.thedti.gov.z  a/article/articleview.asp?current=1&arttypeid=1&artid=358 > (Accessed 11/10/08). 
453 Elisabeth Reichert (2006) Human Rights and Vulnerable Groups, available at,  
< http://www.sagepub.com/upm-data/11973_Chapter_5.pdf> (10/09/2008). 
454 For example, the rights of children are protected in various international instruments including: The 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 1386 (XIV), 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. 
A/4354 (1959); The Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990; Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex I, 54 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 7, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into force February 12, 2002; The 
Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924, adopted Sept. 26, 1924, League of Nations O.J. Spec. 
Supp. 21, at 43 (1924); The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, G.A. Res. 54/263, Annex II, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) 
at 6, U.N. Doc. A/54/49, Vol. III (2000), entered into force January 18, 2002; Convention Concerning the 
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO No. 182), 2133 
U.N.T.S.161, entered into force Nov. 19, 2000. UNICEF, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, 
entered into force Sept. 3, 1981; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
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sanctions should also be given to vulnerable groups specific to the targeted State.  
Treating these vulnerable groups in the same manner during the implementation of 
economic sanctions invariably perpetuates injustices.  I attempt to focus to some 
extent on the vulnerable groups particular to the targeted State. 
 
The impact of economic sanctions on the growth of the economy can be measured 
through an analysis of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of South Africa.  A decline 
in GDP also amounts to a decrease of expenditure which then limits resources for 
                                                                                                                                                        
Discrimination against Women, G.A. res. 54/4, annex, 54 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/54/49 
(Vol. I) (2000), entered into force Dec. 22, 2000; Convention on the Political Rights of Women, Protocol to the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, Adopted by the 2nd Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the Union, Maputo, CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept. 13, 2000); reprinted in 1 Afr. Hum. Rts. 
L.J. 40, entered into force Nov. 25, 2005; Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency 
and Armed Conflict, G.A. res. 3318 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 146, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974). 
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. res. 48/104, 48 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
217, U.N. Doc. A/48/49 (1993); Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action, A/CONF.177/20 (1995) and 
A/CONF.177/20/Add.1 (1995); Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and 
Platform for Action, G.A. Res. 23/10 (special session), U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-23/3 (Nov. 16, 2000); Follow-up to 
the 4th World Conference on Women and Full Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action and the Outcome of the 23rd special session of the General Assembly, G.A. Res. 60/140, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/140 (Feb. 7, 2006); Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriages, 521 U.N.T.S. 231, /entered into force/ Dec 9, 1964; Convention on the Nationality of 
Married Women, opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 1040 (XI) of 29 January 
1957, entry into force 11 August 1958, in accordance with article 6; Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, G.A. res. 55/25, annex I, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 44, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001); 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, G.A. res. 55/25, annex 
II, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 60, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001); Protocol against the Smuggling of 
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, G.A. res. 55/25, annex III, 55 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 65, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (Vol. I) (2001); 
Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, 1438 U.N.T.S. 51, entered into force 
March 17, 1949; Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights of Women, 1438 U.N.T.S. 63, 
entered into force March 17, 1949; Inter-American Convention on the Nationality of Women, O.A.S. Treaty 
Series No. 4, 38, entered into force Aug. 29, 1934; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, 
and Eradication of Violence Against Women, 33 I.L.M. 1534 (1994), entered into force March 5, 1995 
Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. res. 2856 (XXVI), 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 
29) at 93, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971). Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illnesses and the 
Improvement of Mental Health Care, G.A. res. 46/119, 46 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 189, U.N. Doc. 
A/46/49 (1991); Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. res. 3447 (XXX), 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); Ad Hoc Comm. on a Comprehensive and Integral Int'l Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Draft Report, Annex II: 
Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/L.6 (2006); 
International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with 
Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 
(2006), entered into force May 3, 2008; First Optional Protocol to the International Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex II, 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 (2006), entered into force May 3, 2008; 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights, U.N. 
C.H.R. res. 1997/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/150 (1997); A Declaration of Rights of Deaf-Blind Persons, in 
Conference of Hope: Proceedings of the First Historic Helen Keller World Conference on Services to Deaf-
Blind Youths and Adults 91-92 (1977); Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities, AG/RES. 1608, 7 June 1999; Ad Hoc Comm. on a 
Comprehensive and Integral International Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights and 
Dignity of Persons with Disabilities, Draft Report, Annex II: Draft Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, U.N. Doc. A/AC.265/2006/L.6 (2006); United Nations Principles for Older Persons, G.A. res. 
46/91, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/91 (1991). 
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services such as the building of hospitals and procuring healthcare services.  Levy 
explains the state of the South African economy in relation to the GDP at the time of 
implementation of stricter economic sanctions.  He states: 
“the GDP of South Africa from 1940 to 1984 ran current account deficits in the 
order of 2 to 3 percent of GDP per year.  This was offset by substantial capital 
inflows to the State, due to exports. The dependence on foreign capital left 
South Africa vulnerable to shifts in lending policies.  One such shift occurred 
in the period of 1976-1980, when there was a net foreign capital outflow 
averaging 2.3 percent of GDP.  This meant that by mid-1980’s the South 
Africa’s external debt was roughly $24 Billion of which two thirds was short-
term.”455   
The indebtedness was mainly caused by Apartheid and not economic sanctions.456 
However, in 1985 due to economic sanctions bankers refused to loan money to the 
South African government.457  The downturn in the economy as well as the lack of 
access to loans meant that instead of having capital available for imports of medicine 
and medical equipment the government had to settle this short-term debt.  Therefore, 
sanctions had a negative impact on resources available for health services in South 
Africa even without economic sanctions.   
 
Although some countries broke links with South Africa, new links were forged by the 
South African government at an “apartheid premium.”458  The premium resulted in 
the reduction in prices of exports and the increase in prices of imports from the new 
trade partners.  Furthermore, according to Ramphal the greatest impact on the 
economy of South Africa was as a result of the restriction on four commodity 
groups.459  South Africa’s exports were occupied in the following order: gold, coal, 
iron and steel and then uncut diamonds.  Ramphal states that “an export blockade of 
simply these four groups of commodities would cost South Africa almost two thirds of 
its total export earnings, a gold blockage on its own almost half of its earnings.”460  In 
terms of imports he explains that “three commodity groups would be relevant in the 
case of effective sanctions on South African imports: oil, capital goods and arms.”  
                                                 
455 Levy P., op cit 5.  
456 Orkin M. (1989) 28. 
457 Ibid. 
458 Orkin M. (1989) 29. 
459 Ramphal S.S. (1989) 27. 
460 Ramphal S.S. op cit. 
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These commodities all fell under the unilateral economic sanctions of the US which 
impacted severely on the GDP.   
 
Influx Control was the name given to the limitation of the movement of black people 
in cities and designated areas.  It was designed to regulate the movement and 
residence of black people and to condemn blacks from actively participating in the 
formal economy to impoverished rural areas.461 One of the examples used by Orkin 
illustrating the positive effects of the economic sanctions on the Apartheid 
government was the announcement by President P. W. Botha to end Influx Control in 
1986.  According to Orkin, economic sanctions were both efficient and effective in 
South Africa.462   
 
The economic sanctions eventually lifted were responsible for the economic 
dysfunction in South Africa.  Some of the results of the impact were positive, such as 
the decision to end the Influx control; however the impact on the economy was 
severe on blacks in South Africa.  Furthermore, economic sanctions had a negative 
impact on the South African economy and the State’s ability to take steps to improve 
the enjoyment of the rights of the vulnerable population.  The decline in resources 
due to economic sanctions coupled with the Apartheid policies resulted in the 
distribution of majority of these resources to white communities limiting the access of 
other racial groups to these resources. 
 
2.3.2 Impact on the enjoyment of elements of the right to health 
 
In the analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on the right to health of South 
Africans, I will firstly look at the impact on access to healthcare services.  Thereafter 
the section looks at the impact on the preconditions for health.  As with previous 
sections the limitations of this section must be acknowledged.  Throughout this 
section the focus is placed on available data after economic sanctions was lifted as 
data before sanctions is negligible.  Furthermore, there was no compulsory 
registration of births and deaths for black South Africans.  The result of this 
shortcoming in terms of the registration data makes infant mortality rates invariable 
and sometimes unreliable.  
                                                 
461 Ibid. 
462 Orkin M. (1989) 1. 
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South Africa’s official health delivery service was based on the Health Act of 1977 
and proclaimed to be comprehensive and community-based.463  This Act was 
comprehensive and community based but only served the white community because 
of the location of medical services.464  Various factors played a role in limiting the 
general impact of economic sanctions on South Africa.  The economic sanctions 
programme was implemented gradually and exemptions and non observance of 
sanctions among some States made direct effects on the economy less apparent.  
Indeed, it is believed that sanctions may have strengthened the existing white regime 
politically and economically for some time.  Key health-related goods, such as 
pharmaceuticals, never became scarce, as existing US subsidiaries remained in 
production.465   
 
Apartheid policies created a fragmented health system, which resulted in inequitable 
access to healthcare.  The inequities in healthcare were reflected in the health status 
of the most vulnerable groups.  Although consideration must be given to the fact that 
there is no simple way of establishing whether economic sanctions was the main 
cause of further deterioration in health among South Africa’s oppressed population 
there is some evidence that substantiate that this was the case.  According to 
Coovadia the evidence is indirect. 466   
 
Indirect evidence comes from factors such as retarded growth of the GDP and 
increased unemployment in South Africa.  The retarded growth in South Africa was 
mostly attributed to unilateral economic sanctions applied by the US resulting in 
disinvestment.467  The average annual growth rate of the GDP in the period of 1970-
1980 was 3%, compared to a declining figure of 1.3% for 1980-1990.468  In 1994 
black South Africans comprised 95% of the 18 million people in South Africa living 
below the accepted minimum living level per month per household, with 60% of this 
                                                 
463 Act no 63 of 1977. 
464 At the International Conference on Apartheid and Health held in Brazaville in 1981 Mr Alfred Nzo, Secretary 
General of the ANC at the time, stated that the Health Act had “absolutely nothing to do with comprehensive 
and adequate delivery of health care”. 
465 Garfield et al “The Health Impact of Economic Sanctions” (1995) Bulletin of the New York Academy of 
Medicine, 463. 
466 Coovadia H.P (1999) 1507. 
467 Coovadia H.P (1999) 1507. 
468 See A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) published by the African National Congress 28. 
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group living in total poverty.469  These levels of poverty severely restricted the 
populations ability to access private medical services and medication, making them 
heavy reliant on a public healthcare system.   
 
Leonard describes the 1980’s financial disparity and discrimination due to Apartheid 
in the form of a table, he states: 
 that the population was 19 million blacks and 4.5 million White people; 
 that 13% land was allocated to blacks and 87% to White people; 
 that black people’s share of national income was at 20% and White people’s 
share was at 75%; and that the ratio of average earnings was between Black 
and White was 1:14; 
 that the ratio per doctor for blacks was 1:44 000 compared to 1:400 for White 
people; and 
 that the infant mortality rate for blacks was 20% in urban areas and 40% in 
rural areas compared to the 2.7% for White people.470 
 
Chief Minister of the Kwa-Zulu homeland, Chief Buthelezi at the time said that “it’s no 
use having a stick that raps the South African regime over the knuckles but which in 
the process ends up lashing the very victims of Apartheid.”471  From his statement it 
is clear that Chief Buthelezi did not approve of the impact that economic sanctions 
had on the marginalised groups in South Africa.   
 
In 1988 there were 693 hospitals in South Africa and 158 567 hospital beds, public 
and private, of which 28% were in the private sector.  An overall of 4.4 beds per 1000 
was available to South Africans.  However this statistic in real terms amounted to 2.7 
beds per 1000 in the homelands, 4 beds per 1000 in non-metropolitan area and 7.1 
per 1000 in metropolitan areas.  In terms of human resources, in 1990 there were 
22 260 medical doctors registered in South Africa out of whom 6087 had registered a 
speciality.  The metropolitan areas had a ratio of 1:700 compared to 1:1900 in non-
metropolitan areas.472 
 
                                                 
469 At the time this level was R750.00 a month. See A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) published 
by the African National Congress 28. 
470Leonard R. (1980) 2. 
471 Bloom J. (1986) 83. 
472 A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) 32. 
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In the homelands it is estimated that there was between 10 000 and 30 000 people 
per doctor.  In 1988 there were 3 581 dentists registered, with over 93% working in 
the private sector; there were 1 130 clinical psychologists with 92% in the private 
sector and 8311 pharmacists with the majority in the private sector.473  In terms of 
financial resources within the homelands, where 44% of the total South African 
population lived, only 19% of the national health budget was allocated in 1990-
1991.474 
 
In 1991 the infant mortality rate (IMR) across all racial groups was 54 per 1000 live 
births.  For black children the mortality rate was between 94 and 124 per 1000.  The 
major cause of death was infectious diseases, especially intestinal infection and 
respiratory diseases.475  As stated in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the child mortality rate 
of a State is one of the best indicators of the negative impact of economic sanctions 
on the health of the population.   
 
These figures were computed from registered deaths, but the estimated deaths were 
higher, especially in rural areas.476  The maternal mortality rate in 1989 was 8 per 
100 000 for white women and more than 58 per 100 000 for black women.477  
Tuberculosis was by far the most frequent accruing notifiable disease.  The annual 
case rate increased by 4% between 1987 and 1988.  The Western Cape Province 
had the highest rates in the country this is linked with the fact that the Province had 
the highest lack of housing in the country.478  In 1989, the measles notification rate 
per 100 000 was 43.1 for blacks and 3.8 for whites.479   
 
All the indirect evidence taken together tells the story of limited access to medicine, 
medical facilities and services that particularly black people had in South Africa.  The 
1980-90 timeframe when the economic sanctions had hit the South African economy 
the hardest coincides with the timeframe during which economic sanctions were 
intensified against South Africa.  Thus, economic sanctions had a direct role in 
limiting the growth in South Africa.   
 
                                                 
473 Ibid. 
474 Ibid. 
475 A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) 29. 
476 Ibid. 
477 Ibid. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Ibid. 
 
 
 
 
SANCTIONS IMPOSED ON SOUTH AFRICA AND IRAQ 
112 
 
Economic sanctions also had an impact on the level of unemployment, a vital 
indicator of the level of income of the population of South Africa.  The level of income 
also has a direct impact on accessibility of medication and medical services.  Meth 
analysed the impact of economic sanctions on unemployment of South Africans.480  
The Federated Commerce and Industry (FCI) at the time had concluded a 
quantitative analysis of the impact of economic sanctions on unemployment.   
 
Table 4.1 Impact of sanctions on production and employment in 1986 481 
  
Sanctions 
scenario 
Inter-industry effect (over 18 months—2 years) Total net effect (over 5 years) 
 Decrease in GDP 
(%) 
Decrease in employment 
number 
Decrease in 
GDP (%) 
Decrease in 
employment 
number 
1 1,7 48922  --- --- 
2 6,7 204 803  16,9 685 343 
3 10,1 312 361 29,3 1135013 
 
The analyses in table 4.1 illustrate the link between the GDP and employment.  In 
South Africa there was a decrease in GDP which amounted to a decrease in 
employment in South Africa at the time.  The decrease in available income due to 
unemployment greatly limited the ability of the affected groups to get access to 
medication and medical services as well as preconditions to health such as proper 
housing.   
 
This impact was mainly felt by the marginalised groups working in industrial sectors, 
such as mining and agriculture, in South Africa.  In effect, economic sanctions 
assisted the Apartheid government to oppress the black people of South Africa, as 
the government continued to focus resources on white people excluding other 
marginalised groups.  The available resources were distributed unequally, 
perpetuating racial discrimination and infringement of the right to the enjoyment of 
the rights to health of the majority of the population.   
 
2.3.3 Impact on the preconditions for health 
 
The underlying preconditions for the enjoyment of the right to health are where 
economic sanctions caused the most devastation.  The urban housing backlog in 
1990 was conservatively estimated at 3 million units.  Approximately 90% was 
                                                 
480 Orkin M. (1989) 240-252. 
481 Orkin M. (1989) 250. 
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needed by black households.482  In informal settlements there were no sanitation 
facilities.  Of the 16 million rural population rough estimates indicated that 53% had 
safe and accessible water.  These conditions were responsible for a high prevalence 
of respiratory diseases, such as tuberculosis.  In 1989, 2.3 million people were 
considered in need of nutritional assistance.  Of these, 92% were children below the 
age of twelve years, and 8% were pregnant and lactating mothers.483   
 
2.3.4 Factors negating the impact of economic sanctions on the apartheid 
economy 
 
Various factors that negated the impact on the economy of South Africa must be 
noted.  These factors may have assisted to some extent to limit an even more 
devastating impact of economic sanctions.  Oil plays an important role in the 
functioning of an economy.  The international body regulating oil supply, OPEC, 
imposed oil sanctions on South Africa in 1973.  However this embargo was never 
successfully enforced.  The main reason the oil sanction were unsuccessful was the 
refusal of The Republic of Iran (Iran) to implement the oil embargo.  In addition, the 
South African government used some innovative measures.  One of these measures 
was to close petrol stations on Sundays to limit unnecessary use of supplies.   
 
Another measure to limit the impact of the oil sanctions called “sanctions-busting”.  It 
related to the illegal trade in oil.  The word “busting,” in this case, referred to illegal 
trade of oil in a sense busting the oil sanctions.  An example was the illegal oil trade 
by Marc Rich with the Apartheid government.  An article published by Maguire et al in 
The Guardian in 2001 alleges that Marc Rich, a commodities trader was responsible 
for a substantial part of the illegal oil trading with the Apartheid government.  The 
article states that he earned an estimated £100,000 a year by delivering to South 
Africa about 15% of its oil imports that were supposed to be destined for other 
countries.484 
 
Another important factor negating oil sanctions was the oil trade with Iran.  Iran and 
South Africa had a special relationship at the time.  Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlevi’s 
                                                 
482 A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) 28. 
483 A National Health Plan for South Africa (1994) 28-29. 
484 Maguire K. and Pallister D. (2001) Top Tory at centre of sanctions busting claim, available at  
< http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2001/may/04/conservatives.politicalnews1> (17/11/08). 
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farther, Reza Shah, sought refuge in South Africa after his 1941 abdication and was 
buried in Johannesburg following his death in 1944.485  The National Iranian Oil 
Company owned 17.5% of the Natref refinery (a South African company), which Iran 
helped to construct and had a contract for supply of oil for 20 years.486  Furthermore, 
Iranians were granted the status of honorary whites according to South Africa’s 
convoluted racial designations.487  Between 1973 and 1978 Iran was responsible for 
90-96%of South African crude imports.488   
 
Various factors played a role in limiting the general impact of economic sanctions on 
South Africa.  The economic sanctions programme was implemented gradually and 
exemptions and non-observance of sanctions among some States made direct 
effects on the economy less apparent.  Indeed, it is believed that sanctions may have 
strengthened the existing white regime politically and economically for some time.  
Key health-related goods, such as pharmaceuticals, never became scarce, as 
existing US subsidiaries remained in production.489   
 
In conclusion, statistics show that marginalised groups in South Africa did not receive 
timely and appropriate healthcare under Apartheid.  The healthcare facilities in South 
Africa were unavailable and inaccessible because they were situated primarily in 
metropolitan areas serving the white minority.  This fact was supported by legislation 
such as the Group Areas Act and Bantu Homelands Act that moved the majority of 
the population out of the metropolitan areas.  The State distributed scarce resources 
according to race, with black people receiving the most inferior quality of services.  
Economic sanctions did not improve this oppression; in fact it was responsible for 
further economic inequalities in South Africa.   
 
The legacy of Apartheid and economic sanctions was not remedied immediately with 
the lifting of economic sanctions against South Africa.  In 2002, eight years after the 
lifting of sanctions, South Africa’s infant mortality rate was 62 per 1 000 children.  
Child mortality, deaths before age five, was among the highest in Africa, outside war 
zones.  Two hundred out of every 1 000 black children die, on average, before their 
                                                 
485 Kinghoffer A. (1989) 36. 
486 Kinghoffer A. op cit. 
487 Ibid. 
488 Ibid. 
489 Garfield et al “The Health Impact of Economic Sanctions” (1995) Bulletin of the New York Academy of 
Medicine, 463. 
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fifth birthday; the sub-Saharan African average is 160 per 1 000; the white South 
African average is on a par with the most developed Western European nations and 
the United States.490 Statistics like these illustrate that impact of sanctions were 
clearly delegated to the vulnerable groups in South Africa.   
 
3. REPUBLIC OF IRAQ 
 
The broad-based economic sanctions that were applied against the Republic of Iraq 
(Iraq) are now commonly regarded as the most intensive foreign economic limitation 
for abuse of human rights and international law.  Economic sanctions had a 
devastating impact on the enjoyment of the right to health of the majority of the 
population of Iraq.   
 
The recent political history of Iraq is directly connected with the discovery of oil in the 
Middle Eastern region and therefore the discovery of oil is a good introduction for 
understanding the eco-politics of Iraq.  The quest for oil in Iraq, which was known as 
Mesopotamia at the time, followed the discovery of oil in 1908 at Masjid-i Suleiman 
in Iran.491  Oil pursuits in Iraq were concentrated in Mosul, one of three provinces of 
the Ottoman Empire492 that ruled Iraq before its collapse during WWI.   
 
After the war the League of Nations granted France mandates over Syria and 
Lebanon and granted the United Kingdom mandates over Iraq and Palestine which 
then consisted of two autonomous regions: Palestine and Transjordan.493  Parts of 
the Ottoman Empire on the Arabian Peninsula became part of what are today known 
as Saudi Arabia and Yemen.   
 
The mandate of Protectorate over the region was given to some western nations. 
They used this opportunity to seek political influence and commercial benefits in the 
new territory.  James describes the power struggle for a say in Iraqi oil and the 
entrance of the US in the struggle as follows: 
                                                 
490 This is according to Encarta Encyclopaedia (2003) © 1993-2002 Microsoft Corporation.  
491 Demirmen F. (2003) Oil in Iraq: The Byzantine Beginnings, available at 
< http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2003/0425byzantine.htm > (Accessed 12/10/07). 
492 Ottoman Turks took Baghdad from the Persians in 1535. 
493 Treaty of Sèvres, which was ratified in the Treaty of Lausanne. 
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“In July 1928, the quarrelling parties, USA, British and French, finally reached 
a famous accord, known as the ‘Red Line Agreement,’ which brought the US 
consortium into the picture with just under a quarter of the shares and an 
agreement to jointly develop fields in many other Middle Eastern countries.”494 
 
The oil resources in Iraq have played an important role in the US-Iraqi commercial 
and diplomatic relationships going as far back to the presidency of J.F. Kennedy.495  
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was believed to have direct connections to the 
assassination attempts on the Iraqi leader, Abdel Karim Kassem, in 1963.496  
According to a report of the United Press International, in 1959, Saddam Hussein497 
was appointed to assassinate the former Prime Minister of Iraq, General Abd al-
Karim Qasim on behalf of the CIA.498  The economical and political relationship 
between the US and Iraq is long-standing and goes hand in hand with every conflict 
that Iraq had instigated or suffered over the years. 
 
3.1 Political Conditions Necessitating Imposition of Sanctions 
 
Historically the US had strong diplomatic and economic relations with Iraq.  Before 
1980, following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Iraq severed diplomatic relations with the 
US and in late 1979 the US State Department put Iraq on its list of States sponsoring 
groups categorised by the US State Department as "terrorist".499  Despite intelligence 
reports that Iraq still sponsored groups on the US State Department’s terrorist list, 
and "apparently without consulting Congress,” the Reagan Administration removed 
Iraq from the State terrorism sponsorship list in 1982.500  Diplomatic and commercial 
relations continued up until a day before the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, as illustrated 
                                                 
494 James P. (2002) Great Power Conflict over Iraqi Oil, The World War I Era, Global Policy Forum, available 
at < http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/oil/2002/1000history.htm > (Accessed 16/10/2008). 
495 Morris R (2003) A Tyrant Forty Years in the Making, Published in New York Times March 14, 2003  
available at < http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/2003/0314history.htm > (Accessed 
12/10/2007).  
496 Ibid. See also Coughlin C. (2002)  
497 Saddam’s full name is Saddam Hussein al-Majid al Tikriti and he acceded to the presidency and control of 
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), then Iraq's supreme executive body, in July 1979. 
498 Sale R. (2003) Saddam Key in Early CIA Plot United Press International, April 10, 2003, available at  
< http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/2003/0410saddam.htm > (Accessed 12/10/07). 
499 Phythian M. (1997) 11. 
500 Hurd N. (2000) U.S. Diplomatic and Commercial Relationships with Iraq, 1980 - 2 August 1990, updated 12 
December 2001 by Hurd. N. and Rangwala G., available at  
< http://www.casi.org.uk/info/usdocs/usiraq80s90s.html > (Accessed 12/10/07). 
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by the US government’s approval of a $695,000 worth of advanced data 
transmission devices destined for Iraq.501   
 
The invasion of Kuwait resulted from a dispute between Kuwait and Iraq about 
production quotas which began at a meeting held by the OPEC. 502  Kuwait and other 
OPEC members were producing excess quotas that resulted in driving the world oil 
price down, a prospect Hussein could not afford at the time due to his State’s 
financial debt.503  Hussein was particularly angered at the Kuwaiti’s because they 
were supposed to support the Iraqi argument to decrease the quotas because of 
Iran’s’ history, and origins, relating to the Ottoman Empire.  Kuwait decided to 
support the other OPEC States.504  
 
In July 1990 Iraq issued an ultimatum to Kuwait demanding stabilisation of the 
international oil price; a moratorium on Iraq’s wartime loans and the formation of an 
Arab plan similar to the Marshall Plan505 to assist with the Iraqi reconstruction 
Programme.506  With the collapse of the Soviet-Union the previous year507 the only 
world power obstructing a war on Kuwait was the US.  In this regard, Hussein called 
a meeting with the US State Department Ambassador, April Glaspie, and according 
to her conversation with Hussein, the “US had no opinion on the Iraq-Kuwait border 
disputes and that economic sanctions were not an option against Iraq.”508  
 
On 2 August 1990, in the wake of the US Ambassador’s response to the possibility of 
an invasion of Kuwait, Hussein proceeded to order the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi 
                                                 
501 Ibid. 
502 OPEC's mission is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of Member Countries and ensure the 
stabilisation of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to 
consumers, a steady income to producers and a fair return on capital to those investing in the petroleum industry, 
available at <http://www.opec.org/home> (Accessed 15/10/2007). 
503 Coughlin C. (2002) 248. At the time Iraq owed the Gulf States about $ 40 Billion after the war with Iran and 
demanded $ 30 Billion of financial aid for relief purposes without any success. 
504 Ibid. Kuwait, a former part of the administrative district of the Ottoman Empire, had historical disputes with 
Iraq about its independence given by the British after WWI. These disputes included the two State’s border 
drawn by the British in 1920. Furthermore for Hussein the prospects of an annexation of Kuwait would mean 
the increase of the Iraqi Gulf Shore and opportunity to develop a much needed deep-water port.  
505 Secretary of State George C. Marshall initially proposed the plan in a 1947. The Marshall Plan from its 
enactment, officially the European Recovery Program was the primary plan of the US for rebuilding and 
creating a stronger foundation for the allied countries of Europe, and repelling communism after World War II, 
available at < http://www.usaid.gov/multimedia/video/marshall/ > (Accessed 12/10/07). 
506 Coughlin C. (2002) 249. 
507Author unknown The History Guide Lectures on the Twentieth Century, available at  
< http://www.historyguide.org/europe/lecture16.html> (Accessed 13/10/07). 
508 Coughlin C. (2002) 250. Coughlin states: this conversation took place according to transcripts of the 
conversation leaked by the Iraqi’s. 
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military stationed on the border of the States.  The decision to condemn the invasion 
and the subsequent imposition of economic sanctions was taken at a meeting of the 
UN by the SC after receiving letters from the permanent representatives of the 
government of Kuwait and the government of the US.509   
 
3.2 INTERNATIONAL REACTION 
 
The international reaction refers to the UN acting on behalf of the international 
community.  The SC Resolutions against Iraq are the most comprehensive 
international economic action taken by an international organisation against a State 
to date.  Comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions implemented against 
Iraq were devastating.  The population of Iraq was severely inhibited from realising 
their international right to health.  This was acknowledged by the CESCR as well as 
other UN human rights treaty bodies by publishing comments on the impact of 
economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights in Iraq.  
 
In particular the CESCR noted that: 
“the living standard of a large section of the Iraqi population has been reduced 
to subsistence level since the imposition of the embargo. Furthermore 
notwithstanding the effect of sanctions and blockades, the State Party 
remains responsible for implementing its obligations to the maximum of its 
available resources in accordance with article 2 (1) of the ICESCR. While 
aware that the embargo imposed on Iraq created extremely difficult conditions 
with respect to the availability of food, medicines and medical articles, 
recommended that the Government take all necessary measures to address 
the needs of the population, in particular the most vulnerable groups such as 
children, the elderly and nursing mothers.”510 
 
The HRC noted that: 
“the effect of sanctions and blockades has been the cause of suffering and 
death in Iraq, especially to children and reminded the government of Iraq that 
                                                 
509 SC Resolution 660 and 661 of 1990. A comprehensive list of the SC Resolutions in relation to Iraq is 
available here < http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm > (Accessed 02/07/2007). 
510 Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Iraq, E/C.12/1/Add.17, 
(1997), available at,  
< http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/E.C.12.1.Add.17.En?Opendocument > (Accessed 28/10/2008). 
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whatever the difficulties, the State Party remains responsible for implementing 
its obligations under the Covenant.”511  
 
The Committee on the Rights of the Child, responsible for the implementation of the 
CRC, recognised that the: 
“economic embargo on Iraq has adversely affected the economy and many 
aspects of daily life, thereby impeding the full enjoyment by the States Party’s 
population, particularly children, of their rights to survival, health and 
education.”512 
 
Another similar comment came from The Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.  The Sub-Commission appealed to the 
international community and to the SC in particular, “for the embargo provisions 
affecting the humanitarian situation of the population of Iraq to be lifted.”513   
 
3.2.1 The invasion of Kuwait 
 
On the same day as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the SC adopted Resolution 660 
which was based on articles 39514 and 40515 of the UN Charter.516  The Resolution 
condemned the war, demanded a withdrawal of the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and an 
                                                 
511 Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Iraq, UN Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.84 (1997), 
available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/iraq1997.html > (Accessed 15/11/07) 
512 Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Iraq, UN Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.94 
(1998) available at < http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/crc/iraq1998.html > (Accessed 15/11/07) 
513 United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Humanitarian situation in Iraq, Sub-Commission 
decision 1999/110 (Unedited Version), 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/18e324b5ce7b5d3b802567ee0031fba4?Opendocum
ent 1> (Accessed 12 10/2008). 
514 Article 39 provides:  
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act 
of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
515 Article 40 provides:  
In order to prevent an aggression of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the 
recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in the Article 39, call upon the parties 
concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such measures 
shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council 
shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures. 
516 Between 1990 and 2004 there are a total of 74 SC Resolutions relevant to Iraq proscribing the various aspects 
of the Iraqi situation therefore a comprehensive discussion of the content of these Resolutions is not allowed by 
the restrictions on this thesis, I have however, alluded to the most important aspects of the Resolutions for this 
thesis since 1990. for a list of the SC Resolutions relating to Iraq, see 
< http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1990/scres90.htm > (12/10/2007).  
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immediate resort to intensive negotiations between the States.517  The SC, on 6 
August, adopted Resolution 661 of 1990, as a result of the refusal of Iraq to comply 
with the demands of SC Resolution 660, imposed under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Resolution 660 imposed comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq 
and did not recognise any regime set up in Kuwait by the occupying power.518  
 
The SC also established a committee, known as The 661 Sanctions Committee 
(Sanctions Committee),519 tasked with monitoring the implementation of the 
sanctions imposed, which prohibited the export of all commodities and products from 
Iraq, and the sale and supply of all products and commodities, including weapons 
and other military equipment, as well as the transfer of funds, to Iraq.520  Exceptions 
to the sanctions programme included the provision that the Sanctions Committee 
had to allow items relating to humanitarian circumstances, which included supplies 
intended strictly for “medical purposes and for provision of certain basic 
foodstuffs.”521   
 
Coughlin calls the invasion of Kuwait “one of the great military miscalculations of the 
modern history.”522  It is suggested that the reason for the international outcry 
against the invasion was because the world was not ready for another Soviet-Union 
style annexation of States almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet-
Union.523  George Bush (I) immediately ordered the aircraft carrier Independence 
from the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and imposed unilateral sanctions on both 
States to the conflict.524  He ordered the freezing of all Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets and 
property in US.  The order applied to all banks and companies and included the 
restriction of movement of goods and people to and from Iraq.525  
 
On 25 August 1990, in Resolution 665, the SC called upon Member States co-
operating with the Government of Kuwait to deploy maritime forces to the area to use 
such measures as might be necessary  
                                                 
517 SC Resolution 660, paras 1, 2 and 3 respectively. 
518 SC Resolution 661, para 3 (a), (b) and (c), prohibiting imports by UN member States and para 4, prohibiting 
imports by UN member States. 
519 Discussed in the previous Chapter. 
520 SC Resolution 661, para 6. 
521 SC Resolution 661 para 3 (c) and 4. 
522 Coughlin C. (2002) 255. 
523 Ibid. 
524  George Bush senior was empowered by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 50 USC 1701. 
525 Ibid. 
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“to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping, in order to inspect and verify 
their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of the 
provisions related to such shipping laid down in Resolution 661 of 1990.”526  
The SC also requested Member States to use, as appropriate, the SC’s Military Staff 
Committee to coordinate their actions.  
 
The SC focused for the first time on the humanitarian situation in Iraq and Kuwait in 
its Resolution 666, adopted on 13 September 1990, in which it instructed the 
Sanctions Committee to: 
“...keep the situation regarding foodstuffs in Iraq and Kuwait under constant 
review, paying particular attention to children under 15 years of age, 
expectant mothers, nursing mothers, the sick and the elderly.”527 
 
On 25 September 1990, in its Resolution 670,528 the SC explicitly confirmed that the 
sanctions against Iraq applied to all means of transport, including aircraft529 and 
elaborated further measures affecting shipping and air transport.  The SC decided 
that States must deny permission to any aircraft to take off from their territory if the 
aircraft would carry any cargo to or from Iraq or Kuwait other than food in 
humanitarian circumstances.  In addition States were to deny over-flight permission 
to any aircraft destined to land in Iraq or Kuwait.530  The SC also called upon States 
to detain any ships of Iraqi registry which entered their ports and were in violation of 
the sanctions Resolution. 
 
3.2.2 The Sanctions Programme after the Liberation of Kuwait 
 
Subsequent to the successful liberation of Kuwait, the SC adopted, on 3 April 1991, 
Resolution 687531 representing one of the most intricate and extensive sets of 
decisions ever taken by the SC.532  The 34 operative paragraphs of the Resolution 
were divided into nine parts and set out in great detail the terms for a formal cease-
fire to end the conflict and restore security and stability to the area.  The Resolution 
                                                 
526 SC Resolution 665, para 1-2. 
527 SC Resolution 666 of 1990, para 1 and 4 respectively. 
528 Adopted at the 2943rd meeting. 
529 SC Resolution 670, para 2. 
530 SC Resolution 670, paras 4, 5 and 6. 
531 SC Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. S/INF/47 of 1991. 
532 Fishman A. (1999) 700. 
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sought to involve Iraq co-operatively in post-war measures to build lasting peace and 
stability in the region.533  At the same time, enforcement measures remained in 
place, including the sanctions programme and the SC’s authorisation for Member 
States to use “all necessary measures” to uphold Iraqi compliance.534  The economic 
sanctions programme imposed on Iraq became the strongest and most salient UN 
sanctions ever imposed against a State.535 
 
The major requirements provided in Resolution 687 included a boundary settlement 
and peacekeeping aspects,536 the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and 
the non-acquiring by Iraq of nuclear weapons capability,537 the return of Kuwaiti 
property,538 the creation of the Compensation Fund539 and repatriation issues.540  
 
As far as economic sanctions are concerned, the SC decided, under section F of the 
Resolution, that the prohibition on the importation of goods to Iraq first imposed 
under Resolution 661 of 1990 would not apply to foodstuffs, materials and supplies 
for essential civilian needs.  Furthermore, this part of the sanctions programme 
would be reviewed every 60 days, taking into account the policies and practices of 
the government of Iraq, including the implementation of all relevant Resolutions of 
the SC for the purpose of determining whether to reduce or lift the sanctions.541  The 
SC also stated that the ban on Iraqi oil exports would be lifted once the SC approved 
the program for the Compensation Fund called for in section E of Resolution 687, 
and once it agreed that Iraq had completed all the actions pertaining to the weapons 
provisions of the Resolution.542  
 
In the intervening time, exceptions to the oil embargo would be approved by the 
Sanctions Committee when needed to assure adequate financial resources to 
provide for essential civilian needs in Iraq.543  Also in section F, the SC specified the 
                                                 
533 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, preamble and para 34. 
534 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 29. 
535 Joyner C. (2003) 334. 
536 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, paras 2-5. 
537 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 14. 
538 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 15. 
539 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, paras 18 and 19. 
540 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, paras 30 and 31. 
541 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, paras 22-25. 
542 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 22. 
543 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 20. 
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categories of weapons to which the arms embargo mandated by Resolution 661 of 
1990 should continue to apply.544  
 
By SC Resolution 700 of 1991, the SC approved the guidelines, which itemised the 
types of arms, material and activities prohibited by the SC and defined the 
responsibilities of the Sanctions Committee in this regard. The provisions relating to 
both the oil and the arms embargoes would be reviewed by the SC every 120 days, 
taking into account Iraq’s compliance with the Resolution and general progress 
towards the control of armaments in the region.  
 
The period between 1990 and 1997 was the phase that economic sanctions were 
the most devastating to the Iraqi population.545  By 1998 the SC reaffirmed its 
intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 of 1991, 
and noted that Iraq’s failure to comply with relevant international obligations had 
delayed the lifting of the Resolution by the SC.546  The SC conducted 40 reviews of 
the sanctions programme established in paragraph 20 of Resolution 687.547  No 
modification of the sanctions programme resulted from these reviews.  The economic 
sanctions programme against Iraq, as imposed by SC Resolution 687 of 1991, was 
finally lifted by SC Resolution 1483, adopted on 22 May 2003.   
 
3.2.3 US Unilateral Sanctions 
 
The US did not stop to provide Iraq with weapons of mass destruction capability 
even though they had knowledge of the use of chemical and biological attacks on 
Iraqi Kurds by the Hussein regime.  This was an indication of the earlier 
misconceived policy applied by the US towards Iraq.  An investigation held by the 
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs in 1993, confirmed the 
export of dual use products which gave Iraq nuclear capability.548  These products 
                                                 
544 SC Resolution 687 of 1991, para 24, the Resolution also established the UN Special Commission on 
Weapons (UNSCOM). 
545 Joyner C. (2003) 335. 
546 SC Resolutions 1154, 1194 and 1205 of 1998. 
547 Pursuant to para 21 of Resolution 687. 
548 The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs is responsible for U.S. government 
legislation and oversight as it effects "dual use" exports -- those materials and technologies that can be 
converted to military uses. U.S. Chemical and Biological Exports to Iraq and Their Possible Impact on the 
Health Consequences of the Persian Gulf War, available at 
< http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/history/husseinindex.htm > (Accessed 12/10/07). 
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included chemical, biological, nuclear, and missile-system equipment that could be 
used for military purposes.549   
 
In 1990 the US passed specific legislation imposing unilateral economic sanctions on 
Iraq.  The US government pledged support for the enforcement of the SC 
Resolutions and Congress enacted the Iraq Sanctions Act which condemns the 
invasion of Kuwait on 02 August 1990.550  Section C(a) makes provision for 
comprehensive and broad-based economic sanctions on Iraq.  It states that: 
“notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds, credits, guarantees, or 
insurance appropriation or otherwise…shall be used to support or administer 
any financial or commercial operation of any United States government 
department, agency, other entity, or any person subject to the jurisdiction of 
the United States, for the benefit of the Government of Iraq, its agencies or 
instrumentalities, or any other person contrary to the trade embargo or any 
other economic sanctions imposed...” 
 
Humanitarian assistance is excluded by Section 586 C(b) from the embargo and 
Section 586 D(a) makes provision for the denial of assistance in terms of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.  It also places a hold on imports if the president so directs.551  
The Iraq Sanctions Act extends the multinational economic sanctions imposed by the 
UN.   
 
3.3 IMPACT ON THE RIGHT TO HEALTH 
 
In general, individual and business income plays an important role in the strength or 
weakness of the government.  The government’s capacity to have sufficient 
resources is therefore dependent on this income.  The lack of resources creates 
hardship for the population in that the State is not able to fulfil obligation to provide 
services to the population.  Economic sanctions advance this hardship in that it limits 
the ability of the society to develop economically.  No State is able to fulfil its 
international human rights obligations in the light of broad-based economic 
sanctions.  Below are some of the important impacts on the health of the population 
of Iraq.   
 
                                                 
549 Ibid. 
550 Public Law 101-513 of 5 November 1990 Section 586 through 586J. Section A (5). 
551 Section 586D(b) 
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One must not forget that the right to health is interrelated with other rights, for 
example, the right to education, fulfilment of this right also a precondition for the right 
to health.  Thus various other factors impact on the enjoyment of the right to health, 
not all the impacts are discussed here.   
 
3.3.1 Impact of economic sanctions on vulnerable groups and economy 
 
The economy of Iraq is dominated by the oil sector, which traditionally provided 
about 95% of foreign exchange earnings.  In 1990, prior to economic sanctions and 
The US Gulf War, Iraq produced about 3 million barrels of oil a day, of which it 
exported 2.5 million barrels.552  This generated export earnings of US$19bn a year 
providing 95% of the funds for the national budget and 64% of the GDP.  After the 
implementation of economic sanctions foreign trade was cut by 90% drastically 
reducing the GDP.553   
 
Prior to economic sanctions, in the 1980s, Iraq incurred devastating financial 
problems.  The problems were mainly caused by factors such as the government’s 
massive expenditures on warfare in the eight-year Persian Gulf War with Iran as well 
as the damage to oil export facilities.  To combat the financial deficit the government 
of Iraq implemented austerity measures554 by borrowing heavily followed by 
rescheduling of foreign debt payments.  Iraq suffered economic losses from the 
Persian Gulf War of at least US$100bn.  After hostilities ended in 1988, oil exports 
gradually increased with the construction of new pipelines and restoration of 
damaged facilities.  A combination of low oil prices, repayment of war debts and the 
costs of reconstruction resulted in another serious financial crisis.  This crisis was 
one of the main motivations for the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.555 
 
One of the most vulnerable groups in Iraq is a group called Kurds.  Since the 
creation of the modern State of Iraq, the history of Iraqi Kurdistan556 has been one of 
underdevelopment, political and cultural repression, destruction, ethnic cleaning and 
genocide.557  They were part of the Ottoman Empire and were promised their own 
                                                 
552 Garfield R. (1999) 12. 
553 Ibid. 
554 Austerity is usually required when a government's fiscal deficit spending is felt to be unsustainable. 
555 See discussion of invasion of Kuwait above. 
556 The area where the majority of Kurds live is also called Kurdistan. 
557 See O’Leary C.A. (2002) 2. 
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State under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Sevres only to find the offer rescinded 
under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.558  The Kurds of Iraq received the brunt of 
economic sanctions imposed on Iraq.  This was similar treatment to the marginalised 
groups in Apartheid South Africa.   
 
Al-Anfal (The Spoils) was the codename given to aggressive and planned military 
operations against Iraqi Kurds.559  When Hussein’s regime initiated war against Iran 
in 1980 Iraqi forces attacked Iranian soldiers and civilians with chemical weapons.560  
Saddam Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hasan al-Majid, who became known as “Chemical Ali” 
because of his use of chemical and biological weapons on Kurdish towns and 
villages, was the main co-perpetrator of these atrocities.561  The 1980’s is also the 
period when the most of Hussein’s human rights abuses were perpetrated.   
 
In March 1988, the Iraqi forces attacked the town of Halabja with conventional 
artillery bombs, artillery fire and chemicals including mustard gas and nerve gas 
agents.562  The attack hit the Kurds the hardest, when chemical weapons killed 5 000 
Kurds in the town of Halabja.563  O’Leary state that this was part of a systematic 
ethnic cleansing of Kurds.564  According to O’Leary, “the oppression was part of an 
ongoing campaign by the Iraq government against Kurds because of their struggle to 
gain autonomy within Iraq.”   
 
In 1991, following the March uprising of Kurds in the north and Shia Arabs in the 
south against the central government of Iraq, Kurdistan was divided into two parts.  
Relying on SC Resolution 688, military forces from eleven States, including the US 
and Turkey, implemented Operation Provide Comfort565 to give security and 
humanitarian assistance to refugees, mostly Kurdish, in camps along the Iraq-Turkey 
border.  The so-called safe haven and no-fly zone were established in this context.566   
                                                 
558 O’Leary C. A. (2002) 1. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Gunter M. (1992) 37. 
561 Ibid. 
562 Gasses included Sarin, Tabun and VX. 
563 Gunter M. (1992) 44, see also Coughlin C. (2002) 248. 
564 O’Leary C.A (2002) 2. More than 4000 villages in rural Kurdistan were destroyed and perhaps 300 000 
people perished. 
565 See Global Security at < http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/provide_comfort.htm > (Accessed 
14/11/08). 
566 Global Security op cit, paras 1-2.  
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The Kurdish was the most vulnerable group in Iraq before the imposition of 
sanctions.  Nothing specific was done to alleviate the impact of economic sanctions 
on this group. 
 
3.3.2 Impact on the enjoyment of the right health of population 
 
Health services in normal circumstances stretch a government’s budget in 
developing States.  The normal limitations that characterise access and availability of 
health services including medication and equipment are compounded by economic 
sanctions.  Furthermore, the impacts on the health of the population in Iraq are multi-
faceted.  On the one hand it entails the impact of economic sanctions on the 
healthcare system.  On the other hand it entails impact on preconditions for health 
which were neglected due to the lack of resources.   
 
Iraq had invested heavily in healthcare services in the 15 years prior to the economic 
sanctions and in 1990 it had an advanced curative medical care system.567  To 
maintain this advanced system, the continued availability of ambulances, hospitals, 
doctors, technology and more was essential to Iraq.  Broad-based economic 
sanctions on Iraq limited all these elements of the healthcare system.  The limitation 
was compounded by inequitable distribution of medical goods by officials as well as 
population displacements through the war.568  The health of the population as well as 
the ability of the health officials to measure changes in healthcare services were 
placed in jeopardy.569   
 
Almost all sanctions legislation in recent decades contains provisions for exemptions 
for medicines (and/or food) including the economic sanctions legislation imposed on 
Iraq.  Nonetheless, economic sanctions commonly lead to limitations on the 
importation of medicines and foodstuffs due to disruption of commercial 
arrangements, complications in transportation and/or a lack of capital with which to 
purchase the exempted goods in the embargoed State.  Garfield states that despite 
exemptions for medical goods, many companies producing equipment and 
                                                 
567 Garfield R (1999) 14. 
568 Garfield R. (2002) 98. 
569 Ibid. 
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medicines failed to fill orders from embargoed countries for lack of ironclad 
assurances that the item indeed was exempted from the embargo.570 
 
Hospitals and health centres in Iraq largely remained without repair and 
maintenance.  The functional capacity of the healthcare system degraded 
substantially due to shortages of water and power supply, lack of transportation and 
the collapse of the telecommunications system.  Furthermore, communicable 
diseases, such as water borne diseases and malaria became part of the endemic 
pattern of the precarious health situation.571   
 
As stated previously, other than the child mortality rate, an analysis of the infant 
mortality is not the best indicator of the impact of economic sanctions.  However in 
Iraq both the mortality rate of young children as well as the infant mortality rate 
increased dramatically.  While the infant mortality rate rose from 64/1 000 births in 
1990 to 129/1 000 in 1995.572  A study conducted by British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), suggested that the: 
“surge in mortality also reflects the low access to health services, and clean 
drinking water and sanitation, which affects everyone.  The researchers 
looked at 23,000 women aged between 15 and 49 years, asking about the 
health of their children.  They found that in south and central Iraq, infant 
mortality had risen to 108 per 1,000 between 1994 and 1999, while child 
mortality covering those between one and five years rocketed from 56 to 131 
per 1,000.”573 
 
According to initial data provided by Iraq to United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF) an estimated 500 000 children died as a result of economic sanctions.574  
UNICEF’s Chief Statistician based this calculation on the rate of decrease (morbidity 
rate) and the rate of infant mortality in the 1980’s and states that “had this rate 
continued through the 1990's, there would have been half a million fewer deaths of 
                                                 
570 Ibid. 
571 S/1999/356, Annex II.  See also ICRC, Iraq: A decade of sanctions, 14 December 1999. 
572 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Surveys, UNICEF 1999, available at  
< http://www.unicef.org/newsline/99pr29.htm >and < http:// www.unicef.org/reseval/iraq.htm > released August 
12, 1999. 
573 BBC News: Health, Child death rate doubles in Iraq, available at  
< http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/763824.stm > (Accessed 15/09/07). 
574 See Joyner C (2003) 339 around the debate of the likely amount of children that died as a result of economic 
sanctions. 
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children under-five in the country as a whole....”575  Garfield states that this initial 
data was incorrect.576  According to him, correct data was established in 1999, 
indicated that the mortality rate of children had at least doubled, which is still a 
devastating amount of 300 000 children presumed dead as a direct result of 
economic sanctions.577  Another reason why this was the most devastating episode 
of economic sanctions applied by the international community is the maternal 
mortality rate.  In 1997, the maternal mortality rate increased from 50/100 000 in 
1989 to 117/100 000.578   
 
The impact was not only on elements directly linked to the enjoyment of the right to 
health, such as access to hospitals and medication, but also preconditions to good 
health.   
 
3.3.3 Impact on the preconditions for health 
 
Vulnerable groups such as children and the elderly are the most susceptible to 
severe malnutrition and other diseases.579  Prior to economic sanctions the Iraqi 
government had created its own food ration programme.  This programme was 
regarded by the United Nations as the largest and most efficient food-distribution 
system of its kind in the world.  It had become what was perhaps Hussein’s most 
strategic tool to maintain popular support at the time.580  
 
The United States and other western nations had hoped the sanctions, which 
devastated Iraq’s once-prosperous economy, would lead Iraqis to rebel against their 
leader or, at the least, to compel him to fully cooperate with UN inspectors looking for 
weapons of mass destruction.  But Hussein held firm in a large part by using food to 
stem discontent with the pain of sanctions, employing a massive network of trucks, 
                                                 
575 For a comparison between UNICEF’s Report "Results of the 1999 Iraq Child and Maternal Mortality Survey" 
August 1999 and The U.S. State Department's Report "Saddam Hussein's Iraq" September 1999 See,  < 
http://www.scn.org/ccpi/UNandUSreports.html >  (Accessed 15/11/07). 
576 Garfield R (1999) 15. Despite the subsequent retraction by the publishers the study is still referred to. 
577 Ibid. 
578 Report of the Second Panel established pursuant to the note by the President of the Security Council of 30 
January 1999, S/1999/100, concerning the current humanitarian situation in Iraq, S/1999/356, Annex II. 
579 Joyner C. (2003) 338. 
580 Richman S. (2004) 1. Iraqi Sanctions: Were They Worth It? available at,  
< http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/iraq1/2004/01sanctionsworth.htm > (Accessed 14/11/2008). 
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computers, warehouses and neighbourhood distributors to provide basic sustenance 
for most Iraqi’s.581 
 
Almost the entire population of young children was affected by sudden shift in the 
nutritional status towards malnutrition.582  Despite food and medicine exemptions, 
the import thereof had been considerably slowed down due to the needed approval 
of the Sanctions Committee.583  Measures that initially were intended as a means to 
apply non-violent economic pressure on the Iraqi government deteriorated into an 
aggravated humanitarian crisis for nearly all of Iraqi society.584  The use of potable 
water is particularly vital for a health system.  The lack of safe water in Iraq 
contributed substantially to the devastating health statistics, in particular cholera and 
other water born deceases.585   
 
Those children unprotected by breast feeding were at far greater risk.  In addition, 
malnutrition among women giving birth led to a high rate of low-weight births and 
high perinatal mortality.  Economic sanctions led to inadequate sanitation, food 
sources and medical care.  Many of the children with acute malnutrition after 
weaning became chronically malnourished as toddlers.  As a result they were at 
highest risk of serious disease and death, especially from measles, diarrhoea, and 
respiratory infections.586 
 
In a report to the SC on the state of situation in Iraq, Former UN Secretary-General 
Kofi Annan stressed, inter alia, that  
“the nutritional and health status of the Iraqi people continues to be a major 
concern and that increased revenues available for the implementation of the 
humanitarian Programme should be used by the Government of Iraq to 
reduce current malnutrition levels and to improve the health status of the Iraqi 
people.”587  Furthermore, he pointed out that “there were still major concerns 
about the deterioration of infrastructure.  He stated that unless infrastructure 
                                                 
581 Ibid. 
582 Nutritional Status Survey of Infants in Iraq, UNICEF 1998. 
583 Tomaševski K. (2000) Responding to Human Rights Violations 1946-1999, .315. 
584 Joyner C. (2003) 338. 
585 One of the best explanations including destruction of the infrastructure of Iraq is the embargo on imports of 
chlorine as it is seen as a dual purpose product. 
586 Garfield (1999) 14. 
587 S/2000/520, available at < http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/4093939.htm > (Accessed 15/11/07). 
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for electricity, water and sanitation is sufficiently rehabilitated, the Iraqi people 
will continue to be vulnerable to disease and hardship.”588 
 
The initial UN missions that went to Iraq to assess and confirm the state of 
humanitarian needs led to an offer to Iraq to sell oil under UN supervision.589  The oil 
sales would then be used to purchase goods for humanitarian purposes.  The 
programme was to assist in a reduction of the adverse effects of economic sanctions 
on the population of Iraq.   
 
3.4 Oil- For- Food Programme 
 
In August 1990 the Security Council adopted resolution 661, imposing 
comprehensive sanctions on Iraq following that country’s invasion of Kuwait.  In the 
immediate aftermath of the Gulf War in 1991, the Secretary-General dispatched an 
inter-agency mission to assess the humanitarian needs arising in Iraq and Kuwait. 
The mission visited Iraq from 10 to 17 March 1991 and reported that “the Iraqi 
people may soon face a further imminent catastrophe, which could include epidemic 
and famine, if massive life-supporting needs are not rapidly met."590   
 
In an effort to relieve the suffering of civilians in Iraq and in the Iraq/Turkey and 
Iraq/Iran border areas, the SC devised a scheme called the Oil-for-Food Programme 
(OFF Programme).  The OFF Programme allowed for the export of Iraqi oil and the 
proceeds of the sales to be used to pay for foodstuffs and medicines.  Furthermore, 
the proceeds were also used by the Compensation Commission to fund 
compensation claims from Kuwaiti’s; for the United Nations Special Commission on 
Iraq (UNSCOM); for weapons inspection; and other of the UN’s activities mandated 
by Resolution 687.  However, the most important goal of the OFF Programme was to 
alleviate the humanitarian situation in Iraq.   
 
On 15 August 1991, the SC adopted Resolution 706, setting out the terms for the 
limited sale of Iraqi oil and oil products during a period of six months.  Primarily the 
                                                 
588 Ibid. 
589 Tomaševski K. (2000) op cit 315. 
590 Report to the Secretary-General on humanitarian needs in Kuwait and Iraq in the immediate post-crisis 
environment by a mission to the area led by Mr Martti Ahtisaari, Under-Secretary-General for Administration 
and Management, dated 20 March 1991, S/22366, para 37 available at;  
< http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/background/reports/s22366.pdf > (Accessed 21/11/2008). 
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adoption of this Resolution was to increase the level of funds available for 
humanitarian programmes and for several of the operations mandated by Resolution 
687.  On 19 September 1991, the SC, in Resolution 712, approved a basic structure 
for the implementation of Resolution 706.  
 
The SC also confirmed that funds from other sources could be deposited in the 
escrow account.591  The escrow account was a sub-account of the OFF Programme 
and would become immediately available to meet Iraq’s humanitarian needs without 
the deductions specified in the Resolutions.  By Resolution 778, adopted on 2 
October 1992, the SC decided, inter alia, that all States should transfer to the escrow 
account provided for in Resolutions 706 (1991) and 712 (1991) those funds of Iraq 
representing the proceeds of sale of Iraqi petroleum or petroleum products.   
 
On 14 April 1995, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the SC adopted 
Resolution 986 (1995), by which it provided Iraq with another opportunity to sell oil to 
finance the purchase of humanitarian goods and various mandated United Nations 
activities concerning Iraq.  The new proposal permitted the sale of $2 billion of Iraqi 
oil ($l billion in each of two 90-day periods) subject to certain conditions additional to 
those contained in Resolutions 706 and 712, and reaffirmed the commitment of all 
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and describing the 
new exercise as temporary.  
 
Iraq had export earnings of $19bn before economic sanctions.592  The Office of the 
Iraq Programme reported that the OFF Programme transferred a total of $9.978Bn to 
the Development Fund for Iraq.  This amount included: 
“transfers of $1 billion each were made on 28 May, 31 October and 18 
November 2003 from the United Nations Iraq escrow account, at the request 
of the Security Council contained in paragraph 17 of resolution 1483 (2003) of 
22 May 2003. Another $2.6 billion was transferred on 31 December 2003, a 
further $2 billion on 31 March and $0.5 billion on 19 April 2004. Three more 
transfers, totalling $1.128 billion, were made in 2004 and three transfers 
totalling $0.75 billion have been made in 2005.”593   
                                                 
591 The Escrow Account included all money made from the sale of Iraqi oil and was administered by the UN. 
592 Garfield R. (1999) 12. 
593 Office of the Iraq Programme, available at < http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/> (Accessed 02/12/2008). 
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Although the framework for the OFF Programme existed in 1991 it only became 
operative in 1996, partly because of the refusal of the Iraqi government to agree to 
the Programme and the practical implications for the Sanctions Committee.594  On 20 
May 1996, a Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the UN and 
the Government of Iraq on the implementation of SC Resolution 986 (1995) was 
concluded.595  On 8 August 1996, the Sanctions Committee adopted procedures for 
the discharge of its responsibilities as required by paragraph 12 of SC Resolution 
986.596 On 9 December 1996 the Secretary-General’s reported to the President of 
the SC, pursuant to paragraph 13 of that Resolution and authorised States to permit 
the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq. 597 On 10 
December 1996 after 6 years of facing economic sanctions prohibiting the export of 
oil, SC Resolution 986 became operative.   
 
Under Resolution 986 Iraq was given the discretion to sell oil to who they wanted.  
This discretion was used to the advantage of Iraq government in two ways.  The first 
advantage was that they only gave oil contracts to companies owned by States that 
had influence in foreign policy and international public opinion in favour of lifting 
economic sanctions.598  The second advantage was in giving contracts to companies 
from which they could elicit illegal funds, such as surcharges.  The 2005 report from 
the Independent Inquiry Committee on the OFF Programme confirmed that the Iraqi 
government made $228.8 million through illegal surcharges.599   
 
The period of implementation for the OFF Programme, as well as the value of oil that 
could be sold at any given time to fulfil its objectives was increased on numerous 
occasions.600  Fishman writes,  
                                                 
594 Joyner C. (2003) 341. 
595 S/1996/356, available at, < www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/s1996-356.pdf > ((Accessed 28/10/2008). 
596S/1996/636, available at, < www.casi.org.uk/info/undocs/sanctcommittee960808.pdf >  
(Accessed 28/10/2008). 
597S/1996/1015, available at, < www.pogar.org/publications/other/un/secgen/iraq/s1015-96e.pdf >  
(Accessed 28/10/2008).  
598Volcker P A. et al (2005) Report on Programme Manipulation; Independent Inquiry Committee the UN Oil-
For-Food Programme, available at < www.iic-offp.org> (Accessed 02/09/2008), at 16. 
599 Ibid. 
600 Starting with SC Resolution 1111 of 1997 adopting the decision that the provisions of Resolution 986 (1995), 
except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11 and 12, should remain in force for another period of 180 days 
beginning at 00.01 hours, Eastern Daylight Time. Continuing with SC Resolution 1129 of 1997, the SC decided 
that the provisions of Resolution 1111 should remain in force, except that States were authorised to permit the 
import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq, including financial and other essential 
transactions directly relating thereto, sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding a total of one billion United 
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if the humanitarian fund is managed properly, there is no reason why the 
Iraqis should not be permitted to sell as much oil as they wish, as long as the 
proceeds of the sales go toward the purchase and distribution of humanitarian 
supplies for the civilian population.601 
 
Fishman’s concern in relation to the OFF Programme is addressed by the SC 
Resolution 1284 of 1999, which introduced several changes in the sanctions 
programme for Iraq with a view to improving the humanitarian situation of the 
population.  These included the removal of ceilings to the value of imports of 
petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq.602  The Resolution also 
provided for the removal of the waiver of approval requirement by the Sanctions 
Committee for supplies of foodstuffs, pharmaceutical and medical supplies, as well 
as basic or standard medical and agricultural equipment and basic or standard 
educational items.603  
 
The UN Secretary-General at the time of the Resolution, Kofi Anan, was asked to 
make arrangements, subject to SC approval, to allow funds deposited in the escrow 
account to be used for the purchase of locally produced goods and to meet the local 
cost for essential civilian needs.  In March 2003 the coalition forces led by the US 
invaded Iraq.  The OFF Programme officially ended on 31 May 2004. 
 
On the one hand, because of the extent of the devastation and humanitarian impact 
of economic sanctions in Iraq, the OFF Programme was seen to be inefficient in 
providing for the civilian needs and clearly needed improvements.604  On the other 
hand, Langenkamp states that: 
“in the period from 1997 until the invasion in 2003 by the coalition forces, Iraq 
sold oil worth $64.2bn pursuant to the Programme.  In that period the 
combined total of Saddam’s schemes, including kickbacks, illegal surcharges, 
                                                                                                                                                        
States dollars within a period of 120 days from 00.01. Eastern Daylight Time, on 8 June 1997 and, thereafter, a 
sum not exceeding a total of one billion United States dollars within a period of 60 days from 00.01 Eastern 
Daylight Time, on 4 October 1997.  
601 Fishman K (1999) 725. 
602 SC Resolution 1284 of 1999, para 15. 
603 S/2000/520. 
604 Kozal P. (2000) 399. 
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overcharges for supplies, and undercharges for oil, was 2.8% of the oil sales. 
Thus 97.2% of the money collected went for its intended purpose.”605 
 
The OFF Programme was never meant as a comprehensive resolution of the 
humanitarian crisis, it was an interim or temporary measure.606  The OFF 
Programme was reported to have been successful in certain regions like the 
immunisation of 95% of children against polio.607  As can be seen in the table below 
the cases of Polio increased drastically after the implementation of sanctions.  
However, with assistance of the OFF Programme the Polio cases reported 
decreased to zero cases. 
 
 
Graph of Polio Cases from 1984 to 2000608 
 
The OFF Programme is credited with: 
 improvement in healthcare delivery services and in diagnosis and treatment of 
diseases including the national immunisation for a polio free country;  
 a 40% increase in major medical surgeries and a 25% increase in laboratory 
investigations;609 
 a reduction in the transmission of communicable diseases, such as cholera, 
malaria, measles, mumps, meningitis and tuberculosis;610 
 improvement of healthcare delivery in several new or rehabilitated centres in 
the centre/south, including: the Saddam Centre for Neurological Sciences; the 
AIDS Research and Study Centre; the Acupuncture Therapy Centre; the 
                                                 
605 Langenkamp R. (2005) Putting the Oil-For-Food in Perspective, available at  
< http:///jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/11/putting-oil-for-food-in-perspective.php > (Accessed 10/07/07). 
606 Office of the Iraq Programme Oil for Food: Health available at,  
< http://www.un.org/DEpts/oip/sector-health.html > (05/05/06) 
607 Ibid. 
608 Graph from Office of the Iraq Programme, available at < http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/> (Accessed 
02/12/2008). 
609 Oil-for-Food Programme: Background Brief – Health, available at, < http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/sector-
health.html > (Accessed 02/12/2008). 
610 Ibid.
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Tuberculosis Control Institute and; the National Centre for Haematology 
Research; 611 and 
 a decline in the incidence of measles; and a doubling of deliveries of 
medicines and medical supplies.612   
 
During the thirteen years of the economic sanctions the Programme generated 
$64,2bn for humanitarian relief purposes.  In comparison to the GDP in 1980 alone, 
Iraq earned $59 billion, a clear indication that the Oil-for-Food Programme was never 
going to be enough to fulfil all of Iraq’s needs.613  Between 1997 and May 2005 
purchases in all industries amounted to $34.5bn in total.  The Ministry of Health 
spent $2,7bn, 9.7% of the total value.614   
 
In the evaluation of the OFF Programme of Iraq, certain improvements are 
recommended: 
 a humanitarian assessment of Iraq should focus on well-being of the general 
population and of vulnerable groups; 
 it should collect information on changes in poverty levels, income levels and 
sources, and the proportion of income spent on food; 
 the particular effects of economic and social welfare changes on women 
should be investigated, as well as the effects on fertility, marriage, and 
choices of internal and international migration; 
 this will assist in the identification of more and less effective coping 
mechanisms in various population sectors, and modifications needed to make 
the programme more effective; 
 the extended period of neglect to infrastructure for water, sanitation, roads, 
agriculture, and electricity should be specified.615   
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
The consequences of economic sanctions for both target States is in direct conflict 
with the article 12 of the ICESCR.  Firstly, a drastic increase of infant and child 
                                                 
611 Ibid. 
612 Ibid. 
613 Guide to Sanctions: What has caused the humanitarian problems in Iraq?, available at  
< http://www.casi.org.ukl/guide/blame.html  > (Accessed 15/03/07). 
614 Office of the Iraq Programme Oil for Food Report op cit, 265. 
615 Garfield R (1999) 10. 
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mortality rates contravenes article 12 (2)(a) of the ICESCR.  Secondly, the lack of 
prevention, treatment and control of the morbidity rate contravened article 12 (2)(c) 
of the ICESCR.  Lastly, economic sanctions created conditions which ensured the 
lack of access to medical services and medical attention in the event of sickness 
thus economic sanctions are in direct conflict  of article 12 (2)(d) of the ICESCR.   
 
The governments of South Africa and Iraq committed widespread and systematic 
violations of human rights.  These violations necessitated international reaction of 
some kind.  The SC imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq but never 
applied broad-based economic sanctions against South Africa.  The reason for the 
lack of comprehensive action was due to the influence of the US and the UK within 
the SC and internationally.  The US, in particular, applied a strategy of “constructive 
engagement” until the 1980’s when they past the Anti-Apartheid Act.  In both South 
Africa and Iraq, the SC sanctions impacted on the government regime of the day but 
more seriously it’s impacted on the realisation of the rights of the civilian population.   
 
The intended goal of economic sanctions to ensure a regime change was never 
achieved in Iraq; this was in fact achieved by the coalition forces invasion in 2003.  
Even in South Africa I am convinced that sanctions were not the reason for the 
political change.  The reason for this conviction is the nature of the sanctions 
imposed on the Apartheid government.  Other factors like the strong political 
defiance and resistance from the ANC and the PAC played a considerable role in the 
change of government.   
 
However, if one is to question the success of the economic sanctions programme 
against Iraq, there is no doubt that economic sanctions certainly were not a success 
in Iraq.  The economic sanctions programme was imposed for a valid and necessary 
reason.  One cannot dispute that the international law violations by the Hussein 
government were intentional and necessitated a form of response by the 
international community.  However, the success and effectiveness of the economic 
sanctions remains unproven.  
 
It is evident that the economic sanctions were more devastating on the human rights 
of the population of Iraq than that of South Africa.  One of the main reasons for this 
difference in impact was that economic sanctions imposed on South Africa by the 
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UN, were not supported by key trade partners including the US and the UK, two 
permanent members of the SC.  The ability to maintain trade with these partners and 
others, such as Iran, meant that trade in South Africa deceased but at a less drastic 
tempo.  Another reason was the lack of interest by the western powers to impose 
economic sanctions and a focus mainly on military, cultural and sport sanctions 
instead.  These reasons made the long term impact and effectiveness of the 
sanctions on South Africa more benign then those imposed on Iraq.   
 
In addition, South Africa was reliant upon a diverse economy, depending on more 
than one commodity for its growth and income and in fact, these commodities were 
only sanctioned in the mid 1980’s.  This resulted in a gradual decrease in the GDP of 
South Africa.  The negative impact of sanctions was spread more evenly.  Moreover 
the implementation of predominantly unilateral sanctions allowed the South African 
government to adapt and direct its export and imports, from and to, other States.   
 
In Iraq the economy was mainly driven by its oil exports making the control and 
regulation of economic sanctions focused and concise to this one commodity.  This 
meant that economic sanctions, which prohibited export of oil, had devastating 
effects on the economy of Iraq.  It became so overwhelming that the Iraqi peoples’ 
enjoyment of human rights suffered tremendously.  In addition, the western powers 
were in the forefront of imposing the sanctions programme on Iraq mainly due to its 
history and interests in the Iraqi oil.  Hussein’s government had a tradition of 
dictatorship and no real resistance from opposition parties internally, unlike South 
Africa where political activism played an important role in bringing about a change in 
power, the chances of the population voting Hussein out of power was slim to none.  
 
The sanctions programmes implemented in both target States had a negative effect 
on the populations enjoyment of their right to health as well as the preconditions to 
the enjoyment to health.  The right to health is vital to the human being and 
jurisprudence had illustrated that this right is enforceable.  The analytical question 
would thus be whether a court of law can suspend economic sanctions if there exists 
a causal link between economic sanctions and extreme limitations to the enjoyment 
of the right to health. 
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In Iraq, the OFF Programme was vital to stabilising the impact of economic sanctions 
on the population.  The OFF Programme was the first of its kind and hence not 
perfect.  Hussein was able to abuse the OFF Programme to the benefit of the 
government.  This kind of programme will certainly be an asset to any similar 
scenario now that lessons had been learned.   
 
The impact of longstanding, comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions as 
was imposed on the Iraqi population resulted in further hardship for the population of 
Iraq.  The impact was particularly felt by the vulnerable groups within these societies, 
namely women, children and surely the elderly.  In South Africa, because of the 
Apartheid policies and legislation, the most vulnerable groups included those 
classified as black, coloured and indian.  These vulnerable groups in South African 
received the most inferior healthcare services, limited access to health services as 
well as the least favourable preconditions to health.  In Iraq, the Kurdish was the 
most vulnerable group.  It is likely that they suffered the most during the 
implementation of economic sanctions because of the traditional relations between 
the Kurds and the Iraqi government.  
 
Economic sanctions against Iraq and South Africa were not effective in achieving the 
set out goal and were more destructive than even armed conflict would have been 
on the civilian population.  Hopefully, the international community will not tolerate this 
again.  However, in both sanctions programmes the creators of the sanctions would 
have been more successful if the imposition of the sanctions programme had human 
rights protection as the basis of its creation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSSION 
 
 
1. PREFACE TO THE CONCLUSION 
 
Both Iraq and South Africa committed gross violations of human rights which 
necessitated the imposition of sanctions. In both States the SC sanctions impacted 
on the government regime of the day but this impact was mostly suffered by the 
civilian population. This impact was particularly felt by the vulnerable groups within 
the society, women, children and the elderly. In South Africa those vulnerable are 
extended by a classification of race. The same can be argued for the impact on 
Kurdish-Iraqis in northern of Iraq compared to other Iraqi’s but certainly not as acute 
as non-whites in South Africa.  Together due to segregation, there is a stark 
economic difference between races.  The South African government systematically 
divided the population into different races in South Africa. The difference had a class 
connotation ranging from the upper class for whites people to lower class for black 
people. Today as a result of Apartheid South Africa still struggles to think outside of 
colour or pigment of one skin when confronted with different races.  
 
If one wants to establish the success or failure of economic sanctions there must be 
a balancing of the relevant elements.  Various questions must be asked.  These 
questions include: What was the goal of the economic sanctions?  What were the 
costs or impact of the economic sanctions? As well as whether the economic 
sanctions were effective or not? 
  
2. SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Sanctions against South Africa played an important psychological role in bringing 
about political change.  The question accordingly arises why the sanctions campaign 
against South Africa had starkly different consequences than that of Iraq.  It is 
suggested that perhaps an answer may be found in the following factors: firstly, the 
goal was simple but precise.  Throughout the economic sanctions programme by the 
UN and the US it was stated as being an end to the Apartheid policies of the South 
African government.   
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Secondly, the type of sanctions that were imposed on South African was not broad 
based and not applied universally.  A lack of interest by the western powers to 
impose economic sanctions and a focus on, mainly, military, cultural and sport 
sanctions instead, made the impact and effectiveness of the sanctions on South 
Africa more benign then those imposed on Iraq.  Initially the US refused to apply any 
sanctions.  The UN acted alone and never was able to apply comprehensive 
economic sanctions against South Africa because of vetoes from the US and UK.  It 
was only in the late 1980’s that unilateral economic sanctions against South Africa 
were implemented by the US.  In addition, the effectiveness of the economic 
sanctions was minimal.  The economic sanctions did not result in the stated goal 
which was to change the policy of the Apartheid government.   
 
Thirdly, to weigh the success of economic sanctions against South Africa an analysis 
of the impact on the enjoyment of the right to health was done.  The findings of the 
analysis indicate that economic sanctions did have a negative impact on the GDP 
and clearly the State was experiencing economic difficulties. 
 
Fourthly, the population did suffer a heavy cost due the economic sanctions.  
Statistics indicated an increase in morbidity and mortality rates, limited access to 
healthcare services as well as conditions unsuitable for health after the 
implementation of economic sanctions.  Although one must acknowledge the impact 
of Apartheid policies on the economy as well as on the discrimination against the 
black majority in South Africa, economic sanctions did not assist the hardship of 
black South Africans 
 
Fifthly, the benefit of a new democratically elected government cannot be attributed 
to economic sanctions.  It must be noted that economic sanctions were not the only 
factor acting against the Apartheid policies of the South African government.  An 
effective political movement, locally and internationally, against the Apartheid 
government was able to create substantial disruption and awareness amongst the 
international community.616  A further key ingredient in the political change in South 
Africa was the fall of the communism.  This fall meant that one of the main 
arguments used by the Apartheid government, that the ANC was a communist party, 
could no longer stand. 
                                                 
616 Levy P. op cit 11. 
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Lastly, South Africa was more reliant upon a diverse economy and hence the 
negative impact of sanctions was spread more evenly.  South Africa was also 
fortunate to secure valuable oil resources as the oil embargo of 1973 offered South 
Africa a loophole in that Iran refused to be part of the embargo. All these factors 
resulted in the negation the effectiveness of economic sanctions.  Moreover the 
implementation of predominantly unilateral sanctions allowed the South African 
government to adapt and direct its export and imports, from and to, other States.  
 
If one is the answer the question as to whether the economic sanctions that were 
applied to South Africa was successful, the answer will have to be no.  The goal was 
achieved through other factors and the impact outweighed the purported benefits of 
economic sanctions.   
 
3. IRAQ 
 
Firstly, the goal of the economic sanctions against Iraq changed more than once, in 
fact it included restoring the government of Kuwait, minimising damage to Kuwait, 
discouraging Israeli intervention, encouraging United Nations support, reassuring 
potential allies of the policies of the United States and discouraging other potential 
aggressors from trying to emulate Iraq’s behaviour.  How does a State comply with 
all these demands?  The intended goal of economic sanctions to ensure a regime 
change in Iraq was never achieved.  The obvious reason for this was the fact that the 
goal kept on changing.  Unlike South Africa where political activism played an 
important role in bringing about a change in power, the chances of the population 
voting Hussein out of power was slim to none.  
 
Secondly, the impact of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions on Iraq had a 
devastating effect on its population.  The economy of Iraq was devastated.  The OFF 
programme was successful in diverting the worst catastrophe.  The OFF Programme 
was responsible for the improvement to some extent in the enjoyment of basic levels 
of healthcare services and a reduction of morbidity rates.  However, the measures 
were implemented too late for many victims of economic sanctions.  Measures that 
initially were intended as a means to apply non-violent economic pressure on the 
Iraqi government deteriorated into an aggravated humanitarian crisis for nearly all of 
the Iraqi society.  Instead of achieving non-violent aims the sanctions achieved the 
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contrary.  The impact of longstanding, comprehensive and mandatory economic 
sanctions imposed on Iraqi population resulted in grave violations of human rights. 
 
In addition, the Iraqi economy was mainly driven by its oil exports making the control 
and regulation of economic sanctions focused and concise.  This meant that 
economic sanctions, which prohibited export of oil and import of goods without 
consent by the UN had devastating effects on the economy of Iraq.  It became so 
overwhelming that the Iraqi peoples’ enjoyment of human rights suffered 
tremendously.  In effect even the senders started to question the proportionality of 
economic sanctions. In addition, the western powers, in particular the US were at the 
forefront of imposing the economic sanctions on Iraq mainly due to its history and 
interests in the Iraqi oil.  
 
Thirdly, the health conditions in Iraq deteriorated faster than what the State were able 
to import the necessary resources.  The Iraqi healthcare system was severely 
impaired, access to health services was minimal and extremely limited, and 
preconditions for health also deteriorated fast.  Economic sanctions violated the right 
to the health of the population of Iraq. 
 
Lastly, if the benefit was a change in government, the cost of economic sanctions 
would have outweighed the benefits by far.  One of the alternatives was war and this 
even took place in the case of Iraq.  There is now no doubt that the foreign policy 
makers of the time would reconsider everything today if they could see the result on 
the Iraq and the result on the US economy today.  In this case as well, the economic 
sanctions programme against Iraq was certainly a failure. 
 
The popularity of the imposition of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy will 
not change soon.  Recent economic sanctions programmes were imposed on States 
such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well as North Korea.  Due to this 
popularity and a lack of appropriate alternatives, certain recommendations as to the 
possible improvement of economic sanctions programmes are provided. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
4.1 A Human Rights Approach 
 
Economic, social and cultural rights, in general, and the right to health specifically, 
are universal, fundamental and justiciable.  The right to health is an inclusive right.   
Arguments of scarce resources and a debilitated economy cannot be ignored, 
especially since the assistance from the international community is prohibited due to 
economic sanctions.  Economic sanctions in their current form restrict the attainment 
of the highest standard of health to an unacceptable level. 
 
It is submitted that the inability to fulfil the minimum core obligation under 
international human rights law should become a suspensive condition of Resolutions 
imposing economic sanctions.  Recognition, by the UN and other member States, of 
the justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights should take place in all forms 
of international human rights law, even law regulating economic sanctions. In this 
regard special attention must be given to all vulnerable groups in a society including 
vulnerable groups‘ particular to a target State. A human rights approach is the key to 
alleviating the devastating effects of economic sanctions. 
 
4.2 IHL: Necessity and Proportionality 
 
The principle of proportionality is not unique to IHL it is also found, in a limited 
degree, in the field of IHRL.  In the following instances relating to States of 
Emergency, the Human Rights Committee has provided that the need for derogation 
from human rights norms must be demonstrably proportionate.  The proportionality 
test is also not unfamiliar in the domain of economic sanctions.   
 
The International Law Commission Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts stipulates that countermeasures must be 
commensurate with the injury suffered.  Thus while the principle of IHL in the form of 
necessity and proportionality lends assistance to the evaluation of a sanctions 
programme it is not without it difficulties.  
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Caution should thus be placed on the implementation of these principles to a 
sanctions programme. It is however a step in the right direction to a proper 
conceptualised test which can be used to monitor the effectiveness of sanctions in 
relation to its objectives.  
 
In addition to the above call for IHL and IHRL principles to apply to the 
implementation and monitoring of sanctions, developments within the area of 
economic sanction itself, and in particular the creation of targeted sanctions, is the 
international community’s attempt to address the traditional shortcomings of 
economic sanctions. 
 
From the above it is clear that any sanctions programme must be regulated in 
accordance with IHL principles in that it must be necessary in relation to the objective 
or aim and it must be proportionate in relation the objective or aim itself and the 
injury or damage suffered.  Given the character of economic sanctions as complex 
measures commonly employed over a significant period of time, the main problem in 
assessing their necessity and proportionality lies in the fact that circumstances 
change over time.   
 
It goes without saying that a reaction to gross violations of human rights may not 
justify economic sanctions to such an extent as to deprive the people of the 
necessary means of survival.  The response to the violation of human rights, far from 
producing compliance, would in its turn worsen the situation of the people entitled to 
legal protection as is evident in the Iraqi situation.  
 
This is a clear indication that the objective or the aim is disproportionate to the loss 
incurred or is derogating from the core minimum obligations of the State.  In such a 
case the sanctions programme must be halted or suspended automatically. 
 
4.2 Sanction Committees 
 
Sanctions Committees will be scrutinized.  In this regard it suggestions will be put 
forward as to the improvement of these monitoring bodies, with reference to 
humanitarian relief.  It is argued that goods that are subject to the notification 
procedure as well as goods that are considered indispensable for the survival of the 
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civilian population by the Sanctions Committee may be regulated in terms of 
humanitarian law. 
 
Sanctions Committees monitoring the impact of economic sanctions should focus on 
all vulnerable groups in a target State.  It is recommended that the design of 
economic sanctions should consider the effect on vulnerable groups particular to the 
target State.  They should be given the discretion to call for the suspension of 
economic sanctions if the effects on the population are disproportionate to the 
benefits.  An example would be the Kurds of the Iraq, a focus on humanitarian aid in 
strategic position in Iraq would have alleviated the impact on this vulnerable group. 
 
A further safeguard against possible harm resulting from economic sanctions is to 
found in the limitations imposed by the UN Charter itself.  The UN Charter requires 
that sanction or other measures undertaken to maintain international peace and 
security must be effective, meaning that the measure must produce a desired or 
intended result.  Furthermore it must be monitored to be in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international law. 
 
Other limitations include that no act of the Security Council is exempt from scrutiny 
as to whether or not that act is in conformity with the Purposes and Principles of the 
UN and that these purposes include promoting higher standards of living and 
economic and social progress; solutions to international economic, social, health and 
other problems and universal respect for and observance of human rights. 
 
It is clear that these international norms may reduce the discussed negative 
consequences of the Sanctions Committees procedures, namely, time delays in 
granting notifications for humanitarian goods, as well as refusing to allow goods 
indispensable for the survival of the civilian population without any reasons being 
provided.  It is clear from the above discussion that IHL principles have an important 
role to fulfil with regards to the monitoring of sanctions. 
 
4.3 Targeted Sanctions 
 
The concept of targeted sanctions had considerably improved the situation but the 
same principles that are suggested in relation to comprehensive economic sanctions 
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must be applied in the creation and implementation of targeted sanctions. This 
means that principles of necessity and proportionality derived from IHL and general 
principles of human rights must be maintained and developed further. 
 
4.4 IHRL: Duty on International Community 
 
In the event of the State really being incapable, as will be determined by the CESCR 
and other similar bodies, the responsibility will be placed the international community 
in the States position. This responsibility must be regulated by international 
humanitarian law but must clarify that the obligations on the international community 
remains the minimum core obligations of the State concerned. Thus, any 
humanitarian relief must have as its goal fulfilment of the core minimum obligations 
of the rights in the ICESCR. 
 
Compliance with international human rights should be the burden of a State, in the 
absence of State support, for whatsoever reason, the international community should 
carry this responsibility.  Where States are unable to govern progressively due to 
economic sanctions this duty should fall with the international community in the form 
of humanitarian aid regulated by international humanitarian law. The ability of 
governance is severely compromised when economic sanctions are applied hence 
the obligations in relation to ICESCR should fall on the international community who 
apply collective sanctions and/or States who apply unilateral sanctions. 
 
The State responsibility to fulfil international human rights law obligations are 
extended to the right to health but the ambit of this responsibility is continuously 
debated upon, depending on the States financial capability. There is a clear shared 
interpretation of the meaning of the right to health, initiated by the CESCR General 
Comment No. 14. This explains the need for a core minimum content of the right to 
health. This interpretation must be taken further by implementation of these 
principles even when the failure of the State to fulfil its obligations occurs, as a result 
of economic sanctions.  
 
The core minimum obligation in relation to the right to health, means that any 
financial restrictive measure imposed on a government will have a ripple effect on 
the financial ability of the State to fulfil its core minimum obligations. For example an 
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indication of a disproportionate sanctions programme will be a regime that impacts 
on the minimum essential food which is nutritionally adequate and safe or results in a 
substantially inadequate supply of essential drugs.   
 
Accordingly sanctions programmes must consist of an additional compulsory 
programme indicating the manner in which the negative impacts of a 
disproportionate sanctions programme will be addressed.  This will have result that 
sanctions, specifically economic sanctions, are successful because it is created 
based on international human rights perspective.   
 
Economic sanctions are supposed to be a positive foreign policy tool.  They are not 
seen as positive tool by the international community because of the negative the 
impact on the population of a target State.  The Iraq economic sanctions programme 
was too comparable to suffering in military conflicts.  Further development of this 
foreign policy tool is necessary because of the lack of effective alternatives. In my 
opinion, the consideration of the above recommendations should result in positive 
steps towards alleviating the negative impacts of economic sanctions on the 
economic, social and cultural rights of a population.  The alleviation of the negative 
impacts are especially vital in terms of the enjoyment of the right to health, a 
prerequisite to a dignified life.   
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Annexure A: Sanctions Instituted by the UN 
 
No State Res./date passed Component of sanction Date in 
effect 
 
1 Southern  
Rhodesia 
217 (20-11-65)  
232 (16-12-66)  
253 (29-05-68)  
460 (21-12-79) 
Arms and oil embargo  
Calls for member states to 
suspend economic relations  
Sanctions Committee formed  
Sanctions lifted 
1965—1979 
     
2 South 
Africa 
418 (04-11-77)  
421 (09-12-77)  
919 (25-05-94) 
Arms embargo  
Sanctions Committee formed  
Sanctions lifted 
1977—1994 
     
3 Iraq/Kuwait 661 (06-08-90)  
670 (25-09-90)  
687 (03-04-91) 
Comprehensive trade 
sanctions; Sanctions 
Committee formed  
Air embargo  
Cease-fire resolution; full trade 
embargo remains pending Iraqi 
fulfillment of established 
conditions  
Initial authorisation of oil for 
food arrangements and 
Subsequent authorisations for 
oil for food programme 
Assets freeze 
Transfer List of individuals 
established pursuant to 
resolution 
List of entities established 
pursuant to resolution 
1990—present 
until April 
(Kuwait 1991) 
     
4 Iraq (only) 712 (19-09-91)  
986 (14-04-95)  
1111 (06-04-97)  
1143 (12-04-97)  
1175 (06-19-98)  
1210 (11-24-98)  
1242 (6-04-99)  
1483 (24-11-03) 
Comprehensive trade 
sanctions; Sanctions 
Committee formed  
Air embargo  
Cease-fire resolution; full trade 
embargo remains pending Iraqi 
fulfillment of established 
conditions  
Initial authorisation of oil for 
food arrangements and 
Subsequent authorisations for 
oil for food programme 
Assets freeze 
Transfer List of individuals 
established pursuant to 
resolution 
List of entities established 
pursuant to resolution 
1990—present 
     
  
 
 
 
 
ANNEXURES 
168 
 
     
5 Former 
Yugoslavia 
713 (25-09-91)  
724 (15-12-91)  
757 (30-05-92)  
820 (17-04-93)  
942 (23-09-94)  
943 (23-09-94)  
1022 (22-11-95)  
1074 (01-10-96) 
Arms embargo  
Sanctions committee formed  
Comprehensive trade 
sanctions, flight ban, 
cultural/sport boycott on Serbia 
& Montenegro Sanctions 
strengthened  
Sanctions imposed against 
Bosnian Serbs Some sanctions 
against Serbia & Montenegro 
eased  
Indefinite suspension of 
sanctions following Dayton 
peace accord  
Termination of sanctions 
against Serbia & Montenegro 
and Bosnian Serbs 
1991—1996 
     
6 Somalia 733 (23-01-92)  
751 (24-04-92) 
Arms embargo  
Sanctions Committee formed 
1992—present 
     
7 Libya 733 (23-01-92)  
883 (11-11-93) 
Arms and air embargoes; 
diplomatic sanctions; 
Sanctions Committee formed  
Libyan government funds 
frozen; ban on oil equipment 
1992—1999 
     
8 Liberia 788 (19-11-92) 
1792 (19-12-07) 
 
Travel ban and Travel Ban List 
Arms embargo 
Assets freeze and assets 
freeze list 
 
1992—Due to 
end on 19-12-
2008 
     
9 Haiti 841 (16-06-93)  
861 (27-08-93)  
873 (13-10-93)  
917 (6-05-94)  
944 (29-09-94) 
0il and arms embargo; foreign 
assets frozen; •Sanctions 
Committee formed Suspension 
of oil and arms embargo 
following signing of 
Government Island agreement  
Oil and arms embargo 
reinstated Sanctions expanded 
to trade and financial assets  
Sanctions lifted effective 16-
10-94 
1993—1994  
(Preceded by  
OAS Embargo  
1991—1993) 
     
10 Angola 864 (15-09-93) Arms and oil embargo against 
UNITA;  
Sanctions Committee formed 
1993-present 
     
11 Rwanda 918 (17-05-94)  
1011(16-08-95) 
Arms embargo; Sanctions 
Committee formed  
Sanctions lifted 1-9-96 for 
Rwandan government; still in 
effect for non—government 
forces 
1994—present 
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12 Sierra 
Leone 
1132 (08-30-97) 
1171 (08- 01-1998) 
Arms, economic, and 
diplomatic embargo 
Travel Ban on certain leading 
members of the former Military 
Junta in Sierra Leone (Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council -
– AFRC and Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) 
1997—present 
     
13 Sudan 1054 (26-04-96)  
1070 (16-08-96)  
1591 (29-03-05) 
1556 (30-06-04) 
Diplomatic sanctions  
Conditional imposition of air 
embargo effective in 90 days; 
deferred pending further 
examination of sanctions 
effects 
arms embargo on all non-
governmental entities and 
individuals, including the 
Janjaweed, operating the 
states of North Darfur, South 
Darfur, and West Darfur on 
Travel ban 
Assets freeze 
 
1996—present 
     
14 Taliban resolution 1267 
(1999) 
1333 (2000) 
1390 (2002) 
1455 (2003) 
1526 (2004) 
1617 (2005) 
1735 (2006) 
1822 (2008) 
Individual or entity associated 
with Al-Qaida, Osama bin 
Laden and/or the Taliban 
Assets freeze 
Travel ban 
Arms embargo 
1999-current 
     
15 Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
1807 (31-03-08) 
1552 (2004) 
1596 (2005) 
1616 (2005) 
1654 (2006) 
1698 (2006) 
1771 (2007) 
1807 (2008) 
Sanctions Committee 
arms embargo, previously 
imposed by paragraph 20 of 
resolution 1493 and paragraph 
1 of resolution 1596 (2005) 
Travel ban, 
Consolidated Travel Ban and 
Assets Freeze list 
 
2004-current 
     
16 Côte 
d'Ivoire 
1572 (2004) 
1584 (2005)  
1643 (2005) 
1782 (29-10-07) 
 
Arms Embargo 
Travel ban 
Assets freeze 
Diamond sanctions 
Due to end on 31 October 
2008 
2004-current 
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17 Lebanon 1636 (31-10-05)  Travel ban 
Assets freeze 
The resolution individuals 
designated by the international 
independent investigation 
Commission or the 
Government of Lebanon as 
suspected of involvement in 
the 14 February 2005 terrorist 
bombing in Beirut, Lebanon 
that killed former Lebanese 
Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 
22 others. 
As of 26 January 2007, no 
individuals have been 
registered by the Committee. 
2005-current 
     
18 Democratic 
People's 
Republic of 
Korea 
(DPRK) 
1718 (14-10-06) The Security Council decided, 
inter alia, that the DPRK shall 
suspend all activities related to 
its ballistic missile programme; 
that it shall abandon all nuclear 
weapons and existing nuclear 
programmes; and that it shall 
abandon all other existing 
weapons of mass destruction 
and ballistic missile 
programmes in a complete, 
verifiable and irreversible 
manner 
Arms Embargo 
Assets freeze 
Travel ban 
 
2006-current 
     
19 The Islamic 
Republic of 
Iran 
1737 (23-12-06) 
1747 (2007) 
1803 (2008) 
 
A proliferation-sensitive nuclear 
and ballistic missile 
programmes-related embargo 
An export ban on arms and 
related materiel from Iran; and 
Individual targeted sanctions – 
namely, a travel ban, a travel 
notification requirement, and 
an assets freeze – on 
designated persons and 
entities. 
2006-current 
     
 
Table last update 03 October 2008 
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Annexure B United States Sanctions (last updated on 03/ 10/2008) 
  
No. OFAC Country 
Sanctions Programs 
Reason Last 
Updated 
IEEP
A 
 
1 Balkans Sanctions 
(since 2001)  
 
Extremists in the Republic 
of Macedonia and the 
Western Balkans  
03/04/2008 Y 
     
2 Belarus Sanctions  
(since 2006) 
For undermining 
democratic institutions 
human right abuse and 
certain members of 
government of Belarus. 
09/04/2008 Y 
     
3 Burma Sanctions  Burmese government's 
large scale repression of, 
and violence against, the 
democratic opposition. 
07/29/2008 N 
     
4 Cote d'Ivoire (Ivory 
Coast) Sanctions 
(since 2006) 
Blocking property of 
certain persons 
contributing to the conflict 
in Côte d'Ivoire. 
09/19/2006 Y 
     
5 Cuba Sanctions  Trading With The Enemy 
Act in response to certain 
hostile actions by the 
Cuban government. 
09/12/2008 N 
     
6 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo 
Sanctions 
Blocking property of 
certain persons 
contributing to the conflict. 
03/30/2007 N 
     
7 Iran Sanctions  
(since 1979)  
For the Iran hostage crisis 
and subsequent 
sponsorship of terrorism 
and its aggressive actions 
against non-belligerent 
shipping in the Persian 
Gulf. 
11/20/2007 Y 
     
8 Iraq Sanctions 
(since 2003)  
(since 2007) 
Targeted sanctions on 
former officials of the 
Ba'ath government of Iraq.  
Persons who threaten 
stabilization efforts in Iraq 
with violence. 
09/16/2008 Y 
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9 Former Liberian 
Regime of Charles 
Taylor Sanctions 
 
To deal with that threat, 
the order blocked all 
property and interests in 
property of senior 
members of the former 
Charles Taylor regime. 
Does not include current 
government. 
05/23/2007 N 
     
10 North Korea 
Sanctions  
(since 2008) 
Trading With the Enemy 
Act with respect to North 
Korea, effective June 27, 
2008. For risk of the 
proliferation weapon-
Usable fissile material.  
06/26/2008 Y 
     
11 Sudan Sanctions  
(since 1997) 
For policies and actions of 
the Government of Sudan, 
including continued 
support for international 
terrorism, ongoing efforts 
to destabilize neighbouring 
governments, and the 
prevalence of human 
rights violations, including 
slavery and the denial of 
religious freedom. 
07/31/2008 Y 
     
12 Syria Sanctions  
(since 2004) 
The actions of the 
Government of Syria in 
supporting terrorism, 
continuing its occupation 
of Lebanon, pursuing  
weapons of mass 
destruction and missile 
programs, and 
undermining United States 
and international efforts 
with respect to the 
stabilization and 
reconstruction of Iraq. 
07/10/2008 Y 
     
13 Zimbabwe Sanctions  
(since 2003) 
To members of the 
government of Zimbabwe, 
and its supporters to 
undermine democratic 
institutions and processes 
in Zimbabwe, President 
Bush issued Executive 
Order 13288 imposing 
sanctions against 
07/25/2008 Y 
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specifically identified 
individuals and entities in 
Zimbabwe. 
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Annexure C Past United State Sanctions 
 
No Archive of Inactive Sanctions Programs 
Past subjects of IEEPA emergencies 
Inactive Since: 
1 The first Iraq Sanctions Program (for invading Kuwait) Components still 
active in the Iraq 
II program 
   
2 Kuwait (while occupied by Iraq) 1990-1991 
   
3 Libya Sanctions Program (for sponsoring terrorism) 09/20/2004 
   
4 Taliban Program 07/02/2002 
   
5 Yugoslavia Program 05/28/2003 
   
6 Haiti 1994 
   
7 Liberia (for human rights violations) 2004 
   
8 Nicaragua (for aggressive activities in Central America) 1990 
   
9 Panama (for military coup by Manuel Noriega)  1990 
   
10 Serbia and Montenegro (for sponsoring Serb nationalist 
groups) 
2003 
   
11 Sierra Leone (for human rights violations) 07/29/2003 
   
12 South Africa (for maintaining apartheid) 1991 
   
13 UNITA (for interfering with UN peacekeeping efforts) 05/06/2003 
   
 
Annexure D United States Sanctions 
 
 OFAC List-Based Sanctions Programs Last Updated: 
   
1 Anti-Terrorism Sanctions 08/28/2008 
   
2 Diamond Trading Sanctions 05/21/2008 
   
3 Counter Narcotics Trafficking Sanctions 09/12/2008 
   
4 Non-proliferation Sanctions 09/17/2008 
   
5 Persons Undermining the Sovereignty of Lebanon or its 
Democratic Processes and Institutions 
11/05/2007 
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